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Abstract
The idea of choosing political representatives through elections has its origins in ancient times. More
recently, democratic values have been united with the concept of elected representative government. This
then places a great deal of importance on the system used to elect these representatives, since this system
must satisfy an impressive range of democratic values, as well as being effective and simple enough for
the voter to understand. The electoral system chosen will reflect those values and outcomes which those
who introduce the system wish to bring about. Sometimes this may be proportional representation, which
means seats allocated in direct pr..;;JOrtion to votes obtained, which often comes at the risk of unstable
coalition governments but that represents minority groups quite adequately. On the other hand, majority
rule by one major party (or coalition) may be sought through a plurality voting system (or first-past-thepost).

The alternative vote (AV), often called preferential voting, is an electoral system which combines
considerations of stable majority rule as well as the preferences of those who support minority party
views in society. This is done through the listing of preferences on the ballot paper, which enables those
whose first preferences arc eliminated from the count to still affect the final result. The AV has been
refined and implemented largely in Australia, both at a federal level to elect members to the House of
Representatives, and in most state lower houses. Outside of Australia the AV has been used very little.

This study looks at the AV in Australia, both in theory and in practice. The origins of election and
representative government are traced to provide a conceptual background to the study. Both the history
and outcomes of the AV are coverW at a federal level, as well as considering Western Australia as an
example of its use at a state level. /Jso considered is the optional variant of the AV, as is used in the state
lower houses of New South Wales and Queensland. This study uses focus groups as the methodological
tool with which to detennine: firstly, how well the AV is understood by West Australian voters; and
secondly, what these voters think of this system as a method of electing their representatives to the
Legislative Assembly in Western Australia.

The outcomes of the AV, in both Western Australia and the Commonwealth, have sometimes been
different than those who introduced the system anticipated. Most predictable, and indeed one of the main
reasons behind it's introduction, has the been the prevention of vote-splitting between non-Labor
groupings. This, however, has proved more effective on a federal level than in Western Australia. Other
outcomes include the fonnation of a stable two-party system of politics, and the election of candidates
and governments which have the support of an absolute majority of voters. The AV has also sustained
the presence of some minor parties, particularly the National (formerly Country) Party. Interesting, and
less predictable in earlier years, is the way in which the AV has facilitated a 'politics of the centre' in the
Australian context. In recent times, preferences have become more important in determining election
2

outcomes, as the number of minor panics and independents contesting lower house seats in Australia
increases, and also as the number of votes for major parties decreases.

Finally, the focus group research uncovered a marked lack of understanding of the AV amongst voters in
Western Australia. 1hus a primary recommendation arising from this study is that better civic educatior.
is required to ensure that the AV is used to its full potential by voters, which will then achieve fully one of
the original intentions behind it's introduction· to negate the effect of the 'wasted vote'.
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CHAPTER ONE: AN OVERVIEW

Introduction
Voting is a concept which nearly every person in today's world understands, and an activity in which
many participate.

The majority of nations in the world use voting as a means to elect political

representatives. Liberal democratic governments today are representative democracies, with election
being the central institution through which representatives are chosen. Elections then are an integral part

of representative government.

It is here however, that the similarity ends. The method by which elections are enacted have been many

and varied. Electoral systems are largely a product of the state or polity in which they are implemented,
reflecting the values and assumptions inherent within the wider political society.

Since the birth of

modem representative government in the 17th and 18th centuries, political theorists have debated which
voting systems best represent voters. Election outcomes do not only depend on popular votes, but also on
the rules used. It is a question of how the votes are compiled and seats allocated. Often it is not clear
how electoral rules will work, with governments adopting rules in expectation of certain results and then
experiencing outcomes different from those predicted. This is where a more systematic study of electoral
laws and their consequences can become important and useful

A vast array of literature exists which critically examines the roots, characteristics, and outcomes of
almost any given voting system in use around the world. However, the alternative vote (AV) (known
more commonly as prefcrentia.l voting), a system largely refmed and implemented almost exclusively in
Australia, has tended to escape the analysis afforded more commonly used voting systems.

This study luoks at the AV, both in theory and in practice. The history and effects of this voting system
will be examined at a federal level in Australia, and also at a state level using Western Australia as the
principal, though not exclusive, example. The term 'alternative vote' (AV) will be used throughout the
study rather than the more commonly used term 'preferential voting', in order to avoid confusion with a
host of other voting systems which incorporate the transfer of preferences.

Preferential voting systems
The wide range of voting systems used in the democratic world can be divided into two basic types. The
British system is based on a plurality system commonly called 'firsl·pRSt·the-post' (FPP). The European
tradition has

mon~

examples of varieties of proportional representation (PR). Preferential voting systems
10

are a variant of the plurality or 'first-past-the-post' voting method. All the three of the major forms of
preferential voting were developed or refined in Australia. The first of these is the AV, which is now the
most common form of preference voting in Australia, hence the interchangeable use of the two terms.
Appendix 1 shows a typology of preferential voting systems, breaking them down into several basic
categories. The first listed below - the AV with compulsory preference marking - is the voting system
expressly considered by this study.

1. The Alternative Vole (compulsory preferences/ full preferential)
Under the AV system, voters rank their choice of candidates in order of preference, exhausting all
options.

Used in single-member constituencies, a candidate who gains an absolute majority of first

preference votes is elected. In the situation where no candidate has a majority, the candidate with the
lowest amount of votes is elinUnated, their ballot examined, and the second preferences are re-allocated to
the remaining candidates in the order they appear on this ballot.

This process is repeated until one

candidate has un absolute majority and is declared elected. The AV is u~ed for all lower house electiom;
at the Federal, State and territory levels in Australia, excepting Tasmania and the Australian Capital
Territory (Queensland and New South Wales now feature optional preference marking- see below).

2. The Alternative Vote (optional preferences/ optional preferential}
Optional preferential is a varia.-1t of full preferential voting, where voters are not required to exhaust all
choices on the IJallot.

This type of ballot was the one recommended by the Western Australian

Commission on Government (COG} (1995, pp. 310-313). It was introduced for a short time in WAin

1907, although soon abandoned for a system of compulsory (exhaustive) preferential voting in 1911. It
was introduced in NSW in 1981, and in Queensland in 1992. There is some confusion over its use in
Victoria between 1907- 1911, with Goat citing this as incorrect (1985, p. 222) but Reilly (2001, p. 93}
supporting others (Hughes and Graham, 1968; and Parliament, 1983}. Also, in some sources, optional
preferential voting is ambiguously coupled with the contingent vote (Goot, 1985, p. 221}. What may
cause this confusion is that all examples of the contingent vote to date have featured optional preference
marking (Reilly, 2001, p. 94}.

The AVis divided (see Appendix 1) into optional or compulsory marking.

Since the AV is essentially divided into these two types, this study would not be complete without
looking at the optional fonn which is covered in Chapter Seven.

3. The Contingent Vote
The contingent vote was used in Queensland between 1892 - 1942, and in NSW between 1926 - 1928, but
has now been abandoned in Australia (although increasingly used elsewhere}. As with the AV system,
any candidate who receives an absolute majority of first preference votes is elected.

Failing this the

process changes, with all candidates, other than the two leaders, being eliminated and their preferences re·
distributed to the two leaders, thus ensuring a majority winner. While superficially similar to the AV, this
method has quite different antecedents atd delivers quite different results (Reilly, 2001, p. 82}.

II

4. The Alternative Vote in Multi-member Districts
Occasionally the AV has been utilised in multi-member districts. The Australian Senate used this form of
voting from 1919 until 1948 when the STV (see b::low) was introduced. South At!stralia also used this
form of voting for its lower house elections between 1929 and 1935. In 1936 South Australian lower
house electorates were divided into single-member districts which then used the AV proper. Outside of
Australia, British Columbia used the AV in multi-member districts for a short time in the 1952 and 1954
elections, although the process was complicated due to the AV being used in single-member districts
simultaneously.

As it is, the process is quite complicated in multi-member districts. In two-member

electorates the count to produce the setond successful candidate involves returning to the first preference
votes. The elected candidate's votes are transferred according to the setond preferences shown. If no
absolute majority emerges, then the preference allocation again starts with the exclusion of the candidate
with the fewest votes, and continues until a second absolute majority is obtained. A similar process is
used, if necessary, to produce the third and subsequent members. The AV is no longer used in muhimember electorates in Australia and this form is not considered in this study.

5. The Single Transferable Vote
Finally, there is the Single Transferable Vote (STV), and its Australian variant Hare Clark. This form of
proportional representation is used for elections t.o the feder81 Senate, the lower House in Tasmania, the
unicameral ACT Legislative Assembly, and to upper houses in New South Wales, South Australia, and
Western

A~1stralia.

The STV is quite unlike other forms of preferential voting, using multi-member

electorates and a quota system which includes some distribution of preferences for election of candidates.
This form of voting is not the focus of this study (and will therefore not be covered in any detail in its
own right), the focus being the AV form of preferential voting which was developed as an adaption of the
STV to enable its use in single, rather than multi-member, constituencies.

The Concept of Representation
In order tC' gain fuller insight into a particular voting system such as the AV, it is useful to understand
better the history behind the more general concept of representation and its intersection with election as a
form of choosing representatives.

The following chapter examines th~ history of representation and

election, and how these two institutions were united to serve democratic principles.

Institutions and

political theories about representation which had their embryonic beginnings in the middle ages, and even
more practical roots in ancient civilisations, were adapted to modem democn:tic •.heory and practice by
reformers beginning in the 17th century. In countries where the practice of electing representatives had
existed since medieval times, democratic reformers saw an opportunity to convert parliaments and
legislative bodies into more truly representative institutions that would serve democrntic purposes.
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In

1820 James Stuart Mill described "the system of representation" as "the grand
times" (Dahl, 1998, p. 104).

discove~

of modem

The two main concepts that emerged out of this period in political history

are the basis on which modem represemative government is constructed. The first one is the idea of an
elected representative as an independent policy maker, and the concept of a representative assembly as a
public authority deriving its legitimacy from the fact that its members have gone through an e\ectior.
process, even though they have no obligation to take instructions from their electors. The other is the
radical notion that sovereignty rests with the people

M

the theory that in the middle ages was 'driven

underground', and later resurrected by theorists such as John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, JeanMJacques
Rousseau, James Stuart Mill, James Madison, and Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes.

It was through the ideas of these men that the idea of representative government became linked with the

idea of democracy, and the values of liberty, justice, as well as majority rule. Thus representation as we
know it today - that is, the idea of some humans representing others in politics

M

is an essentially modem

concept. Ancient Greeks, for example, had no theory about this, although in practice used representation
in their everyday political activities (Pitkin, 1967, p. 241).

This failure to recognise representational

theory within their institutions is what Eulau (Eulau & Walke, 1978, p. 37) claims was partly responsible
for their eventual failure. In the middle ages, members of parliament gradually came to be thought of as
representatives, while still having nothing to do with elections or democratic rights.

In England,

parliamentary representation gradually began to be used as a device for furthering local interests, as a
control over the power of the king. By the 17th century the idea of political rights and the right to elect
members of Parliament began to gain momentum in England, and the culmination of this trend was the
French and American revolutions which enshrined the right to elect representatives as one of the
inalienable 'rights of Man'. As Pitkin (1967, p. 3) argued, "Thus representation came to mean popular
representation, and to be linked with the idea of self-government, of every man's right to have a say in
what happens to him. And that is how it came to be embodied in our institutions."

Representative govemmt::nt has only been accepted as a form of democratic government for a relatively
short time.

In the late 18th century, a g'JVerrunent organised al0ng repr(:sentative lines was seen as

differing radically from democracy, wherf;as today it passes for a form thereof (Manin, 1997, p. 4).
Contemporary democratic governments which rely on representative institutions to function efficiently
have evolved from a political system that was conceived by its founders to be somethipg quite different
from democracy. What we call today representative democracy has its origins in a sy.~tem of institutions,
established in the wake of the English, French, and American revolutions, that was in no way initially
seen as a form of democracy or of government by the people (Manin, 1997, p. I).

Practical applications

of representation go as far back as ancient Greek and Roman civilisations, as outlined in Chapter Two,
although normative theories of political representation were not formulated until quite recently in
comparison.

13

Representation and Elections in Theory
1. The Role of Election in Representational Theory
Liberal democracy, based upon the idea of government by consent,

actually "implies a system of

representative democn:cy. in which the right to exercise government power is acquired through success in
elections" (Heywood, 1992, p. 281). Elections are an integral part of the representational process, since
elections are the means by which representatives are chosen and legitimised. This means for revolutionary
yet bloodless change is what Hampton (1995, p. 391) terms "controlled revolutionary activity." In this

way representatives are made accountable for their decisions, harking back to the arguments inherent in
the social contract theories of Plato, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, and Rousseau.

However, rather than

surrendering all power to the representative ruler as envisioned by Hobbes, democratic societies retain the
right expounded by Locke to depose any

r~presentative

who does not govern as the public demands.

Locke, arguing against Hobbes, claimed that people had a right to "resume their original Liberty" in cases
of legislative abuse of power, implying the possibility of people monitoring the performance of their
representatives (Maddox, 1996, p. 395).

It is understandfl.ble then, that in liberal democratic theory, great attention has been devoted to the rules
governing the electoral process, and especially the methods used to convert votes into seats. John Stuart
Mill advocated the "highly practical employment of scientific intellect, to improve the mechanics of
government and the formulae for political representation" (Phillips, 1995, p. ll4). This sentiment has
been fulfilled in Australia, a country where democratic institutions have been in continuous existence for
most of its federal history, and where extensive electoral law reform has played an important part in the
search for new and better ways to represent the people.

This was relatively easy in Australia, as

compared to an older civilisation such as England, partly due to the absence of a powerful, entrenched,
conservative class (Aitkin & Jinks, 1985, p. 123). Both federally and at a state level, electoral law
reformers have introduced, modified and discarded an impressive array of voting systems. One of these
experiments was the AV.

Another interesting Australian anomaly is t~e variety of electoral systems

between the Commonwealth and the States, there being no uniform system. The AV, either optional or
exhaustive, is one of!he more widely used electoral systems within Australia.

In Australia currently there is renewed debate over both principles and practice of representation, as
changes which have come about in 20th century politics impact fully on political systems around the
world on the cusp of the 21st century. In some ways representation of populations became more fully
realised early in the 20th century with nearly universal suffiage. Other changes such as the extension of
government activities and the increasing dominance of the executive branch of govenuncnt have made
represer..tatives more distant, highlighted by the growing gap between political elites and m<:.ss opinion.
The rise of one party states and totalitarian systems have demonstrated how representative principles and
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institutions can be the very antithesis of democracy. Ont- of the most important developments has been
the jy-owtb of party politics, which has radically changed the way representation functions in modem
democracies like Australia.

The complexity of representation in contemporary liberal democracits means that one should not be
surprised that political analysts have not been able to generate a unified or cohesive political theory of
representation in the Australian context (Uhr, 1998, p. 120). Within the literature of political theory there
are any number of competing yet plausible accounts of the ends and purposes of representation.

What becomes obvious in any analysis of a political system is that the boundaries a1~d issues regarding
representation are neither stmightforward nor permanent. The study of the AV in this thesis will illustrate
how a particular voting system has its own inherent assumptions about the purposes and outcomes of
representation.

Thus the study of an Australian electoral system such as the AV is useful to come to some conclusions
about representation in Australia.

A brief review of the literature on electoral systems will provide a

starting point for this, thus placing the A V into context within the wider range of electoral systems and
theory.

2. The History or the Literature on Modern Eledoral Systems
In 1859, Thomas Hare presented a proposal for a new electoral system for Great Britian and Ireland. His
proposal was prompted by John Stuart Mi!l's theories on representative government, set out in his

Considerations on Represcntatiw Govemment (1861). In short, Mill arb>ued against the representation of
geographic constituencies which is inherent in plurality systems, especially those used in single-member
districts (of which the AV is one). Mill's view of legislators was that they are elected to address national
concerns &nd should be chosen on the basis of their conformity to voters' viewpoints on the issues of the
day. Thus any electoral system that confi,,cs voters' choices to those candidates who are running in their
electorate falls short of the ideal representational electoral system.

The Hare system that Mill

recommended was in its essentials what we know now as the single transferable vote (STV), commonly
known as proportional representation (PR). While Mill's dissertation was not really an empirical study
but rather a philosophical statement, it is important because the subsequent 'first generation' of empirical
studies of electoral systems "unabashedly took sides in the dispute over whether proportional
representation or the Anglo·Sax.on system of plurality was the 'best' system" (Taagepcra & Shugart,
1989, p. 48).

In a book published in 1926 titled Proportional Represemativn, Hoag and Hallet presented examples of
numerous anomalies which can result from plurality systems. Much attention was paid to the 'wasting' of
15

votes under these systems. The AV was considered by them to be the 'best' of the plurality systems, but
still inferior to the 'worst' form ofPR- this being the list system (Taagepera & Shugart, \989, p. 48).
Other books in the same tradition are Lakeman and Lambert's Voting in Democracies (1955) and
Lakeman's Huw Democracies Vote (1974).

On the other h3nd, Hermens, in Democra'y or Anarchy ( 1941 ), was probably the most virulent critic of
PR. He argued that the use of PR leads to anarchy through the proliferation of political parties, and
eventually to dictatorship. He extolled the virtues of the British plurality electoral system in providing
stable two-party govenunent.

These books are examples of just of some of the more prominent arguments between the proponents of
plurality and PR (although mainly the use of STV) voting systems. These arguments will be further
illustrated in the following chapters when discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the AV.
Mentioned above was the prominent role that the development of political parties in the twentieth century
has played in politics of representation and electoral systems.

In 1951 ( 1954 in English) Maurice

Duverger published probably the most seminal work to date regarding electoral systems, political parties
and representation. His work, Political Parties, prompted questions regarding the interaction of parties
and representation which are still being debated today by political scientists. Simply put, his theory is
that the political world is dualistic by nature and that this dualism is reinforced by plurality elections
which polarise electoral choice between two parties. PR on the other hand, undermines this dualism by
multiplying political choices and sustaining the presence of many parties.

Two important questions

which he raised were; firstly, what are the effects upon the party system of a change in electoral system;
and second, to what extent are voters influenced by the electoral system through the psychological effect?
Many published works on electoral systems since the 1950's have attempted to explore one of these
questions (for instance, J. G. Grumm, 1958; Rokkan, 1970; Sartori, 1968; Fisher, 1973; Nohlen, 1984).
Duverger concentrates on the m'Jst common electoral methods and does not expressly consider the type of
preferential

v.:~ting,

the AV, which we use here in Australia. He does however, deal with the use of the

second or 'run-off' ballot in single-member constituencies, which is well known for its use in France. It
was also briefly used in New South Wales from 1910 to 1918. While these differ from the AV in several
ways, they do have important similarities, and the conclusions he draws are applicable to the Australian
use of the AV.

In Australia certainly, 'Duverger's law' seems to hold true. Plurality electoral systems such as the AV in
federal and state lower houses has tended to promote the two-party system, while on the other hand PR
(used in the federal Senate and most state upper houses) has tended to promote the representation of
minor parties. Furthermore, Duverger argues that with the second ballot (not unlike the AV) one would
expect splits or 'proliferati'Jn' of the major parties unless such parties were already extremely well and
16

tightly organised. Rydon (1968a, pp. 190-191) finds this argument applicable to Australia. The party
organisation would seem to be a detennlning factor in the working of the AV. For example, the rigid
organisation of the ALP has tended to prevent the multiplicity of candidates one would expect under the
AV. When splits do occur the party tends to be tom asunder, with great hostility resulting in lack of
preference exchanges. T!1e less rigid discipline of the non-Labor parties enables them to make better use
of the AV, espedally the National (formerly Country) Party (see Chapters Three and Four).

Duverger's second assumption regarding the psychological effect of plurality voting systems seems to be
largely supported by the fmdings of the research conducted through the focus groups, documented in
Chapter Six. Duverger proposed that as voters became aware over time that voting for a minor party in a
two party system meant an implied 'wasting 'of votes, they then would refrain from voting for these
parties, thus further reinforcing the two-party system. It is interesting that this persists even although one
of the intentions behind the introduction of the AV in Australia was to negate the effects of the 'wasted'
vote.

A watershed in the comparative study of electoral systems was Douglas Rae's book, The Political

Consequences of Electoral Laws (1967). He primarily considered how electoral laws affect competition
b:::tween political parties. One of his conclusions which is relevant for this study is that both PR and
plurality electoral systems produce manufactured legislative majorities which lend legitimacy, or what
some would call a mandate, to the winning party. Building upon Rae's work, Ujphart (1984; 1999) found
that fewer majorities were manufactured under PR systems, than under plurality systems.

This

manufacturing of majorities is generally considered a positive thing by most commentators since
normative theories of democracy, widely accepted in our society, suggest that government should be
supported by a majority of voters. However, critics counter that manufactured majorities violate the
principle of majority rule since power goes to a party which more people voted against than for, and thus
creates the illusion of a mandate when none exists.

In conclusion, another work with some relevance for the Austra!it:r1 system of preferential voting is Katz's

findings, documented in A Theory of Parties and Electoral Syslems ( 1980). In this work Katz asserted
that intraparty preference voting provides for less of a team orientation within parties, especially given
that most of the turnover in legislative seats in systems with preference voting occurs within parties and
not between them. The failure of the AV in the Australian context to encourage any large sca1e multiple
endorsements by parties within electorates (discussed in Chapter Four) reflects both the cohesiveness and
discipline of Australian political parties, and a two-party system which discourages ideological
extremism. Katz bases his findings on the assumption that parties in r. two-party system will converge
ideologically, while parties under a PR system will have to accentuate their differences in order to
differentiate themselves from parties on either side of them on the ideological scale. It is certainly true
that a two-pnrty system in Australia, along with the use of the AV, has led the two major parties to
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become closer over time on the ideological scale, and has facilitated a 'politics of the centre' in Australia,
in which all political parties are drawn toward the centre of the political spectrum.

While the above review covers just some of the studies more relevant to this particular research on the
A V, they do provide a fairly general literature review of some of the seminal works on electoral systems
and representation. Their findings provide a conceptnal framework for an analysis of the AV in Australia.

Representation and elections in practice: The AV in Australia
1. History
Preferential voting, of which the AV is one variant, has its beginnings in 'run-off systems of voting
conunonly called the 'second ballot'.

These types of elections allow for a run-off between the top two

·candidates when no candidate has an absolute majority on the first ballot. These kinds of elections are
still used today in France to elect the president, and for presidential eledons in various other countries.
Used very briefly in NSW (1910-1918), it was abandoned in favour of preferential voting proper (the AV)
(Goot, 1985, p. 222). The second ballot shares all the main advantages of the AV, these being: they
encourage candidates to broaden their support base in search of a majority; they limit the impact of votesplitting; and they manufacture majority support for one candidate (Reilly, 2001, p. 80). The AV
however, can be considered a further refinement of the second ballot, in that it does away with some of
the problems associated with run-off elections. For example, run-off elections require parties to follow
one exhaustive election campaign with another. An AV system requires only one election, and ballots
can be later re-examined for information if necessary. Electoral refonners in the 19th century tleveloped
the idea of a preferential voti11g system (later refined to the AV in Australia) to capitalise upon the
advantages of run-off elections, while retaining the simplicity of one-off elections.

The first serious

proposal for applying a preferential ballot to national elections was put forward in 1856 by Thomas Hare
in Britian (as mentioned above), and Carl Andrae in Denmark as part of a new fonn of proportional
representation, the STV (Reilly, 2001, p. 80). However, it was Australian refonners who developed the
AV as we know it today.

The AV was developed by electoral st.-ategists as an adaption of the STV for use in single-member
constituencies. The first documented method of this reworking of STV appears to have been by Professor
Ware of Harvard in 1871. He demonstrated that the transfer of preferences in order to find the most
preferred candidate could work just as well in single-member constituencies as it did in Hare's complex
scheme of proportional representation, which was developed for multi-member constituencies.

The AV system, which was not yet in use anywhere else in the world, was suggested by reformers for the
House of Representatives during the framing of the Australian constitution in the 1890's. The first

18

Electoral Bill presented to the new federal Parliament in 1902 provided for AV in the lower House, and
STV in th~ Senate. In spite of the perceived benefits of these choices however, conservative opinion held
sway, and the systems of AV and STV were deleted during the passage of the bill, to be replaced with
ftrst-past-the-post systems for both Houses. The issue was not laid to rest however. Bills for AV were
introduced by the Dealcin government in 1906 and a Liberal member in 1911, both of which failed.

In

1915 the Royal Commission into Commonwealth Electoral lAw and Administration also supported the
adoption of preferential voting, i.e. the AV, in the House of Representatives. The AV was perceived by
its proponents to give better representation of 'all shades of political opinion' in society, which was later
noted by Lhose on the Joint Select Committee on Electoral Reform in 1983 (Parliament, 1983, p. 8).

When the AV was finally introduced for elections to the House of Representatives in 1918, it was more a
political choice than anything else, based upon considerations of partisan advantage (this is outlined more
fully in Chapter Three). As for outside Australia, the AV has not been popular, in 5pite of its simplicity
and fairness, probably because its introduction would enhance the power and position of minor parties
more so than under a straight plurality system (Aitkin & Jinks. 1985, pp. 125-126}.

Other than Australia, the A V has been tried briefly in a handful of other places, the most notable being the
Canadian provinces of Alberta (1926-1955}, British Columbia (1952-1954), and Manitoba (1927-1936)
(see table in Appendix 1} with Alberta and Manitoba using it in rural electorates only.

While these

experiences are at times mentioned in this study, the main focus will be on the Australian experience with
the AV, since this is where it has been used most extensively.

This study will also look closely at the use of the AV in Western Australia, as an insight into the
functioning of the AV at a state level.

In spite of attempts to install a system of AV in the federal

Parliament sooner, the AV was first introduced in the Western Australian State Parliament by the
Electoral Act of 1907. Discussed in Chapter Four, the history and consequences of the AV in Wes1em
Aus1ralia so far have been only sparsely documented, and usually dealing only with representation at a
federal level. As John Uhr (2000, p. 4) points out, while Australian developments in electoral practice
attract international attention, there remain many gaps in the scholarly investigation of Australian law,
policy, and history on elections. He concludes that:
International attention is directed to the Australian approach to electoral fWrness through a
combination of preferential and proportional voting, both subject to the distinctive
Australian requirements of compulsory voting. But more needs to be known about the
policy and purpose behind these distinctive Australian practices. (p. 4)
This provides a sound rationale for studies such as this one, which look at distinctively Australian
electoral practices through analysis of their history and outcomes.

19

2. Outcomes
This study will also look at the effects of the AV within the Australian context, and whether the same in
Western Australia (at a state level) as at a federal leveL Use of the AV has mostly ensured the election of
governments which enjoy the

m~~:iority

of electoral support, avoiding the possibility that a party supported

by a minority of electors will gain a majority in parliament and form government. However, it enables
the votes of these minorities to still be utilised, thus sustaining the presence of some minor parties. It has
also enabled coalitions to form between parties with similar ideological views, without their votes
working against each other.

These have ::~.11 come together to produce what Reilly (2001, p 78-79)

considers the most important effect of this method of voting; its moderating, consensual influence upon
Australian politics. By encouraging parties to look outside their immediate support bases for potential
secondary support, the AV has tempered some of the more 'zero-sum' aspects of Australia's majoritarian
electoral politics, making elections above all a search for the political middle ground, thus encouraging a
degree of 'consensual' practice which moderates what is otherwise considered a highly adversarial
political culture.

As a direct result of this, parties in Australia tend to be broad based, converging

ideologically in the centre of the political spectrum, with extreme candidates and issues relegated to the
margins of Australian politics.

It is true also that, as votes for the major parties have declined in recent years, preference votes under the
AV system have become increasingly important in determining election outcomes. It is now common for
minor parties and independents to detennine election outcomes via their preferences. This phenomena
has

encour~ged

major parties to court the interests of minor parties, particularly the Greens, the Australian

Democrats, and One Nation. However, these minor parties generally do not win seats in their own right

in the lower house, since their support is spread over many electorates and concentrated support in one
electorate is necessary _to gain a seat in single-member constituencies. This factor is seen by some as a
faiJlng of the AV, in that it does not allow for accurate representation in parliament of a minority, or
minor party, for which support is spread over many districts. In this way, by obtaining minorities in many
electorates, a party can obtain a parliamentary majority out of proportion to its gross electoral mnjority
(Sawer, 1987, pp. 69~70).

However, as the volitical climate in Australia becomes more volatile, and the numbers of minor party and
independent candidates contesting lower house seats increases at every election, the AV system is just
beginning to deliver results which more accurately mirror the large number of primary votes allocated to
these candidates. For example, on both a federal level and in Western Australia, independents elected
increase at every lower house election., and tend to overtake major party candidates due to preference
distribution.

Now, more than ever before, are major parties reminded of their vulnerability to the

preference flows of minor party and independent ballots.

Furthermore, this trend tends to be more

pronounced under systems of optional A V (particularly in Queensland), in which voters are not required
to vote for aU candidates, and can thus ignore the major parties altogether when allocating preferences.
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3, The AV and Voters
The final aim of this study is to detennine exactly how the West Australian voting public understand and
perceive the AV. This research has been limited to Western Australia, since this is the state which has
been the main focus of this study, and furthennore suits the time and resources available to this
researcher. Further studies conducted in the same manner would be advantageous to test the hypothesis
that other Australian states would yield similar results regarding understanding and perception oft he AV.
This analysis is achieved through data colleL1ed from focus group interviews which also includes
respondents filling out an anonymous questionnaire. Chapter Five looks more closely at this choice of
methndology, while Chapter Six documents the results of the research. Public awareness is an extremely
important part of any voting system since it is the voters who, in the end, must use the system to gain their
desired representntion in Parliament. No amount of theorising about an electoral system is beneficial
unless the system is utilised by a voting population who understand the system properly and are able to
use it to its full potential.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORY OF REPRESENTATION AND ELECTION

Representation in Antiquity
1. The Greeks

The ancient Greeks had a number of institutions and practices which we would today consider

representative, although as Pitkin (1967, p. 241) points out, they themselves bad no concept of, or word
for, this essentially modem political idea. It is for this very reason that many commentators on

representation ignore the Greeks (and other civilisations of antiquity scch as the Romans), when looking
for the roots oft he idea of political representation (for P.xample see: Birch, 1972).

Today, when we distinguish between representative and direct democracy we usually imagine that in

th~

!Ptter all important political powers w:::re exercised by the assembled people. Closer examination of the
institutional system used in ancient Athens renders this false. Even apart from the magistrates, three
institutions other than the Assembly, namely the Council, the courts, and the nomothetai, exercised
political functions of the first importance. The peoples' courts and the Council merit particular attention
because both institutions played a key part throughout the history of the Athenien democracy. Certain
powers of the courts even belonged to what was regarded as decisive power; that is, the ability to overturn
decisions of the Assembly. In this way then, the populace did not wield all power. Certain important
powers and even a portion of the decisive power belonged to institutions that were in fact, and perceived
to be, other than directly democratic. These institutions were what we would tenn representative.

For the Greeks, representation was a means of limiting rather than extending the participation of citizens
in government.

The boule, or Council, was the main representative machinery within the city-state,

which constituted a cross section of the citizen body (Phillips, 1975, p. 29).

While in Athens the

assembled people were an institution in themselves, unlike modem representative governments they did
not perform aU aspects of governance. Certain functions were perfonned by officials elected by Jot. Lot
has not been used in any fonn of representative government in the last two centuries. Just recently the
idea of lot has been rethought (for an example see Fishkin and his ideas on Citizen Initiated Referenda,
1991), but for a long time has had no place in political culture of modem societies. Although ridiculed by
Socrates, it appears that Atheniens still considered the advantages to be greater than the disadvantages
(Martin, 1997, p. 10).

This random lottery was used to select the Council or Senate, and also other public officials, juries, and
administrative bodies. The only exceptions were roles requiring specific skills, such as military offices
and officials of public works. In this way, similar to our selection of jurors today, random citizens were
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chosen regardless of knowledge or political skill, to probe in depth important public issues and to also try
political leaders. It is interesting to note that the decisions or opinions of the Assembly (the paradigm of
direct democracy) were considered by the Athenian:; to be subordinate to the political decisions of this
group of jurors, selected by lot, who were empowered as representatives of the rest of the citizenry to
explicitly reconsider and overturn the decisions of the Assembly (Fishkin, 1991, pp. 86-91).

Tl:e Athenien democracy entrusted to citizens drawn by lot most of the functions not performed by the
popular Assembly (ekklesia).

This applied mainly. to the magistracies (arch!U).

There were several

restrictions placed upon the posts to guard ag~~'nst corruption and incompetence (Manin, 1997, pp. 12-17).
Members of the Council (boule) were elso appointed by Jot (Manin, 1997, pp. 17-18). Also, the he\iastai
was chosen every year by lot from a pool of volunteers thirty years or older. Members of the courts were
recruited from this group. These courts performed important political functions (Manin, 1997, pp. 18-22).
In the 4th century, a further body appointed by lot was the nomothetai. This body performed legislative
action after the oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 404. So, in the 4th century legislative decisions were in
the hands of an organ distinct from the Assembly and appointed by lot (Manln, 1997, pp. 22-23).

While it may appear to the contemporary observer that selection of citizens by lot to fill these roles could
compromise democratic principles, democracy was preserved through several means. Firstly, rotation in
office (Manb, 1997, pp. 28-32) was very important to the Atheniens as a method of limiting abuses of
power. Also. the absence or restriction of professionals or experts in political roles demonstrated a
healthy distrust of professionalism (Manin, 1997, pp. 32-34). Finally, the principle of equality was
evident in political thought and process at the time (Manin, 1997, pp. 34-41), although there was some
contention over what kind of equality was at stake.

Two conclusions made by Manin about ancient Greeks (1997, p. 41) throw up some interesting thoughts
for those considering representation today.

Firstly, in ancient Athens the assembled people did not

exercise all power. which technically makes some part of their government representative. However, the
tact that modem representative governments have never used lot to assign political power shows that the
difference between the representative system and direct systems has to do with the method of selection

rather than with the lintited number of those selected. That is, what makes a system representative is not
the fact that a few govern in the place of the people, but that they are:. ·lccted by election only. Secondly,
selection by lot was not a peripheral institution for the Greeks, but it embodied a number of fundamental
democratic values. Even though they could not explain how it was so, democrats had the intuition that
elections did not guarantee the same equality. We can conclude then, that election has an important place
not only in facilitating representative .government, but is also part of its definition.

2. The Romans
Like the Greeks, the Romans conducted a great deal of business through representative insl:itutions. They
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differed from the Greeks however. in that election was the main method of appointing representatives,
while lot was used in a limited way in the assembly (comitia).

The Romans had a mixed constitution, a combination of monarchic, aristocratic and democratic features.
The popular assembly (comitia) constituted the democratic element of government; the mhgistrates in
general and consul the monarchical element; and the Senate the aristocratic element. The three powers
balanced and checked each other, not unlike the three anns of government traditionally used as balances
and checks in the Westminster style of government.

Unlike Greeks, Romans did not use lot for its egalitarian properties. In the census based Roman republic.
lot had the effect of drawing votes together and promoting political cohesion, first among the propertied
classes and then among the people as a whole, because of its neutrality and also the religious
interpretation that was placed upon it (Manin, 1997, p. 51).

3. Other Examples of Representation in Antiquity

The use of lot as a method of appointing representatives was not confined to the Greeks and Romans.
The ltalian Republics of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance often chose magistrates by lot. Similarly
in Florence, the intellectual centre of civic humanism and republican renewal, the selection of magistrates
by lot was a key institution of the republican system. Florence is especially interesting for study today
since for a while, while vacillating between the use of lot and election, there was some debate about the
respective merits of the two methods of appointment. Having introduced lot to combat factionalism, the
Florentines ended up rediscovering, through experience, the idea of the Athenian democrats that lot is
more democratic than election.

This sentiment influenced later developments of republican thought,

especially in England and the United States. There is reason to believe that the theorists and political
actors of the 17th and 18th centuries, who were familiar with the Florentine republican experiment, lalew
that the belief in the aristocratic nature of elections was not unique to Greek political culture (Manin,
1997, p. 63).

Venice, the 'Most Serene Republic', whose stability gave it an almost mythic status, also practiced a
fonn of lot until its fall in 1797. However, election was still the dominant fonn of appointment. In fact,
Venice was seen by 17th and 18th century observers as the archetype of the elective republic. They had
perfected an extraordinarily complicated and subtle system for appointing magistrates that became
famous among political thinkers all over Europe. Venice's reputation as a paradigm of elective
government seemed to suggest to these observers that somehow a link existed between republican success
and the use of election. This view was also reinforced by the longevity of the Roman Republic, in which,
as already mentioned, election was also the dominant fonn.

24

The Evolution of Modern Representative Government
1. The Middle Ages
It was in medieval times that the early elements of modern representative government emerged, although

once again it must be pointed out that nonnative theories about political institutions usually are not

formulated until long after the actual practice has embedded itself in political institutions. Thus, coherent

theories of political representation did not emerge until a long time after the development of
parliamentary bodies in England and elsewhere in the 13th and 14th centuries.

However, there is evidence that there was some development of theories about the origins of political

authority. The ascendiflg theory held that political authority originated with the people and was delegated

by them to leaders and monarchs. In contrast, those that subscribed to a descending theory felt that the
authority of some men over others could only be regarded as legitimate if it were divinely

sanctio~::::!.

Monarchs, rulers and spiritual leaders were God's representatives, ruling over his people (Birch, 1972, pp.
23-24). This was the theory which became widely accepted while the ascending theory was 'driven
underground', largely due to the dominant influence of the Christian church in medieval Europe
(Ullmann, 1965, p. l3).

The development of representative institutions in medieval Europe was more a result of the financial and
administrative needs of kings, rather than any coherent theory of the political right of citizens to choose or
influence government

For example, variants of the ascending theory were often used to condone

authorities freeing themselves from the influence of the Church, or imposing taxation on their subjects
(Birch, 1972, p. 24).

Thus, it was in the Middle Ages that representative institutions were first established as part of the
machinery of secular government, although not yet as any fonn of representative government. European
medieval parliaments contained the first seeds of modern representative institutions, in that they allowed
commoners to come as agents on behalf of their constituencies and present their grievances, and also act
as a channel of communication between ruler and subjects (Birch, 1972, pp. 27-29). However, it wasn't
until after the decline of feudalism, and a more repressive 'Age of Absolutism', that ideas like these fully
flourished into modern representative government.

2. The Emergence of the Idea of Popular Sovereignty

The concept of popular sovereignty which has its origins in theories such as the ascending theory
mentioned above, is the idea that political authority originates from the people and is ultimately held by
those people. It is a principle which those of us who today live in Western, democratic societies take for
granted, largely since it is the basis for our whole society and system of (representative) government. As
recently as the 17th century however, it was a new and mdical idea. The following is a very simplified
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overview of the de-:elopment of this idea.
Political upheavals, like the English Civil War in the 17th century, threw up new hopes for democratic
ideals. In the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries political theorists began to apply the representative principles
fonnulated in the middle ages to refonn parliaments and legislative bodies in order to make them more
democratic. For example, the Levellers, a radical movement in 17th century England, demanded such
refonns as annual or biennial Parliaments, manhood suffrage, a Parliament that was the agent of the
popular wilL religious freedor-

1d equality before the law. In conjunction with these democratic

refonns they proposed a repr.oJentative who was a delegate from the people, simply empowered to give
consent on bel1alf of those people through their right to vote. The Whigs, around the same time, proposed
a slightly different role for this representlltive - that of a member of Parliament who was freer to make
decisions without the strict approval of constituents. This representative however, was still ultimately
responsible to the people, foreshadowing later ideas about representative govenunent. This model of
representation - known as the trustee model ·was later echoed in the ideas ofEdmund Burke, whose ideas
have been influential in thought on representative government.

An important contribution to the development of the idea of popular sovereignty and representative
government Cllrrle from the social contract theorists. John Locke, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques
Rousseau developed consent theories to explain the distribution l'nd allocation of political power. Their
treatment of tile issues of authority and obligation in the political realm led each of them to refer to the
concept of representation, albeit in slightly different ways. All three claimed that human beings would
find life so difficult in a pre-political 'state of nature' that they would consent - either between one
another, or with a prospective ruler- to the creation of political institutions which protected tile rights of
citizens. This is what Rousseau called the 'social contract'. All three had slightly different slants on
representation and what it entailed - Hobbes believed that a people surrendered their power to the ruler
within the context of this contract, while Locke believed that power was merely !ended, and could be
taken back if the ruler was unfit. Rousseau believed more in direct, rather than representative democracy,
warning that "The instant a people allows itself to be represented it loses its freedom" (Barber, 1984, p.
145). However, he

w:~s

influential in his ideas on contract and consent, and the idea of consent is the

basis of modem representative institutions.

John Stuart Mill, in Considerations on Representative

Government (1861), placed the idea of representation finnly within liberal ideology. For him, this fonn
of government was the most desirable, with ultimate power residing with the people.

While these men established that representation could be adapted to democratic principles, and the idea
that ultimate political power resides with the people, representation was taken one step further by thinkers
of the French and American Revolutions in the late 18th century. The American Revolution was based
upon social contract principles, articulated by thinkers like Thomas Jefferson, who drew heavily on the
work of Locke and his advocation of the right to revolution and government by consent. The Declaration
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of Independence followed the final breakdown of conununlcation between the American colonies led by
Jefferson on one hand, and the colonial rulers on the other. It justified thP. revolution partly by citing
grievances conunitted by the colonial rulers under George III, and partly by appealing to the larger, more
general principles derived from the writings of theorists likt Locke and others of the 17th and 18th
centuries who suggested that natural rights and natural law were discoverable by reason (Birch, 1972, p.
42).

And, unlike the Whig view (or trustee model) of representation which had gained widespread

acceptance in England, the Americans expected their representatives to act simply as delegates from the
people. In many ways tile new American government was much more radical than its English counterpart
in that it took representative government to be a substitute for direct democracy; a way of people ruling
themselves.

The French Revolution was even more radical aga:,,, basing government upon 'popular sovereignty',
derived directly from Rousseau's concept of the 'general will'. This popular sovereignty resided in the
National Assembly (fonnerly th(; Third Estah:), which represented the whole nation. So extreme were the
ideas of the French revolutionaries that American and English revolutionaries who migrated to France due
to their 'radical' political views found themselves to he moderates compared to their French counterparts
~

Thomas Paine being one example (Hob!!bawm, 1962, p. 74). Interestingly, the French revolutionaries

subscribed to a similar view of representatives as that of the Whigs in England, where representatives
were not delegates bound by the instructions of their constituents or 'mandates', but were to contrive, in
their collective capacity, to act as a voice of the whole nation and so to represent both the government and
the governed (Birch, 1972, pp. 46-47).

3. The Triumph of Election
Representative government was seen as a 'republican' form of government by the two men, James
Madison and
representation.

Emmanuel~Joseph

SieyCs, who played a crucial role in establishing modern political

They both saw representation as a superior and different form of government than

democracy.

In The Federalist Papers (1961 ), Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, defended what was
in their day a revolutionary charter - the Constitution of the United States - a blueprint for a modern
republic. Madison often contrasted the rlr·mocracy of the city-states of Antiquity, where a small number
of citizens administered government in person, with modern republics based upon representative
principles. While fonns of representation were not unknown in Antiijuity, they existed alongside the
popular assembly, another organ of government. According to Madison writing in the Federalist 63, the
real difference between ancient democracies and modern republics lies in "the total exclusion of the
people in their collective capacity from rmy share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of the
representatives of the people from the administration of the former'' (Hamilton, eta!., 1961, p. 387).
Madison also argued in Federalist 10 that representation was a superior system because public views are
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refined and enlarged by passing them through the: medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom is
more able to discern the greater good of the whole nation, not just their own individual, or temporary or
partial, interests (Hamilton, et al., 1961, pp. 77-84). Madison, like John Stuart Mill, believed that these
citizens should be of superior intellect, and that not all people are suited to political office.

They were not alone in this thought.

Harrington - champion of republicanism under Cromwe\ls

protectorate, admirer of Venice, and reader of Machiavelli- looked into republican tradition for mode!s
for future free governments and believed that election, unlike lot, selected pre-existing elites. He argues
that when men are left free to choose, they spontaneously recognise their betters, making election the
superior system (Manin, 1997, p. 67). Montesquieu, on the other hand, venerated Rome, but concluded
that republicanism was a thing of the past. He established a close link between lot and democracy on one
hand, and election and aristocracy on the other (Manin, 1997, pp. 70-74).

Rousseau,

fond of the institutions of his native republic of Geneva, proclaimed that every legitimate

government is republican. Like Montesquieu, Rousseau linked lot with democracy and election with
aristocracy, finding that lot is the right selection method for democracy because it allocates office without
the intervention of any particular will. He concludes however, that because it is possible in an aristocracy
to make political use of differences in t<>Jent and worth, elective aristocracy is the best fonn of
government.

Both Rousseau and Montesquieu were fully aware that lot can select incompetents, which is what strikes
us today, and explains why we do not even think of attributing public ftmctions by lot.

But both

perceived that lot had other properties or merits that at least made it an alternative worthy of serious
consideration, and perhaps justified that one should seek to remedy the obvious defect with other
institutions (Manin, 1997, p. 79)

All three of these thinkers- Harrington, Montesquieu, and Rousseau- regarded lot and election as both a
part of republican tradition. It was the elites which established representative government as we know it
today- based solely on election- which took the use oflot out of the equation (Manin, 1997, p. 44)

Sieyes saw a huge difference between democracy and representation. Sieyes applied the principle of the
division of labour to the political realm. For him, repres{'ntation was superior because it con~tituted the
form of government most appropriate to the condition of modem commercial stJcieties in which
individuals were chiefly occupied in economic production and exchange (Manin, 1997, p. 3). Due to lack
of time, dtizens require representatives for task of government.

Thus the position of representative

becomes a specialised profession like any other occupation in modem society.

Lot wa~ never seriously considered during the American and French Revolutions. At the same time that
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the founding fathers were declaring the equality of all citizens, they decided without the slightest
hesitation to establish, on both sides of the Atlantic, the unqualified dominion of a method of selection
long deemed to be aristocratic. Manin (1997, p. 79) considers this absence of even a debate about lot an
"astonishing paradox" considering the place given to lot in preceding republics which were the source of
ideas for the founding fathers of modem representative governments.

4. The E~tabHshmeut of Re1 1resentative Government
By the end of the 18th cenlury, a system of representation as we know it today was functioning in US,
France (with some hindrant;es along the way), and England. From these three countries representative
ideas and institutions were exported to other parts of the world.

From this period of chllllge there

emerged two concepts of political representation. The first is the concept of the elected representative as
an independent policy maker, who derives legitimacy from having gone through the process of election.
The Whig or Burkean view of the representative as a decision maker not bound by mandates, but rather a
representative of the whole nation, derives especially from the French and to a lesser extent the British.
This is the trustee model of representation.

The other concept of representation emerging out of the

period of revolution was that of sovereignty resting with the people. with representatives being the
peoples' agents. Tills type of representation is known

M

the delegate model. This tradition was more

strongly American, hence the preamble to the Constitution beginning with the words "We, the people of
the United States ... do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America".

The system of representation which emerged out of this period - that is, one with elected representatives was not the only one ever utilised by different political regimes, but it became the only form which
survived into the modem era.

The new representative governments of the United States and France,

although calling themselves republics (the US from the beginning of the revolution, and France from
1792) were breaking republican tradition in fmding no place for Jot in their institutions. This tradition
was still alive in the 17th and 18th centuries, or at least still in political debate and culture. In the 19th and
20th centuries however, or at least until :ecent times, the elective model became the accepted norm with
no apparent alternative. This was probably due in most part to the legitimacy whlch election was seen to
confer on representatives. This legitimacy becomes especially important when representatives are elected
under the British and French tradition of the Whig or Burkean view of representatives, in which
representatives have a large amount of freedom in decision making.

This is the tradition which

Australians have inherited.

In many ways the model of representation which was functioning after the Revolutions is, for all intents
and purposes, the same as today. Manin (1997, p. 6) identifies four principles of representative regimes
which have been consistent since the!£ invention:
1. Those who govern are appointed by election at regular intervals.
2. The decision-making of those who govern retains a degree of independence from the wishes of the
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electorate.
3. Those who are governed may give expression to their opinions and political wishes without these being
subject to the control of those who govern.
4. Public decisions undergo the trial of debate.

However, representation in the 20th century, while retaining these basic features, bas gone through some
major changes. Two of the most relevant (to this study) will be discussed below. They are: the extension
of the franchise; and the rise of party politics.

Representation in the 20th century: Universal s•Jffrage and the rise of
party politics
Probably the most obvious contribution to the evolution of representative democracy was the inauguration
of mass suffrage in western democracies which ensured the representation of previously unrepresented
groups. In Australia, by 1904 the vote was extended to women and by 1962 indigenous peoples were
enfranchised. The 20th century also saw the fonnation of political parties. In Australia, by 1910, a twoparty class-based system had crystallised, following similar trends in other western political systems
(Sawcr, 200la, p. 73).

The rise of party politics is one of the most important developments in the 20th century. A review of the
literature of the politics of any Western nation delivers a clear message - that modem representative
government is party government, and that the ("..oncept of political parties is essential to the analysis of
power distribution in the political realm (Jaensch, 1994, p. 1; Sartori, 1976, p. ix; Duverger, 1954).
~;erkl

(1980, p. I) claims that "political parties and party systems are among the most important political

institutions of twentieth century society".

Elections in representative democracies like Aust:alia have

become dominated by contests between parties, thus making parties, elections, and represent,:'ion in the
Australian context inseparable (Jaensch, 1997, p. 389).

The major parties not only act as avenues of representation but also as barriers to representation (Sawer &
Zappala, 2001, p. 2), structuring and limiting the choices available to the individual voter (Hague, Harrop

& Breslin, 1992, p. 196).

Political parties then have become the 'middle men' of representational

politics, in that they represent the interests or groups that support them and translate this into actual scats
in government. There is no longer a dialogue between the elector and the representative; a third party has
come between them, radically modifYing the nature of their relations. Electors simply ratify the party's
choice of candidate(s), and so in a way, the representative receives a double mandate, one from the party
(which seems to carry more weight), and one from electors (Duverger, 1954, p. 353).
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Parties also simp\ii}' the representational process; they stand for set voticies on issues making choices
between candidates easier for voters who have neither time nor inclination to research into every
candidate's policies. Voters choose between parties which represent ideologies, and therefore it is parties
that are brought to account when the electorate is dissatisfied (Hughes, 1998, p. 321).

A liberal

democratic party is expected by voters to "transfonn the party's ideological beliefs and the demands of its
supporting interests into sets of policies" (Smith, 1997, p 167). Voters vote for representatives, many of
whom are total strangers, simply because they are endorsed by parties which the voter feels best reflects
his interests (Hughes, 1998, p. 294).

It is interesting to note then, as Birch (1972, p. 97) does, that many theoretical writings about political
representation ignore the existence of organized political parties. Of course, many of the earlier theorists
on representation wrote before the advent of party politics. And more recently, modem theorists have
found it difficult to justify the existence of political parties and the discipline they entail. How can a
representative justii}' voting along the party line if his constituents or even the whole national good is not
in accordance with this line?

One theory which has been fonnulated to answer this problem is the electoral mandate theory. Very
simply put, this theory holds that electors are presented with two or more programs of action, these being
party platforms and policies. The party elected on their programfpolicies then has a mandate to cany out
these actions. In tum, this will not put too much power in the hands of party leaders if the parties are
democratically organised. In~ividuallvlP's are then expected to support party policy in Parliament since
this was the platfonn along which they were elected.

The electoral mandate theory holds well if all players involved behave as they should. For example, if
party leaders do not have undue amounts of power, and if parties carry out those platforms upon which
they were elected. Of course, practical experience tells us that this is not always the case, and in fact is a
major issue for most voters. The focus group research conducted for this study and outlined in Chapter
Six, finds that many voters today are dissatisfied with party politics, and recent evidence shows that
Australians are now voting for more independent (non-party) candidates than ever before, and are
shunning the two major parties at election time.

Some argue the failure of representative democracy in political syJtems in the 20th century, due the
increasing dominance of the executive and extension of government activities in many areas (for
example, the popularity ofKeynesianism in economics for a large part of the century). As Phillips (1995,
pp. 113-114) asks, does this represent a shift away from the 'representational' concept of the legislature
envisioned by John Stuart Mill, in which the representative assembly controls and watches a government
performed by experts?
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It is true that the late 20th century demonstrated increasing calls for a more participatory, as opposed to

representative, democracy (Barber, 1984).

Th~se

calls can be understood as an attempt to respond to

widespread recognition that many representative democracies today face serious problems stemming from
inadequate po\itica:. understanding and information among the electorate, increasingly low levels of voter
turnout, corruption and other violation:. of democratic accountability by public officials, all of which can
be attributed to the ;.en-participatory nature of large scale representative democracies (Gutman, 1995, p.
415). Regarding Australia, Solomon (1988) observes:

It is not at all surprising

. that there is little general interest or participation in

[Australian} politics. Compulsory voting, backed by the threat of fines, ensures a high
turnout on election day, but there is no indication that those who arc forced to the polls (and
would not have gone voluntarily) have much interest in what happens as a result of the
bnllot that they cast. (p. 7)
The issues involved in the above statements are many and complex, and can be seen as posing serious
problems for representative democracy in the 21st centUiy.

Many of these issues merit separate

investigation. The ones which this study will take up are those to do with elections, electoral systems,
and lack of voter understanding of these, achieved through analysis of the AV in Australia.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE HISTORY AND EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE
AT A FEDERAL LEVEL

History
Australia's political institutions and practices work within a complex and peculiarly Australian

framework which is an amalgam of three influences. The tint is the Westminster system of responsible
government; second, the American system of federalism and judicial review; and third, the 19th century
liberal and 20th century European tradition of proportional representation. Often these influences have
been contradictory and resulted in argument and conflict in Australian political history, resulting in fairly
unique formulations such as the alternative vote (AV).

Australia has long been regarded as a laboratory for democratic political innovation, being described as
the first nation created through the ballot box, with much of it's early identity as a nation revolving
around its democratic experiments (Sawer, 200\b, p. 69). Electoral reform was one area in which
Australia caught the attention of such champions of representative democracy as John Stuart Mill, who
drew on the Australian interest in PR to argue the case for parliamentary reform in the United Kingdom.
Thomas Hare's proposal for a new electoral system for Great Britain and Ireland in 1859 was influenced
by Mill's ideas on representation and was essentially what we know today as the STV. The AV, or
preferential voting system, for single-member constituencies was developed and refined in Australia, and
in fact, has been largely unique to the Australian experience.

The main reason behind the development of the AV was to adapt the STV for use in single-member
constituencies.

The first documented method of this reworking of the STV appears to have been by

Professor W. R. Ware of Harvard in 1871, in experiments of voting procedures on college students. He
demonstrated that, where no candidate has an absolute majority, the sequence of elimination of the lowest
placed candidate and the transfer of his or her votes to continuing candidates, could work in singlemember electorates just as effectively as in Hare's complex scheme of proportional representation.

An influential campaigner for electoral reform in Australia w,'I.S E. J. Nanson, Professor ofMathematics at
Melbourne University from 1875-1922. He promoted this system of AV (as ofy_et, unused anywhere else
in the world) as a viable choice for the House of Representatives during the framing of Australian
constitution in the 1890's.

It was clear that political pressures wou;d ensure that the House of

Representatives would utilise single-member electoral districts and Nanson wanted at least to ensure the
choice of the AV which he saw as being far superior to other single-member syste~s.
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Nanson did have considerable influence on the first Electoral Bill presented to the new federal Parliament
in 1902, which provided for AV in the lower House, and STV in the Senate. He was not alone. In fact,
Australia, on the eve of Federation, boasted an impressive array of theorists on representation whose
many written commentaries on the ideals of representation provided the Australian political community
with a stimulus to further reform, should there be political will (Uhr, 2000, p. 5).
At this stage in Australian political development, three bodies of thought had emerged regarding electoral
systems. One was made up of the champions of proportional representation (PR) and preferential voting
(the AV), now referred to as 'proportiona1ists'. Proportionalists believed that only when all significant
social groups were given an effective voice in Parliament, would the political community be stable. They
argued that only when the legislature bad become a microcosm of the whole society, in all its variety of
interests, could real political integration be achieved (Graham, 1968, p. 203). This group included Liberal
politicians such as Alfred Deakin and Sir George Turner, who were concerned about the growing power
of party organisations. Middle class intellectuals, greatly influenced by the ideas of Jc·m Stuart Mill, also
supported proportional methods of voting.

Mill and his circle were of considc-.able importance in

Australian electoral history, with supporters from women's suffrage to the representation of minorities
clothing themselves in his intellectual authority (Sawer, 2001 b, p. 76).

It must be noted at this point that often arguments for PR and the preferential voting system (the AV)

went hand in hand, and supporters of one were usually supporters of the other. Similar outcomes were
anticipated for both; that is, provision for greater swpe of representation, particularly of minorities, in
Australian politics, and the lessening of the effect of the 'wasted vote' which occurs under more simple
plurality systems (the AV being a more complex plurality system). It has become apparent however, that
the effects of the AV have been largely different from those of the PR system advocated by the
proportionalists and now used in upper houses in Australia.

The two other groups of opinion at the time were closely aligned with each other against the
proportionalists. Firstly, the conservatives argued that representation of groups and classes within the
legislature would encourage factionalism within politics. They wanted voters to identifY themselves with
broad political movements, thinking in terms of national interest. The interplay of two large parties each
concerned with the general good was accepted by the conservatives as natural and desirable (Graham,
1968, p. 204).

The other group in Australian political thought at the tum of the century, the dualists, believed thalli two
party system perpetuated by a simple majority electoral system, was not so much desirable, but nec~ssary.
They claimed a third party would use the balance of power under a proportional system to extort
concessions from the governing party (Graham, 1968, p. 204). None of these three groups fully realised
that the AV, advocated by the proportionalis.ts for the federal lower house and opposed by the 9tlwf twq
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groups, would actually promote the development of the two-party system and ensure that voters thought

in terms of broad political movements, due to the AV facilitating a 'politics of the centre'. It must be
pointed out that these debates were taking place at a time when the party system was in .::mbryonic stages

in Australian politics, and it is evident in hindsight that the fonnation of the party system was bound
closely to electoral law developments.

In the end however, conservative opinion held sway and the systems of AV and STV were deleted during
the passage of the first electoral bill, to be replaced with first-past-the-post systems for both Houses. In
spite of the efforts of refonners and idealists such as Professor Nanson, Andrew Inglis Clark, Catherine
Helen Spence, and the Ashworth brothers, elected politicians proved themselves rather evasive in the
application of the very relevant ideals of the Australian theorists regarding representation and electoral
reform (Reid & Forrest, 1989, pp. 87-94). These politicians were not wil\ing to introduce electoral law
which they were not certain would further their own interests, and as of yet there had not been any
sustained experiences with the AV anywhere else to provide a working example.

Before the third federal election in 1906, protectionist Prime Minister Deakin wrote to his Labor
counterpart, Chris Watson, suggesting an exhaustive ballot (compulsory AV) which he hoped would
isolate the free trade forces of George Reid, and provide an electoral "safety valve" for them both (Reid &
Forrest, 1989, p. 114). The Labor Party however, benefited from the vote-splitting amongst non-Labor
candidates making it uninterested in this kind of electoral refonn. This very issue of vote-splitting would
soon prompt Liberal governments to persist with the introduction of the AV.

After the failure of two more bills, in 1915 a Royal Commission into Commonwealth Electoral Law and
Administration handed down the following recommendation (cited in Parliament, 1983):
preferential voting [the AVJ:

. there must necessarily be many shades of political

opinion, which, in a democratic country, should be given expression to in the freest possible
manner. In order that public opinion may be portrayed in distinct broad tones of thought,
we strongly urge the adoption of preferential voting for the House ofRepresentatives. (p. 8)

As always in matters political, considerations of partisan advantage were behind the initiation of this
Royal Commission by Sir Joseph Cook's Liberal government (1913-1914). Liberals were concerned
because, more and more often, minority Labor candidates were defeating divided conservative candidates.

In 1917, the Nationalist Party under Hughes was able to defeat Labor and form a governing majority.
Under this government, legislation to provide for the AV in the lower house was introduced in 1918,
following a nasty scare in which a Labor candidate with a mere 35 per cent of the vote won the byelection for the seat of Swan in Western Australia. In the Flinders by-election in Victoria in May of 1918
th~ Victo~~n Farm~rs Union. ca.n,~idale ~~?d~~w ~s n9mination aft~r the Na!ional
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rartr• ~~~~ of the

consequences of a split vote, promised to introduce a bill providing for the AV in elections to the House
of Representative£

The result of the Swan by-election was in danger of being repeated at the

Corangamit~ by-election in Victoria later that year.

The farming lobby threatened to split the

Nationalist's vote by standing it's own candidates unless the electoral system was refonned.

The

resulting Commomvealth E/ecloral Act of 1918 remains, in effect, the statute governing electoral
competition at a national level today. Thus, the Corangamite by-election was won on the preferences of
the Victorian Fanner's Union, in spite of the Labor candidate leading the on primary vote. Following
this, the practice of distributing how-to-vote cards outside polling booths, showing voters a suggested
preference ordering amongst all candidates, quickly served to institutionalise such arrangements without
placing excessive expectations on the interest or memory of voters (Reilly, 2001, p. 85).

The influence of political parties in the establislunent and amendment of electoral law is a foregone
conclusion. While many electoral refonns date to an earlier period before the crystallisation of the twoparty class-based system around 1910 (Sawer, 2001a, pp. 73-74), after 1910 liberal rcfonners were no
longer an independent force and electoral reform ber.ame bound up in party politics. The proposals of
1902 were defeated on their own merits, in spite of coherent and logical argument >br the adopti01~ of the
AV and STY, and the perceived benefits to a new and flourishing democracy, However, when it became
politically expedient for these very same electoral reforms to be adopted by those who had previously
rejected them, in both cases the reforms came not only as a result of the pursuit of principles of electoral
justice - although this must be recognised as a contributing factor - but largely from pragmatic
considerations of party gain.

The conventional approach amongst researchers toward analysis of the hi~tOf)' of elef'tomi law and policy,
has been to reduce the introduction of electoral systems wholly to the self-intcre~~ of the political parties
dominating Parliament at the time. Although the role of the political parties as key stakeholders in the
electoral system has received prominent attention, it is important to note that parties rarely obtain voting
methods entirely appropriate to their needs. All Uhr (2000) states:
Parliament is more than the sum of the interest of the political parties represented in it. Just
as the political parties represented in the early Commonwealth Parliaments had to adopt
standing orders consistent with the long-tenn interest of Parliament as an institution of
national governance, so tov those original parties had to adopt electoral laws compatible
with the wider institutional role ofParliament in Australian national governance. (p. 4)

Commonwealth electoral legislation is more than just an outcome of the interests oft he parties, although
they do play a role. It is necessary to regard the Electoral Acts of 1902 and 1918 as carefully weighed
pieces of legislation, passed, not as casual expedients, but as a means of providing what were considered
to be appropriate conditions for the interaction of parties at the electoral level (Graham, 1968, p. 202). As
becomes evident through this study of the AV, those who engineer electoral acts are not always able to
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predict accurately how the method they choose would work in practice.

It is very likely that the unpredictability of new electoral systems has played a large part in there being

very little experimentation with the AV outside of Australia. This being in spite or' a favourable and
comprehensive study in the United Kingdom of the likely workings of t;Ie AV contained in the Report of

the Royal Commission Appoillted to Enquire Into Electoral Systems {1910). Other notable experiments
with the AV, however, occurred in the Canadian provinces of Alberta, Manitoba and British Columbia.
They were slightly different than as practiced in Australia. Firstly, the AV was not used as uniformly as
in Australia. The AV in Alberta and Manitoba was utilised in conjunction with PR, with rural areas to be

the only constituencies to be elected with a system of AV. And, in British Columbia, the AV was used in
both single and multi-member districts simultaneously, leading to much confusion and delays when
determining election results, particularly in the first {1952) election (Phillips, 1976, p. 277). Secondly,
the AV utilised optional preference marking. unlike the majority of the Australian experiment which has
been with compulsory preference marking. Thirdly, Australia has the compulsory vote which adds an
extra dimension to analysis of any voting system implemented (Phillips, 1976, pp. 239, 245-247, 275), as
will be discussed later in this chapter. While not the primary focus of this study, reference will be made
throughout at times to the Canadian experience with the AV when comparison can shed tight on the
workings of this system of voting.

Outcomes
The main reason behind the introduction of the AV (commonly called 'preferential voting' by those who
introduced it) was to secure majority representation in single-member seats by giving more effective
voice to neutral or non-party opinion in order to ensure that the seats were won on the basis of an absolute
m&.jority of votes. It is certainly true that the AV system in a sense 'manufactures' a majority vote for the
winning party, avoiding the possibility inherent in first-past-the-post systems of a candidate in a three or
more cornered contest gaining a seat even while the ma:;ority of electors did not vote for them. The
distribution of preferences ensures that a candidate has the support of an absolute majority of voters, thus
enhancing the legitimacy of the government. The way in which parties with similar ideological views are
then able to form coalitions without their votes working against each other is often seen as a positive
effect of the AV (Reilly, 2001, pp. 78-79).

During the debate'! on the electoral bills of 1902 and 1918, it was recognised that the AV would have this
effect of manufacturing majorities, and it was indeed considered desirable. However, it was not foreseen
that the use of the AV in single-member constituencies would work to the advantage of centre parties
rather than extreme candidates. The failure to predict this in 19\8 had far reaching consequences for all
parties involw!d (Graham, 1968, p 213). Due to the reliance on preference assurance of other candidates
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for victory under an AV system, the application of this method in a system ofnght, centre, and left parties
results in a high proportion of centre victories in constituencies where political forces are evenly
balanced. Over time, "such victories could have the cumulative effect of exaggerating the electoral and
parliamentary strength of the centre party . or of a minor party treated by the electors as if it were a centre
party" (Graham, 1968, p. 214). This situation occurs because for a party to gain enough votes to win a
seat under a sing\e·member prefer.:ntial system, a candidate must appeal to a majority of voters in order to
gain, if not first preference votes, then either second or third preferences of those who vote for more
obscure candidates. Parties then are encouraged by this voting system to tailor their policies toward the
centre of the political spectrum.

Graham (1968, pp. 214·215) further points out that if the Barton

government had appreciated this fact and persisted with its original intention of introducing the AV for
the election of Representatives, the Protectionist Party may have fared better in the 1903 and 1906
elections. Not only would it have countered vote·splitting, but also would have checked the defection of
voters to the extreme candidates and enabled the Protectionists, as a centre party, to win contests which
were evenly divided between three parties.

After the introduction of the AV in 1918, the Country Party, viewed as a centre party by voters, thus
benefited from the preferences of both the National and Labor votes. The funn groups themselves were
very likely surprised and delighted by this unexpected effect of the AV. Whlle they had pressed for the
refonn in order to counter the effects of vote·splitting which benefited Labor because it discouraged
fanners to support sectional candidates, the AV did help the pa..ty make a decisive rather than partial
breakthrough into politics (Graham, 1968., p. 215).

However, the assertion by Duvcrger that the

introduction of the AV was crucial to the birth of the Country Party (1954, p. 218), has been largely
discounted by Australian researchers (Goot, 1985, p. 223) who also look to other factors as being
important in the success ofthis party.

An immediate, though unintended, effect after the AV was introduced in 1919 for voting in the House of
Representatives, was that at the next election in 1922 many voted informally or did not vote. This was
one reason why in 1925 [1924] Parliament was persuaded to vote for compulsory voting (Ryden, 2002, p.
172). Compulsory voting, coupled with the AV utilising compulsory preferences, as employed in the
Australian context, ensures that candidates and governments are elected on a true majority of votes. A
strong argument for compulsory voting is that participation and consent of all citizens legitimises
government and provides citizens with a "sense of proprietorship" (Phillips, 2001, pp. 14·15).

The exchange of preferences between candidates within parties so as to encourage multiple endorsement
by parties, was another early hope of the conservative parties who introduced this system on a federal
level. They saw the use of the AV as means of abolishing pre-selection, which is often viewed as
undemocratic.

The 1915 Royal Commission found that this would be a beneficial result of the AV,

allowing electors tu have some choice within party lines. Many hoped that this would temper the strict
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party discipline of the Labor Party by making pre-selection unnecessary (Parker, 1960, p. 66). Even
amongst the champions ofPR there were those who conceded that if an end to 'caucus control' within the
Labor Party was the sole object of their refonns, then the AV would be enough to achieve this (Jowett,
1917, pp. 6-7). However, by the end of the 1920's it was conceded that the AV had failed completely in
this area of federal politics (Goot. 1995, p. 225). Maybe the only positive outcome was that some of the
first women elected, such as Edith Cowan and Dame Enid Lyons, were elected in seats where
conservative parties practiced multiple endorsement and gave their supporters a choice bt1tween male lllld
female candidates (Ryden, 2002, p. 173). The failure of the AV to promote multiple i!ndorsements, both
in the past and in recent times, is unfortunate for Australian democmcy, since often the only effective
contest in elections is party pre-selection, particularly if the electorate is a 'spJe' seat for either of the
major party groupings (this factor is discussed in more detail below).

As attested to above, one of the maln intentions behind the introduction of the AV in the House of
Representatives was to counter the effects of vote-splitting. On a federal level at least, there is no doubt
that the AV system has adversely affected the ALP for much of the twentieth century, and hence was a
target of Labor hostility during most of this period. This was especially true in the first half of the
century. Benefit to non-Labor parties was particularly noticeable in the first three

e\ectioru~

after the

introduction of the AV (1919, 1922, and 1925). In ther<! only 9 per cent of successful ALP candidates
were returned after a count of preferences, compared to 25 per cent of Nationalist candidates, and 42 per
cent of Country Party candidates. Although just over half of these non-Labor candidates had been leading
on first preferences anyway, the insurance that the AV provided still definitely contributed (amongst other
factors) to the survival of the infant Country Party. As established in the literature review in Chapter One,
plurality systems, of which the AV is a variant, tend to favour a two-party system and the emergence of
small parties can be difficult unless they are based on a special regional interest, like the National
(Country) Party.

The table in Appendix 2 shows all the elections for the federal lower house between 1919 and 2001. The
table shows the number of electorates which required preference distn1mtion in each election, and also the
number of electorates in which the candidate who was leading on the first count (i.e. with a plurality of
votes) was defeated due to preference distribution. For all the federal elections between 1919 and 1951,
of the 73 seats in which preferences changed the results, non-Labor won 58, and 49 of these were taken
from Labor candidates. Labor won only 15 of these contests, with 10 being taken from their non-Labor
counterparts. The other 5 were won from other Labor candidates, 3 of these from Labor splinter groups
(Ryden, l968a, p. 191). Furthermore, almost all of the cases where Labor benefited from preference
distribution and came from behind to win, date back to the Langite splits oft he thirties and furties when
the breach was on the left of the main federal ALP, so that an ALP candidate might "gain from the
preferences of either Labor left-wing schismatics or ordinarily anti-Labor voters to his right"(' Australian
Electoral System', 1969, p. 154).
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The period after Labor's split in the 1950's has been much cited as a time when the AV worked against
Labor. The federal elections of 1958, 1961, 1963, 1966, and 1969, after the Democratic Labor Party
(DLP) became a nationwide party, demonstrated a certain disadvantage to the ALP from preference
distribution under the AV system.

Of the four elections in the 1960's, all of which were won by the

Libera\wCountry coalition, two would have been won by Labor under a firstwpast-thc-post system. In
1961 for example, the ALP won 47.9 per cent of the primary vote, compared to the Conlition's 42.09 per
cent. The DLP vote amounted to 8.71 per cent of the primarf vote (without them gaining any seats), a
substantial amount for a minor party, which when distributed as preferences ensured the Coalition victory
(Government and Politics database).

In all these elections (1958-69), many Liberal and Country Party candidates had either initial leads
confinned by preferences or came from behind to win, while very few ALP candidates benefited from
preference distribution. An anonymous writer in the Current Affairs Bulletin in 1969 concluded: "So
long as the DLP remains at its present strength and as implacably opposed to the ALP, the retention of
preferential voting [i.e. the AV] appears certain to disadvantage the ALP" ('Australian Electoral System',
p. 155). Indeed it was so- until the midw70's the AV was most beneficial to; firstly, and most obviously,
the non-Labor coalition; but secondly, also to the Democratic Labor Party who, while not gaining any
House of Representative scats themselves, found their votes were not wasted in that for many years they
helped keep the ALP out of office (Solomon, 1988, p. 135). This, then, is an example of the AV
sustaining the presence of a minor party, although not necessarily allowing actual representation (i.e. seat
share in Parliament).

Some commentators go as far as to argue that the use of the AV in House of Representatives elections up
until the mid-1960's (although 1961 would be have to be considered an exception) behaved no differently
to a straight plurality (first-past-the-post) system of voting (Rae, 1971, p. 108). Rydon (1966, p. !53) &nd
Butler (1973) claim that the AV affected only the division of seats between rival Liberal and Country
Partir.s, rather than the overall outcome. Lakeman, in her assessment of plurality and proportiona1 voting
systems published in 1970, concluded that under the AV the results are as "unrepresentative as those of a
British general election [which operates under a straight plurality system]" (pp. 65, 70).

Since the mid-1970's developments in federal politics have meant that the effects of the AV have changed
somewhat. Jaensch (1994, p. 92) describes this era as "characterised by instability at aU levels of party
and electoral politics" with "unprecedented turnovers in seats". As well as some other minor factors, he
attributes this largely to how voters distribute preferences amongst parties. He points to the emergence of
non-aligned parties such as the Australian Democrats who (at least until very recently) have not directed
supporters' preferences (unlike previous minor parties such as the DLP, who were strongly anti-Labor),
and which reject any formal coalition or informal alliance with either Labor or the Coalition (Jaensch,
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1994, pp. 92-93). This factor then creates a new situation in which major parties need to court the
interests of these minor parties in order to gain the second and subsequent preferences of those who vote
for them.
Already noted was how the preferences ofDLP during the fifties and sixties affected the seat share won
by the ALP. The decline of the DLP after 1972 temporarily lowered the number of electorates in which
preferences were counted (see table in Appendi.x 2). The emergence of the Australian Democrats in 1977
brought the number of such electorates up again b!.lt at a lower levc;i of impact on the final results, at least
during the seventies and eighties {Hughes, 1983, pp. 226-2211). \\'hen Democrat preferences did affect
the results significantly, it was almost always to Labor's advantage. Because the Democrats avoided
directing their supporters' preferences (unlike the DLP), they affected the results in less seats. However,
by avoiding the painful choice in House of Representatives contests between the two major parties, the
Democrats kept their supporters together. They thur became in the nineties, as far as the AV allowed, a
viable minor party in lower house elections which

\>;as

able to influence the policy of the major parties in

being a constant alternative for disaffected voters. The advent of centre-oriented minor parties in the
1970's has resulted in the advantage enjoyed by the Coalition from the AV being substantially reduced.
Since the 1990's, the ALP has been more likely to benefit from minor party preferences.
Another factor which has reduced the advantage enjoyed by the Coalition through the AV in recent times
is the decline in the number of three-cornered contests where preference distribution has been required to
detennine the winning candidate (see table below). Previously these kinds of contests were largely
important in detennining the number of electorates which required preference distribution, and delivered
results which favoured the non-Labor parties. It was, of course, one of the main reasons behind the
introduction of the AV. However, as their numbers decrease, so does the number of electorates in which
preference flows favour non-Labor (Department of the Parliamentary Library website).
Table 3,1
Three-cornered contests in Federal House of Representatives elcctiom (1984-2001)
Election year

Total electorates
requiring preference
distribution

1984
1987
1993
1996
1998

44
54
92
63
65
98

2001

87

1990

Number of threecornered contests

35
41
29
30

15
16
16

Source: Department of the Parliamentary Library website
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More important in recent elections has been the increasing share of the primary vote al\ocated to minor
parties and independents, which has meant that the !Wljor parties have come to rely more on preferences
from a wider variety of parties and indepen1ents for their seats in the House of Representatives. As the
two major party groupings are increar,ingly seen as distant from, and unrepresentative of, the Australian
populace, more voters are choosing !o allocate their first preference vote to minor parties and
independents.

Thompson (2000) identifies a rise of 'new politics' which broadly encompasses such

movements as women's rights, student rights, gay rights, black rights, envirorunentalism, and
participatory open government, and which has challenged the role of the major parties as effective
representatives of all the people in Australia. Thompson states that 'new politics' brought with it an
awareness that the members of Parliament, despite party differences, were largely homogenous. They
were white, male, 'Anglo~Australians', and as such did not represent the diversity of ali Australians
(Thompson, 2000, p. 12). While some of these claims could be contentious, thus meriting separate
critical discussion, the basic logic behind these st&tements ~i.e. that Australians feel that Parliament needs
to be more representative of all of society ~ is largely sound. This has resulted in more first preference
votes for minor parties and independents, thus requiring more preference distribulion to detennine
winning candidates.

This increase in the number of electorates which have r~quired preference distribution to detennine
winning candidates reached a peak in the 1998 federal electbn, with 98 out of 148 electorates requiring
preference distribution. There has not been however, a corresponding increase in the number of divisions
where the result has been changed by preferences (see Appendix 2).

This development makes it vital for major parties to consider the interests of the minor parties, thus
ensuring that the minorities represented through these parties do have input, albeit indirectly, into policy
fonnation.

To take a much cited example, in the 1990 Federal election, the ALP was trailing the

Coalition in opinlon polls leading up to the ele{;tion. However, because the ALP managed to gamer
substantial support from the Green and Democrat voters by tailoring their policies accordingly, it
achieved election victory with less than 40 per cent of the primary vote. It is now widely ar.cepted that
federal Labor governments are more likely to be elected with the help of Green and Democrat preferences
under a full preferential (AV) system (Jupp and Sawer, 2001, p. 218). Reilly (2001, pp. 87~88) sees this
kind of outcome as a 'win-win situation' for both groups, obviously for the ALP, but also for the minor
parties, "who did not win any lower house seats, but nonetheless saw their preferred major party in
government and committed to favourable policies in their areas of concern".

A.5 votes for major parties de{;line with more choosing to vote for minor parties and independents, the AV
system will come to have a greater role in ensuring that the government elected is the most preferred
government of the Australian people, even if this majority is 'manufactured' to a greater extent than ever
before in Australian political history. ljlthe last Federal House of Representatives election in 2001, the
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first preference vote share for a candidate other than from one of the two major parties was nearly 20 per
cent (Government and Politics database). In other words, over 2 million voters preferred to vote for a
minor party or independent. From these 2 million votes, direct representation in only 3 seats resulted (all
won by independents), which means that preference distribution was extremely relevant for these two
million voters to have their say without registering a 'wasted vote'.
Another tilctor which may make preference flows all the more important in future elections is what
political analyst Laurie Oakes calls the "genteel decline" of the National Party (2003a, p. 14). Many of
the issues that have given the Nationals their itnpetus over the years have lost their political appeaL with
p11rty membership steadily declining. The National (fonnerly Country) Party, benefited from the AV for
many years Mth consistent over-representation in the federal lower house. Recent elections however,
have seen them lose seats to their Coalition counterparts, the Liberals, as well as to independents. While
in most the states the Liberals have been cutting into the Nationals for years, at the Federal level the
process has been "quiet but inexorable" (Oakes, 2003a, p. 14). Although Liberals only contest federal
National seats when a vacancy occurs through retirement or death, due to an agreement to avoid threecornered contests, independents on the other hand are a very real threat tbr National Party seats in crisis.
So, as preference flows become more important in detcrminlng the outcomes in many electorates, the
voting system w!Uch once was the protector of the National Party could now be its nemesis.

And

furthennore, if the Liberals l!fe increasingly unable rely on National seats to form government in the
\ower house, going into the next Federal election in 2004 with a majority of just seven seats will make the
Liberal Party as vulnerable to preference flows as its Labor counterpart has traditionally been
Considering that most commentators see Labor benefiting more from Green and Democrat preferences
than the Liberals, the AV does not bode well for the current government.
One final outcome of the AV which needs to be

ass~ssed

is the representation of diverse elements of

Australian society under the system, as this was one of the original intentions behind it's introduction.
The proportionalists, discussed earlir,r in this chapter, who argued for the adoption of the AV for lower
house elections during the debates about electoral law at the beginning of the last century, did so in the
hope that the AV would provide for greater scope of representation, particularly of minorities. This group
also advocated PR for the federal Senate for similar reasons.

However, the two systems, while

superficially sirrUiar, have delivered quite different results.
In IUs discussion of the functioning of legislative assemblies, John Uhr points out that majorities must
eventually win. He argues that "de.Jiberative assemblies are not entrenched proter,tion for minority forces,
although they seek at least to delay the hand of automatic majorities and, more especially, to mould the
very process by which majorities are formco·· (1998, p.94). This last point is especially relevant for the
electoral systems which choose these assemblies (although not expressly what Uhr himself was getting
at).

While not achieving final seat share, a minor party or parties can influence the policies of major
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parties under a system of AV through the use preference flows as a bargaining chip, such as the Greens
and the Democrats influenced ALP policy in the 1990 election.
The AV then, in some ways could be argued to be a workable comprorillse between majority and
minority representation. While giving some scope to minor parties and opinions, the AV does tend to
'manufacture' majorities which is considered by some to be essential for a stable democratic government.
For this &arne reason, others criticise this system because it does not allow for accurate direct
representation in parliament of a minority, or support for a minor party, whicl1 is spread over many
constituencies. Support for a minor party has to be fairly concentrated in one electorate to enable that
party to gain representation through a seat.
The power of the major parties then, enhanced by the use of the AV in single-member constituencies, is
clearly an obstacle to direct minority representation in the lower house on several levels. Firstly, internal
party machinations, especially pre-selection procl:'.::~es, arc

a,;.~rded

heightened importance under the AV

system, in spite of one of the early hopes for the AV being the abolition of party pre-selection. This is
because the majority of lo•ver house electorates, state and ferleral, are safe seats for one of the major
parties due to several factors related to the use of the AV.

Af,

mentioned above, this ultimately makes the

only effective contest in these seats party pre-selection. Preselection processes are often effectively
closed to 'outsiders' and generally favour white, Anglo-Celtic, middle-class candidates (McAllister, 1992;
Jupp, 1988, p. 168; Allan, 1995). Added to this is the tendency for the AV to work against candidates
who do not hail from one of the two major party groupings. Over-representation of one or more of the
three entrenched parties in the Federal House of Representatives has occurred consistently since the
1940's, a direct result of the use of the AV in single member electorates. For many years the Liberal
Party, although at times the Labor Party instead (especially more recently during their election victories in
the 1990's), were over-represented in federal lower house elections. The National Party has been
consistently ovcHepresented since the 1940's (Jaensch, 1994, pp. 85-86; 1997, pp. 404-405).
At this point, PR systems provide a useful contrast to the AV. PR is often argued for by activists
representing political minorities such as women or ethnic/cultural groups, because under this system
minorities have greater power through direct representation and clear overall majorities are rare, thus
lessening the power of major parties. However, it is often argued that if first-past-the-post systems give
too little weight to smaller partiP.s, PR gives them too much. Under PR., smaller parties are often in a
pivotal position in post-co.·lition negotiations, able (in theory at !east) to form an alliance with either
major party (Hague, Harrop & Breslin, 1992, p. 196). Under the Australian system ofPR in State and
Federal upper Houses, minor parties and independents can hold the balance of power on crucial issues,
gi';;ng them a power disproportionate to their votes. Theoretically, these situations can have a potentially
dcstabilising effect, with frequently shifting alliances and bargaining for support of minorities. It must be
noted that in practice however, ideological factors limit the range of feasible bargaining partners, thus
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maintaining some stability (Hague, Harrop & Br€-.slin, 1992, p. 196). The AV then, which sustains the
presence of some minor parties while electing stable majority governments, provides a compromise
between simple plurality electoral systems and proportional electoral systems.

In conclusion, the effects of the AV in federal politics must be classified into two sections. The first
kinds of results are more the effects of single-member constituencies in general, which apply to the AV as
it falls within this wider grouping of electoral system. The most significant feature of the single-member
electorate system is that it always tends to exaggerate the representation of the winning party, and the
greater the victory, the more it will be exaggerated proportionately (Rydon, 1968a, p. 179). This is effect
of 'manufactured majorities' discussed previously. A related effect is the way in which minor parties are
discriminated against unless they hold concentrated support in one electorate.

This discrimination is

moderate against the second party, but against the third, fourth, fifth and so on, the discrimination
becomes progressively stronger until it extinguishes their chances of winning altogether (Ryden, 1968a,
p. 180). Thus the two-party system in Australia is probably more a result of single-member electorates
than anything else.

As has been demonstrated above, the AV, although it has somewhat modified the trend of the single-

member electorate system to produce a rigid two-party system, has not encouraged the multiplicity of
parties, nor the emergence of a third centre party. Single-member preferential systems such as the AV
favour a centre party as opposed to extreme candidates. This encourages parties to become broad-based in
order to gamer enough votes and preference flows to win. H follows then, that it is not practically
feasible for more than two groups to be this broad and operate in the centre of tiJe political spectrum; in
this kind of a system only a government and an opposition to 'watch' the government is necessary. Any
other party which enters the political scene must differentiate themselves in order to entice vote share
away from an existing party, and to do this must then be further along to the right or the left of the
political spectrum. And, we have already seen that the system of the AV will generally favour a centre
party. So, unless support for minor party is concentrated in one electorate, or unless there is widespread
discontent with one or other of the two major players, minor parties under the A V must operate merely as
preference suppliers.

Thus, the second set of results of the AV are those to do expressly with the allocation of preferences, as
opposed to a cruder first-past-the-post system. These have modified, but not changed dramatically, the
effects of single-member electorates. The AV has in essence: prevented vote-splitting within the two
main party groupings; favoured moderate candidates; made multiple endorsements feasible although not
widely practiced; sustained the presence of some minor parties; and lessened somewhat the psychological
effect of the 'wasted' vote. Overall, it has had a consensual, moderating effect on what has the potential
{under a simple plurality system) to be a 'zero-sum' electoral process.
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The Alternative Vote and 'Two-Party-Preferred' Analysis
As well as the practical outcomes of the AV in Australia outlined above, there has also been the

development of a whole system of analysis and theory peculiar to the AV and electoral statistics. This is
what is commonly known as the 'two-party-preferred' method of analysis. Because tmditionally only one
or other of the two major parties has been expected to win electoral contests under the AV system, this
form of analysis has been designed to measure the level of support for each of the two parties at any given

time, incorporating potential preference flows from other candidates.
This method of measuring electoral support for one or another of the two major parties is a direct

indication of the way in which the AV has perpetuated the two-party system. Although muted to some
extent by the AV, Duverger's theory of the 'psychological effect' of plurality systems still seems to stop
voters utilising the AV system to its full potential. As Shannan (1997) observes:
The institutional context of state lower house party systems makes them very resistant to
change.

The naturally bifurcated character of parliamentary politics divided between

government and opposition means that most voters have a dichotomous view of politics.
Tills is reinforced by single member prejerenlial voling [emphasis added] ... which fosters
the belief that electoral politics, no matter how many candidates are on the ballot, is really
about voting for one of two big parties. (p. 61)
This then exacerbates, and is exacerbated by, the fact that many single-member dectorates are still safe
seats for one or other of the major parties (Jupp and Sawer, 2001, p. 223).
The concept of the two-party-preferred vote has passed into the conventional wisdom of Australian
psephology and is promoted by analysts such as Malcolm Mackerras (1975) who claims:
In Australian elections no elector who wishes to cast a formal vote can avoid casting a vote
which expresses either a higher preference for the Liberal-CP candidate or a higher
preference for the ALP candidate; even if he gives his first preference to a minor party
candidate his effective vote is his preference between Liberal-CP and ALP. The elector's
only way of avoiding this choice is to vote informal. (p. 275)
This two-party approach is questio11ed critically by Dean Jaensch who argues that the assumption that it
all boils down to a choice between one of two parties is not acceptable. As he points out, Mackerras'
analysis, which assumes qualitative equality of each preference allocation, would not explain the reCent
elections of nllnor party and independent candidates in lower hou.~e elections. Furthermore, his lUmpiO"g
together of Liberal and National parties becomes increasingly questionable as Coalition tensions show no
signs of abating (1994, pp. 78-79). The implications of using a system such as this" aro broader than just
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simple election analysis. Mayer (1980) points out the faults of this system of analysis:
Mackerras and those who uncritically use his two-party preferred vote and the pendulum
again and again, seem unaware of how they have fashioned an Iron Maiden which crushes
the minor parties and independents till they yield nought but preferences .... Mackerras'
approach is not just one among many: it has a grossly misleading and crudely positivistic
facticity which hides its ideological assumptions and that of the presentation of data on
which it rests. It is visual, widely publicised, mechanistic and has the great merit of being
easy to grasp .... Our hunch is ... that its artificer and those academics who uncritically
use it are not aware of the problems of big party chauvinism, reductionism and minor
parties as mere preference suppliers. (pp. 352-353)
Irrespective of the technical difficulties with this system of analysis. the psychological impact of twoparty-preferred statistics becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, as voters who wish to have their vote count
vote only for those parties they deem have a chance at electoral success.
Furthermore, to accept the allocation of preferences as the main contribution of minor parties to the
political process concentrates media interest on this area. For years the DLP suffered from this, then the
Democrats, and more recently the Greens. When these parties did not play the usual game as preference
suppliers, the media simply ignored all the work done on more in depth issues and policies (Mayer, 1980,
p. 352). This sets the agenda in a very narrow way, where minor parties are failures because they do not
score seats in lower house elections. In this way, the tactic of blaming the victim is used here. The
failure of the minor parties is defined in tenns set by the large parties - their definition of success (i.e. seat
share) is accepted universally by voters and the media alike.
In retent times, as the number of first preference votes going to candidates other than the two major
parties increases. two-party pre-dominance has come into question.

The increasing presence of

independent candidates in both state and federal lower house contests makes the reduction of the final
results into a two-party preferred figure somewhat contentious. Is it meaningful or accurate to use a twoparty preferred figure when independent candidates are still present in the final count, and especially
when the numbers of these situations are increasing?
Increasing support for minor parties presents a similar problem. A recent article in The Bulletin (Wright,
2003, pp. 16-20) points to the recent surge of support for the Greens and the fallacy of using two-party
preferred methods to document support for either the Liberals or the ALP in the present political climate.
Although a recent Newspoll (taken October 2003) rated Labor higher than the Coalition on a two-party.
preferred basis, thls was done simply assuming that Green second preferences would flow to Labor, since
this is what happened in the last federal election. One Labor strategist is quoted as calling this two-party
figure "fools gold'' (Oakes, 2003b, p. 23). With the Greens now occasionally in a position to win House
47

of Repres,•.ntative seats in their own right, as Green candidate Michael Organ did in the NSW
Cunningham

by~election

last year, the position of minor parties as mere preference suppliers in a

party-preferred style of analysis becomes increasingly questionable.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE HISTORY AND EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVE VOTE
IN WESTERN AUSTRALIA
-~

The analysis of the history and outcomes of the AV in Western Australia is included in this study to
provide more insight into AV in practice. While later used in other Australian states, as well as a handful

of other places around the world (see Appendix 1), Western Australia was the first state to introduce the
AV with compulsory preference markings for any length of time long enough to detennlne some long

term results. Westem Australia is important in demonstrating the way in which regional differences can
influence the outcomes of electoral systems like the AV. Finally, there has been little attention given to
the workings of the AV in Western Australia as a separate study.

History
In spite of attempts to install a system of AV in the Federal Parliament sooner, the AV was first
introduced in the Western Australian State Parliament by the Electoral Act of 1907. This Act introduced
an entirely new method of voting, primarily designed to prevent to the election of candidates who failed
to win a majority of valid votes cast. At this stage, the exercise of preference votes was optional, with
voters allowed a choice in listing all preferences.
This system was relatively untested as yet anywhere else in the world. with Queensland being the only
other state thus far to have experimented with optional preferential marking under a similar system
introduced in 1892 (to be replaced in 1942 by a simple plurality system). The system used in Queensland
however, was contingent voting, slightly different from the AV. AB outlined in the previous chapter,
many refonners had championed the use of preferential voting (the AV), along with PR, with efforts to
introduce it in the Federal Parliament continuing concurrently.
The introduction of the AV with options! preference marking in 1907 was part of a broad electoral bill
encompassing several refonns, dealing with issues such as the qualification of electors, absentee voting,
and postal voting. The principle of the AV (called 'preferential voting' at this time), being quite novel,
was sometimes confused by those debating the bill with a system of PR. No doubt this was also due
somewhat to the fact that refonners championed both systems in the same breath, with PR being
promoted for the federal Senate and the AV for the federal House of Representatives. As well as this, PR
(the STV in Australia) also requires the distribution of preferences similar to the AV system. At this time,
the West Australian membt:rs of parliament did not fully understand the difference between the two
systems of preference allocation. This lack of understanding was acknowledged in a moment of candour
by the Attorney General when introducing the clause to Parliament (WA PO, I August 1907):
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I know members have an idea that when I spoke on preferential voting on a former occasion
I did not quite understand the subject; but I hope to be able to-night, whether I understand
it or not, to make the House understand it. (p. 621)
The push for PR throughout Australia was acknowledged by those debating this bill, as well as the fact
that PR would probably be introduced in the Western Australian upper house in the future. While it was
established that for single-member constituencies PR was not workable,

it seems that the debate

surrounding voting systems in 1907 reflectl•d an overall trend in political thought throughout the country
at the time; that was, to better ensure adequat~ representation of all sections of the community.
The decision to make preference marking under the AV optional was questioned by another MP, with tl1e
Attorney General conceding that "it may be advisable after some years to make the system compulsory"
(WA PD, 1 August 1907, p. 621). The rationale for making the system optional at first was to avoid the
occurrence of too many informal votes from an electorate making the change to a completely new system
of voting, and thus risking discrediting the system altogether before the benefits became apparent. It
was anticipated that once the electorate were educated regarding the system, then it would possibly be
made compulsory (WAPD, I August 1907, p. 623).
TI1e introduction of the AV as an optional form of preferential voting was expected to alleviate the
problems associated with the selection of candidates in West Australian Legislative Assembly elections.
By 1905 in Western Australia, politics had begun to polarise into two very clear camps- Labor and nonLabor, although the tenn 'Liberal' was not used in relation to non-Labor until 1911. Vote-splitting
plagued the (Liberal) leagues, which were as yet quite unorganised and fragmented (Black, 1979, p. 194195). In the 1908 election, after the introduction of the optional AV, the Ministerialists listed up to four
candidates in some electorates, leaving the choice between them up to the voters. It was assumed that the
most popular candidate from this party would collect the preferences of the other non-Labor candidates
and thus be elected on a majority of votes (de Garis, 1977, p. 353). This tactic proved unworkable, since
voters did not, in most cases, go beyond their first choice of candidate. With only about one in three
voters listing further preferences, there were "several instances" where a candidate was elected with only
a relative majority of votes (Stenberg, 1911, p. 25) Although the optional AV did alleviate the votesplitting to some extent, the Ministerialists lost one seat they ought to have won, due to the failure of
Liberal and Ministerialist candidates to exchange preferences. This factor contributed "probably in large
measure" to the adoption of compulSOJY AV (Black, 1979, p. 194). In the 1908 election, preference votes
were largely ineffective, being counted in only seven out of fifty electorates, and affecting the results in
none of these (see table in Appendix 3). It must be mentioned though, that this figure is somewhat
distorted by the high ratio of seats held by acclamation (uncontested seats) prevalent in early West
Australian elections (Buxton, 1979, pp. 35-36). There were nine uncontested districts in the 1908 election
(see Table 4.1later in this chapter).

so

ln 1911, the Attorney General introduced a bill to the West Australian Parliament for compulsory
preferential marlcing, using the Albany by-election as an example the failure of the optional system. In
tllis by-election in the Albany Legislative Assembly district in 1909, of the 1587 valid votes cast, 47.5 per
cent showed only one preference, 49 per cent two preferences, and only 3.5 per cent tluee preferences.
As a result, the successful candidate was declared elected on 745 valid votes - 49 short of an absolute
majority (Byrne, 1960, pp. 26-27). This then was yielding the very results that the AV was designed to
prevent; that is, a candidate being elected on a minority of votes. Although then opposition leader
Scaddan claimed that compulsory preferential marking would keep voters away from the polls rather than
register a vote for a candidate they conscientiously objected to (Byrne, 1960, p. 27), the merits of the
system were, on the whole, perceived by most to outweigh the disadvantages. Thus the AV with
compulsory marlcing was introduced by a non-Labor government in Western Australia, for reasons
including both electoral advantage to non-Labor and majoritarian principles of democratic government.

Outcomes
The surprising thing about Western Australia is that there has been little research into how the AV system
has affectOO politics overall since its introduction. It is likely that most commentators would assume that
the effects of this system would be the same as at the federal level of politics. The most salient aspect of
electoral politics in Western Australia for most of the twentieth century has been electoral weighting and
malapportionment, surfacing again recenlly as the 'one vote, one value' issue. This issue has tended to
overshadow other electoral issues. Recently, however, other electoral issues have become more topical,
and the increased usage of preferences in detennining election outcomes has meant that the AV is due for
closer scrutiny at all levels of Australian politics.
This comes at a time when Tonkin (1984, p. 45) reports a dimitlished respect 11nd confidence in singlemember electoral systems (of which the AVis one) as opposed to an increasing prestige of proportional
systems, with this trend being most pronounced in Western Australia and Queensland. However, what is
sometimes overlooked in cruder analyses of voting systems is that the presumed fundamental contrast
between single-member and multi-member districts is now more a matter of degree than of lcind, as
observed by Kitzinger (1959) over forty years ago. The AVis a good example of this, being essentially a
multi-member system (the STV) reduced to the AV for use in Australian single-member districts. As
demonstrated in the previous chapter, the AV can be seen as a workable compromise between simple
plurality systems and proportional systems.
Est~blished

in the previous chapter was that the AV was largely introduced at a federal level to combjlt

the rising 'influence of the Labor party by lessening the effects of vote-splitting between nonoLabar
51

candidates. As with federal politics, the introduction of electoral laws like the AV in Western Australia
has long been viewed as the outcome of machinations of blatant political self~interest, rather than the
application of principles upon which the Australian political system is based (Gallop, 1998, p. 76). Also
discussed in relation to federal politics however, is the way in which electoral systems take on a life of
their own and often have outcomes which are unforeseen.
For example, in 1911, the first election in Western Australia to be held under a full (or compulsory)
preferential system of the AV, the non~Labor party which had introduced this system (the Ministerialists)
lost to the Labor Party under Scad dan! As a result of these kinds of outcomes in Western Australia. the
Labor Party's attitude to the AV was varied over the course of the first half century under this system. In
1916, at a Congress of the State branch of the Labor Party, a motion that compulsory preferential marking
under the AV be abolished was carried after it was concluded that it did not favour the Labor Party. This
was in spite of Labor success at the two previous state elections under the compulsory AV system. At the
next Congress in 1919, a motion affirming PR was debated, with one supporter of it arguing that under a
system of PR the Great Southern district would return four or five Labor members. There was much
disagreement over this however. At the 1922 Congress of the Labor Party a speaker pointed out that the
system ofPR had actually operated to the injury of the Labor Party in NSW. In the end however, Labor
MPs in Western Australia did not put forward any bills to either end the use of the AV, or to introduce
any different system such as PR for the lower house. It is probable that their success in the election of
1924 shortly after these debates made this seem irrelevant (Byrne, 1960, p. 27). The AV system appears
to have been accepted more easily in the early years by the WA branch of the Labor Party, than on a
federal level where for many years Labor opposed it and indeed seemed worse off under it.
This acceptance could be attributed to the fact that up until the 1960's, transfer of preferences between
non-Labor parties was poor, with leakage of preferences hi:h (Byrne, 1960, pp.

28~29).

Partly, this was

due to the fragmentation of the early Liberal Party and it's predecessors in Western Australia (Black,
1979). Added to this was the fact that traditional party allegiances and territorial/sectional interests,
extremely pronounced in many Western Australian electorates, limited transfer of preferences between
non-Labor candidates. Much of this had to do with the background behind the origins of Country Party in
WA which was the first in Australia. The Country Party was formed due to a failure of the Liberal Party
to adapt itself to West Australian conditions and adequately represent agricultural and pastoral interests
without appearing to favour urban interests. Agriculturalists and pastoralists of the (now) wheatbelt area,
and dairy farmers and agriculturalists of the state's south west, loathe to vote Labor, 3upported the
formation of a second conservative party to more adequately represent rural interests.

Prominent

Literals, such as former premier John Forrest, were implacably opposed to the formation of another non~
Labor party which they felt would be detrimental to the total

non~Labor

vote and which they perceived

would not survive at any rate. The Country Party fielded their first candidates in the 1914 election, and
all but one of their resulting eight seats in the Legislative Assembly were won from the Liberals.
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Although forced to come to a fonnaJ coalition agreement in 1916 which included preference ex-changes,
for many years w;official tensions. and indeed often overt boJitility. between the two non-Labor parties
and their supporters usually resulted in a marked Jack of preference exchange in Legislative Assembly
contests (Willcock, 1961, pp. 45-60).
For example, Liberal party candidates polled so poorly in wheatbe\t areas that the Liberals rarely even
contested these seats, leaving them to Country Party candidates. Rather, the Country Party consolidated
their support in rural areas, leaving the Liberals to oppose Labor in urban electorates. Indeed, West
(1965, p. 80) claims that in many areas triangular contests failed to reach their full potential due to some
Country Party members directing their preferences away from their Coalition partners, in spite of a formal
agreement between the Liberal and Country parties to swap preferences. An example of this hostility was
the 1959 State election where the CounHY Party did not contest one Labor-held seat, but opposed the
Liberal Party in three electorates (West. 1965, p. 82).
It appears then. that transfer of preferences between candidates from similar ideological backgrounds was

poor in Western Australia

11p

until the 1960's. Evidence from this era demonstrates that other factors

such as the personality vote. locnl issues, and entrenched s~tionalism were more influential in preference
allocatiru1. Far instance. rebel (unendoroed) candidates from various parties rarely ex-changed preferences
successfully with their rival endorsed candidates from the same party.

Similarly, the transfer of

preferences between two candidates of the same rebel group (for example two National Labor
candidates), was also poor. In the same vein. candidates from rival organised Country Parti~:s had nearly
the same amount of (high) preference leakage as those from rival Labor Parties. Maybe the only
exception to this trend against ideologically driven preference allocation was the successful transfer of
preferences between Nationalist and National.Labor Party candidates. Whether endorsed ALP candidates
were able to el\change votes effectively is unknown since multiple endorsement was precluded under
Labor's pledge system.

There is some evidence however to suggest that it may have worked more

effectively than for the other parties, if it had occurred.
Other factors which Byrne (1960 pp. 3l-3Z) claims affetted preference allocation are: position on the
ballot paper, with higher positions scoring better; number of candidates on the paper, with leakage
increasing with the nUJllber of candidates; the closeness of many of the contests; and a general
carelessness on behalf of voters to allocate preferences thoughtfully. These factors lessened the elrtent to
which preferences were kept within party labels or coalition agreements. So, as far as uniting the nonLabor vote, the AV system seems to have been rather ineffective in Western Australia. despite being a
r~.son

behind its introduction. In other Australian states also. there is scant evidence to suggest that

three-cornered contests under the AV have been overly beneficial to

non~Labor

(Goot. 1985, pp. 223-

.224), although Victoria appears to demonstrate more disadvalltage to Labor WJder the AV in early years
than others (Rydon, 1968b, p. 237).
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For the sake of comparison, it would appear that it has not been unusual for the AV to fail to ensure
preference exchange within ideology or coalition agreements even with non-Australian experiences of
the use of the AV. It is likely that those who introduced the AV in British Columbia, which used the AV
(with optional preference marking) for the provincial elections of 1952 and 1954,looked to how the AV
had apparently worked on a federal level in Australia to disadvantage less conservative parties, as well as
favouring more centre rather than redical candidates.

The AV was introduced by the conservative

coalition (Liberals and Progressive Conservative Parties) who expected to gain from each other's
preferences, and thus keep the socialist CCF (Co-operative Commonwealth Federation) from fanning
govenunent and "wrecking" British Columbia's economy (Phillips, 1976, pp. 271-273).

Ultimately

however, the system worked to the disadvantage of the conservative parties and actually enabled a new
party, the Social Credit League, to benefit from the preferences of all three of the original parties and
fonn government. The AV did. however, prevent the CCF from winning government on a minority of
votes and "upsetting the free enterprise system" (Phillips, 1976, pp. 276"281).

Again, those who

introduce electoral law cannot always predict how it will shape outcomes. The conservative coalition in
British Columbia were right about the disadvantage to the CCF, but misjudged the benefit the AV would
bring to their own chances of electoral success.

Covered ir.1 the previous chapter was the early hope that introduction of the AV would enable the abolition
of pre-sele..:tion since candidates from the same party would be able to exchange preferences. While at
the federal level the AV was deemed to have been a failure as far as abolishing pre-selection was
concerned, in some states it was more successful, with Western Australia being one of these. Although
~uccess

was limited, it did see the Liberals in Western Australia endorse multiple candidates with positive

results (i.e. minimal leakage of preferences), and there was evidence that it had the potential to work well
for the ALP also (Byrne, 1960, pp. 28, 31), should there be an end to the party's opposition to it. As
demonstrated above however, the refusal to endorse was not particularly effective in enforcing party
discipline in Western Australia, e::pecially in non-Labor camps. with many rebel candidates holding seats
due to, or even in spite of, preference distribution (Byrne, 1950, p. 28). The election of some women in
electorates where the Liberal Party gave cl'!ctors a choice between male and female candidates through
multiple endorsement was mentioned in the previous chapter. In 1921 in the lower house in Western
Australia, Edith Cowan was thus elected and became the first woman in parliament.

As far as other effects of the AV in Western Australia up until the mid 1970's, these are a little more
difficult to detennine. For example, on a federal level the AV has ensured the government elected has
had the support of the majority of voters. In Western Australia however, the number of uncontested seats
(seats held by acclamation) and 'not genuine contests' up until the mid 1970's distorted the functioning of
the electoral system for the state's lower house, making raw electoral figures for this period open to
contention. Table 4.1 (on the following page) shows the number of uncontested scats and 'not genuine'
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contests for the period between the introduction of the AV and 1977. A contest was considered not
genuine in this era if there was no choice between Labor and non.Labor, such as a contest between ALP
and Communist candidates, or between Liberal and Country Party candidates only.

This situation

changed after the mid 1970's when both the ALP and the Liberal party followed the general rule of
contesting every seat (Buxton, 1979, pp. 35·37).

Table 4.1
Ut~contested

Districts and 'Not Genui11e' Contests (Western Australian Legislative Assembly 1908·

197'J)
Percentage
Election Uncontested
Not genuine
Percentage
year
districts contest of seats total clecturnte
1908

9

13

1911
1914
1917
1921

10

I
8
IS
8

1924
1927

12

IS

10
6

i930

9
ii

8
ti
7

1933

9

9

19J6

15

9

1939
1943

7
3

1953

10
12
20
12
22

1956

16

1~59

1962
1965

II
ll
II

8
8
6

l'J68

14

1971
1974

0

1977

0

1947
1950

Srmr(!(''

I

2
5
4

44.0
22.0
46.0
50.0
28.0
40.0

30.u

36.0
36.0
48.0

34.0
30.0
44.0

34.0
52.0
4S.U

38.0

J?.l
21.4
35.8

49.8

25.9
29.5
I? .'J

33.4
30.7
16.1
24.7
27.0

38.3
29.1
47.5
44.8
37.1

34.0

26.5

3
4
1

28.0
35.3

23.3

3.9

2.7

I
3

3.9

2.4

5.5

3.6

........

00,

R11rfrm, /979, pp. 35-31'1

A5 on a federal level, fundamental changes have affected state politics over the last few decades.

Preferences have come to be more important in determining election outcomes and seat share in the lower
house. Much of this has to do first and foremost with the ''period of flux" in which all major parties
across western liberal democracies are finding themselves (Sharman, 1997, p. SO). Major parties in
Australian politics are becoming increasingly executive dominated, run by party elites (Ward, 1939).
Furthennorc they are increasing appearing as ideologically indivisible, and removed from ordinmy
people. The high levels of stable party identification characteristic of the Australian system has weakened
considerably over the last 30 years (Jupp & Sawer, 2001, p. 222).
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Western Australia appears to be a little more responsive than the norm to these trends. It has already been
mentioned that dissatisfaction with electoral systems is most pronounced in Western Australia and
Queensland. Consider the One Nation phenomenon in the 1998 Federal election whlch was born in
Queensland and resounded firmly in Western Australia. In a massive show of dissatisfaction with the two
major parties, this minor party polled nearly a million primary votes without &l.lining any direct
representation in the House of Representatives. Voters from Western Australia were in the vanguard of
this protest with 9.3 per cent of West Australians voting One Nation, compared to 8.4 per cent nationally.
Overall, some 22.4 per cent of West Australians voted for groupings other than the two major
alternatives, as compared to 17.6 per cent nationally (Shannan & Mirag\iotta, 2000, p. 134).
In Western Au!,tralia specifically, the 1990's saw a

including pa1 ·
operation cformally

~

~

ious erosion of public trust in political institutions,

olitics, following a series of political scant!·
mment (Sharman, 1997, p. 49).

·hich led to several commissions into the

Thu WA Inc. Royal Conunission (known more

.. L>yal Commission into Commercial Activities of Government and Other Matters) and

the Commission on Government have had a significant impact on West Austrnlian political culture, and
"to attempt to understand contemporary politics from the 1990's without a special reference to these
inquiries would be difficult" (Phillips, Black, Batt & Fischer, 1998, p. 235). These commissions,
particularly WA Inc., have largely

neg~tive

connotations for most West Australians which appear to have

penneated state politics in the new century. The following chapter which covers research conducted on
focus groups within Western Australian electorates has one resounding theme: the 'average' voter is
extremely disenchanted with the two major parties, both seen as 'com1pt' and removed from the people,
while minor parties and independent candidates are becoming increasingly popular.

The loss of trust in the 1990's coincided with major changes in the lower house in Western Australia. In
1991 due to internal problems within the state branch of the ALP, defections by several Labor MP's
created a minority government, dependent for its survival on the support of independent members. For
the first time in Western Australia, in the 1993 state election, candidates from the two more prominent
minor parties, the Australian Democrats and the WA Greens, contested seats in the Legislative Assembly.
Since 1993, the number of independents elected to the lower house in Western Australia has increased at
every election: three in 1996; four in 2001. The continuing small but significant number of independent
members in most state parliamer>truy chambers is an indication of a dissatisfaction with major party
politics (Sharman, 1997, p. 51). Minor parties and independents now have a unique opportunity, due to
this dissatisfaction, to influence election outcomes through preferences even if they do not gilln any seats
in the lower house. While also tnte for Australian politics generally, this seems especially pronounced in
Western Australia where the minor party and independent vote was the first in Australia to exceed 10 per
cent.

This fact has not gone unnoticed by the minor parties in Western Australia - they contested a

record number of Legislative Assembly electorates in the 2001 State election, rightly assuming that they
had the power to influence results with their preferences. For example, Pauline Hanson's One Nation
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Party contested a record 54 out of 57 electorates, directing their preferences away from all but a few
sitting members (Black & Phillips, 2001, pp. 357, 360).

An indication of the increasing importance of preferences in West Australian elections can be detennined
by looking at how many electorates usually require the distribution of preferences to detelll'.ine the
winning candidate.

Appendix 3 is a tabulation of all the elections in Western Australia since the

introduction of the AV 1907, showing figures for both tho number of electorates which required
rreference distribution to detennine outcomes, and the number of electorates in which a candidate came
from behind to win due to preferences.

A.JJ the table shows, up until very recently, the majority of

candidates who won, won on first preference votes. At times the number who won on first preference
votes were only slightly more than half of the winning candidates, but there was never less than thirty-~o
candidates who won on first preference votes (i.e. with an absolute majority of primary votes) up until the
1990's. During recent elections this number has started to decline, with quite a dramatic fall in the last
state election. In the last state election (2001), preferences were required to determine absolute majorities
in forty-three out of fifty-seven electorates.

Put simply, this means that in very few electorates do

candidates now win outright with an overali majority of primary votes. In other words, if a simple first~
past~the-post

system of voting was in use in Western Australia during the last state election, then forty-

four members ofthe lower house would have won their seat with electoral support of a minority of voters,
with this support sometimes as low as twenty-five per cent of the total valid votes cast (Government and
Politics database). This fact has important implications for the AV system. The two major parties are
now more than ever required to accommodate the policies of the minor parties in order to be assured
preference flows. The last state election in 2001, in which the Labor government was swept into power
on platforms of environmental concern and sustainable development, also demonstrated a marked
increase in the Green vote in Western Australia. Without courting this vote, it is unlikely the Gallop
government wou:d have claimed victory.

The WA Greens polled remarkably well in the 2001 state election.

WlLb not gaining any direct

representation in the assembly, t;1eir first preference vote share was up 2.54 per cent from the 1996
election. As previously mentioned, it is only due to the filet that support for these minor parties tends to
be spread over many electorates that they don't gain any seats in the lower house under the system of the
AV. This was certainly true tOr another newcomer in the 2001 State eleel:ion- Pauline Hansons One
Nation Party. Jt is quite obvious, as shown in Table 4.2 below, that the number of first preference votes
for a party is not an accurate indication of seats won.
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Table 4.2

-

Western Australia Legislative Assembly Election· 10 Febmary, 2001
Fin I preferoo~

Flntprdr~

vole(n)

vote &bare (~•)

Australian Labor Party

382,308

37.24

Liberal Pnrty

319,n7

PaulincHnnsonsOne
NationPnrty

Partyllllme

Sc:lt&haR
{~•)

won (n)

32

56.]4

31.16

16

28.07

98,321

9.58

0

0

Independents

78,952

7.69

4

7.02

Greem WA

74,641

7.27

0

0

Nntiorud Party

33,450

3.26

,

8.77

Auslfalinn Dt:mocmts

27,102

2.64

0

0

0\ho

1.17

Source: Government and Politics Database

Examination of these figures shows that while Pauline Hansons One Nation Party polled nearly 10 per
cent of the primary vote, it failed to gain even one seat in the lower house. Compare this to the National
Party, polling a mere 3.26 per cent, but winning five se.-us. Obviously, support for the National Party is
concentrated in rural electorates, while support for One Nation is more evenly spread throughout the state.
One Nation's national

vice~president,

John Fisher, complained bitterly that preferential voting had worked

against them, both in the lower (with the AV) and upper (with PR) houses in the election (ABC News
Online, 2001).

While this is a valid criticism from a minor party's point of view, maybe what Fisher should have
considered is the way in which major parties must now more than ever, under the AV system in the lower
house, take into consideration the policies of minor parties in order to maintain their vote share. These
minor parties may run candidates in elections as a way of influencing government policy on particular
issues. They can also use the electoral process as a way of publicising their policies by ranking the
candidates of other parties according to their sympathy towards the party's goals on their how·to-vote
cards (Sharman, 1997, p. 53), this being exact1y the tactic One Nation utilised.

This tactic used by One Nation is what is sometimes known as strategic voting. Sometimes strategic
voting can mean panics adopting stlategies such as running independent candidates which effectively
take votes away from the opposition. More often it denotes situations in which parties, and sometimes
independent candidates, forego ranking candidates on their how·to-vote cards according to ideological
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considerations. Instead they use how-to-vote cards as a way in which to oust parties with which they
have other, more pragmatic, grievences.

In the 2001 Western Australian state election One Nation

directed preferences against nearly all sitting members, except for a few Liberal MP's who had not openly
attacked One Nation (Blaci:: & Phillips, 2001, p. 357). This was primarily a response to the way in which
major parties had been seen to combine forces against One Nation in this and previous federal and state
elections. One Nation polled 9.58 per cent of the primary vote (see Table 4.2 on previous page), which in
the end impacted heavily on all sitting members, and especially Coalition members. Knockout blows
such as the loss of One Nation preferences in Albany and Geraldton sealed the fate of the Coalition
(Black & Phillips, 2001, p. 357-358), which ideologically was not considered too fur removed from One
Nation.

The two over-riding factors which made tllis tactic all the more potent was the loss of first preference
votes given to major parties by voters, and the sheer number of seats contested by minor parties. Recent
trends in WA seem to i:ldicate an increased primary vote share going to minor parties and independents in
future elections. And, along with this, an increase in the number Of minor parties and other candidates
contesting seats in the lower house, which, since 1945, has traditionally been strongly dichotomised with
a small National Party playing a crucial role in non-Labor politics.

Couple these factors with more

closely contested elections, and we could see the AV working for the first time to actually give more
scope to those 'many shades of political opinion' as the architects of thls system envisioned.

Another way to assess the impact of the AV is to look at the number of seats in whlch the candidate with
a plurality of first preference votes was defeated after preference distribution. That is, where preference
distribution changed the result. This is the most telling exercise since this is where the AV (preferential
system) distinguishes itself from a cruder first-pasHhe-post system of voting. A1though the number of
electorates in the Western Australian 2001 state election which required the distribution of preferences
was high, the number of seats in which the results which were acbJally changed due to preference
distribution was fairly relative to previous elections. In only six electorates was the candidate leading on
primary votes overtaken by their rival due to preference distribution.

Thls number has fluctuated

somewhat over state elections since 1911, and in the last state election was the hlghest since 1930, but it
cannot be said unequivocally that there has been a marked increase in this over recent times. In fact, on a
percentage basis, in both 1917 and 1930 t~1e percentage of seats in which preferences altered final results
was greater than 2001 (see Appendix 3).

What is important to recognise however, is that unlike a simple plurality system of voting, the AV at least

offers this chance for candidates to draw on preferences in order to gain a majority of votes. So, whlle the
number of candidates who come from behlnd to win has been small (anywhere from none up to 18 per
cent), in theory there is the chance for any candidate to gain a lead from preference distribution. In effec~
any major party which ignores the policies of those minor parties which direct preferences their way, will

59

soon feel the full effect of the AV system.

Most importantly, the two different methods of looking at the results of the AV utilised above need to be
combined to find some overall conclusion about the workings of the AV, as compared to a simple
plurality system. We have seen that the number of electorates which require preference distribution in
order to detennlne final electoral outcomes (absolute majorities) appears to be on the increase. On the
other band, the actual number of seats in which preferences alter the final outcomes appears to be
remaining fairly consistent over time, with some variation from election to election. This means that
elections are becoming more closely contested, with a larger number of scats which require preference
distribution to confirm the winning candidate.

And, with the ever present chance that preference

distribution could change the primary result, major parties must, more than ever before, ensure their
policies appease not only their staunch supporters, but also that increasing portion of the electorate who
are voting for an alternative to one of the two major party groupings.

On both a state and federal level, the AV in recent years has appeared to talce on a life of its own due to
other various political factors, reinforcing the view supported earlier in this chapter about electoral
systems being independent of political parties and their aspirations. As we saw, on a federal level the AV
has tended to benefit the Labor party in recent times. This trend appears even more pronounced in
Western Australia. If ever the AV did disadvantage Labor in WA. and evidence for this is patchy at best,
it is certainly not the case at the present time. In the 2001 state election, of the six electorates in which
results were changed due to preferences, four (Swan Hills, Bunbury, Joonda\up, Albany) saw a Liberal
candidate leading on the primary count with a Labor candidate finally claiming victory.

Only one

(Kalgoorlie) saw a Labor candidate conceding defeat to a non-Labor candidate. The remaining electorate
(Alfred Cove) saw a Liberal candidate lose to a former Liberal turned independent who campaigned
heavily on the conservation issue.

Green, Democrat, and (rather suprisingly) One Nation preferences appear to have played an important
part in Labor electoral success

in Western Australia in 2001. While it could be argued that Labor would

still have won the election under a first-past-the-post system, it would have been a tenuous victory with a
margin of only one seat giving them the majority in the lower house. Such a narrow margin calls into
question a government's mandate to represent the majority of voters and does not leave much room fur
error. However, largely due to minor parties and independents contesting record numbers of seats in the
lower house, the 2001 state election was a decisive victory for Labor due to the preferences of the nearly
30 per cent of West Australian voters who cho~-e not to give their first preference vote to one of the major
parties (Black & Phillips, 2001, pp. 355-362).

With elections becoming increasingly closely contested in recent times, and with preferences detcnnining
a party's lead on its opposition, it is very possible that in the future in Western Australia we will see
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election victory being determined through preferences. It is also probable that minor parties will gain seat
representation as bas already happened in other states.

The results of the focus groups, covered in the

following chapters, indicate that minor parties are being seen more and more as a viable alternative to the
major parties. In fact, this research appears to indicate that if voters better understood the amount of
freedom they had in preference allocation. and could also overcome the fear of the 'wasted vote', then the
AV would deliver somewhat different results than it now does. The possibility that the AV can deliver
results not unlike a cruder first-past-the-post system simply because that is how voters perceive it, is
considered in more depth in the following chapters.

It is very possible that in future elections in WA all the factors discussed above - voter discontent with the
major parties, increasing importance of preferences in achieving majority govenunent, growing support
for minor parties and independents- will all come together to produce quite different results under the AV
system than what Western Australia has witnessed previously.
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CHAPTER FIVE
TID: METHODOLOGY OF FOCUS GROUPS

Introduction
The analysis of public perception and understanding of the AV in Western Australia is achieved through
data collected from focus group interviews which included respondents filling out an anonymous

questionnaire. Public awareness is an extremely important part of any voting system since it is the voters
who, in the end, must use the system to gain their desired representation in Parliament

If votrr

knowledge about the system in place is found to be lacking (quite probable in the case of a more

complicated system such as the AV), then it doesn't matter how effective the system is in theory because
it will not be utilised by the voting public to it's full potential. In this case it could be said that

representation becomes flawed.

BefOre proceeding further with methodological considerations, a point must be made here regarding
terminology. Because voters arc largely unfamiliar with the tcnn 'alternative vote', the more common
terms 'preferentin1 voting' or 'preference voting' were utilised during the focus group research, both by
the researcher and participants. 1his choice was made in order to eliminate confusion, especially since
many participants in the study were already quite confused about the mechanics of the voting system in
question. Therefore, in this chapter and the next, when the terms 'preferential voting' and 'preference
voting' are stated, they refer explicitly to the alternative vote {AV) as used in the lower house in Western
Australia and in the House of Representatives in the Australian Parliament. Furthermore., in this chapter
and the following, when a direct quote is used from the focus group discussions, they will be italicised to
avoid confusion with the rest ofthe text.

The use of focus groups for qualitative research
The choice of focus groups to resea>ch political issues is unusual. However, public understanding and
perception of a voting system is not a topic which lends itself to public opinion polling techniques, as it is
difficult to reduce the issues researched to one or two quantitative poll questions.

Given this, it is

surprising that group work, as a research technique in the social sciences, is still relatively underdeveloped and un-acknowledged as a legitimate way of coUecting data. More often, focus groups are
used for i!lustrating a theory generated by other methods or as a cost effective way of interviewing more
than one person at a time {Kitzinger, 1994, p. 104).

One example however, is the variant of focus group research used by prominent Australian socia]
62

researcher Hugh Mackay. He uses these to draw out generalisations regarding public attitudes to political
issues in Australia (Mackay, 1993; 1999). Mackay uses small group discussions- that is, people meeting
in familiar environments discussing issues without anyone directing the conversation or asking structured
questions- to gajn his information. One critic of this method is Murray Goat (2002a, p. 20) who criticises
this method on three accounts. First, he claims, it is difficult to generate reliable historical insights from
evidence gathered this way, and impossible to show the extent to which the distribution of opinion has
actually changed. Second, he feels that this method does not readily lend itself to generalisation; to do
that typically requires some approximation to random sampling and much larger numbers. Goat finds
that Mackay's conclusions are lacking scope, since they are based upon limited age groups, limited socioeconomic strata, and limited geographical distribution. Finally, he contends that these findings, however
representative, need to be chl!cked and validated through other methodological tools. This would involve
asking respondents direct questions, one of the most basic forms of attitudinal research.
Applying the above three criticisms to the methodology use.d in this study is beneficial in that it serves as
a reminder of the limitations of all attitudinal research. However this case is slightly different in several
ways. To the first point regarding historical value, the objective in this study is to research attitudes
towards a voting system currently functioning; thus more focus will be more on present attitudes, rather
than in attempting to gain historical insights on how these attitudes have changed. Furthennore, since this
is a topic which has received little previous attention in Western Australia in its own right, there are not
many specific previous findings to compare with to gain information on how opinions have changed.
The second point Goat makes about needing a greater random sampling and larger numbers to make
generalisations, presents maybe a greater obstacle for the focus group method. However, since the range
of people covered is smaller (i.e. only West Australians) the geographical boundaries are somewhat
smaller and more manageable. Attempts are made to cover both rural and urban Western Australia in the
focus groups, although admittedly the extremities of the state are untouched. Every effort is made in this
study to cover a fairly broad spectrum of the voting population, while taking into account those factors
that tend to influence peoples attitudes towards political issues.
underpinning political attitudes which are recognised by

Five key demographic factors

research~'!":: .lie

gender, age, region, religious

denomination and church attendance. Added to this are the key social structural variables of education,
occupation, employment, trade union membership, and subjective class. All these factors are used by
Bean and McAllister to analyse voting behaviour in the 2001 election (2002, pp. 274-277). The research
conducted for this study suggests that these factors affect not only partisanship, but also basic political
attitudes and understanding. In fact, balancing these factors could be argued to be more important in
attitudinal research than simply obtaining random, approximate samples of a target population, since any
research which does not balance all these fa<..1ors has the potential to be seriously biased. Rather
interesting is the way in which the same Murray Goat who presented these criticisms of Mackay's
methodology has also more recently outlined some blase!! which can be inherent in polls conducted in a
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broad and random manner (2002b, p. 89). This must not be interpreted by the reader as an inconsistency
in Goat's analysis, but rather as a reminder that all methodologies have li'llitations. Therefore, the focus
groups in this research • while maybe not large, random samples - were constructed taking into account
the above distinctions used by Bean and McAllister, which this researcher perceived in preliminaiy
studies to be largely influential.

The third point outlined above regarding analytical tools. such as asking direct questions of respondents,
is accounted for in this study. The focus groups used were asked questions in a more structured way than
in Mackay's methods, these being questions regarding their attitudes and understanding of the preferential
voting system (the AV) in Western Australia. A1so, the completion of the questionnaire, which asks
questions about issues covered in the focus group discussions, provides a more structured framework for
analysis, as wei! as opportunity for cross comparison between the recorded conversations and
questiotu1aire results.
Another problem with any kind of surveying of attitudes is that the issue being addressed could have an
impact on the outcome of the questions. For instance, respondents may not wish to disclose their views
on certain issues, especially in a focus group situation where others are present, and therefore falsify their
response. However, we can suppose that this would be more of a problem in cases of emotive or
controversial issues. For electoral issues, as in this study, the only foreseeable problem could be that
respondents would maybe want to appear more politically engaged than they would otherwise be,
perceiving this to be a requirement ofparticipation.

In spite of the limitations of focus group research, Khzinger, in her article on AIDS research and focus

groups, (1994, p. 116) outlines the advantages gained by interaction between respondents in a focus group
situation. This interaction:

•

highlights the respondents attitudes, priorities, language, and framework of understanding;

•

encourages a great variety of communication from participants • tapping into a wide range and form
of understanding;

•

helps to identify group noons;

•

provides valuable insight into the cp'?":·ation of group/social processes in the articuiation of knowledge
(for example, through the examination of what information is censured or muted within the group);

•

can encourage open conversation about embarrassing subjects and facilitate the expression of ideas
and experiences that might be left underdeveloped in an interview or questionnaire.

The questioJU1aire used in coqjunction with the focus groups is also a technique whlch Kitzinger

advocates {1994, p.

~05).

The questionnaire is valuable in providing data on each participants attitudes

and beliefs before the discussion has affected them in any way. It allows for some comparison betWeen
initial, individual responses and later group n:sponses, as well as maximising subsequent debate and
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encouraging participants to express their own point of view because, as other authors have noted, "the
process of writing things down reinforces a person's commitment to contributing them to the group, even
in the face of apparent disapproval" (Morgan, 1988, p. 58). Furthennore, this way every respondent has a
chance to express opinions on every issue discussed, negating to a certain extent the criticism that focus
groups only reflect the opinions of the most dominant or talkative in the group.

Participants
The way in which respondents are chosen is important for this kind of research. All the participants in
each group (except one) were drawn from pre-existing social groups. That is, clusters of people who
already knew each other through living, working, or socialising together. All members of any one group
came from simllar backgrounds, lived in similar geographical areas, and were of similar age, socioeconomic status, and political persuasion.

Religion and church attendance were also taken into

consideration, with some focus groups taken from larger church groups. These kinds of pre-existing
social groupings are those in which political sentiments are naturally discussed, albeit to a less structured
degree than in a focus group. These kinds of focus groups are considered by some researchers to be
particularly suited for attitudinal research (M:organ, 1988, p. 17), although admittedly more in
sociological or anthropological studies. A fucus group, although essentially a contrived setting, can be
used to "encourage people to engage with one another, verbally fonnulate their ideas and draw out the
cognitive structures which previously have been unarticulated" (Kitzinger, 1994, p. 106).
This study evidenced that people will more readily discuss their political views in an honest and
spontaneous way within a group in which they already feel confident and comfortable. In order to
validate this hypothesis, one of the focus groups (focus group number three - see following chapter for
focus group profiles) was made up of respondents who did not know each other. In all other respects this
group of people were similar - they a11 came from a similar geographical area, were of a similar age and
background. They closely mirrored the other focus group (Group 1), with the only difference being that
the participants were unfamiliar with one another.

This group were either very reluctant to talk

(especially initially), had separate discussions within themselves, and it was more difficult to formulate
coherent themes from this group.

The methodology of focus groups
The section above lists several ways in which focus groups facilitate interaction between respondents,
which in tum tells the researcher some important things, not only about participants' views and
perceptions, but also about the contexts in which these are formed. Firstly, recall that Kitzinger claims
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that focus groups "tughlight the respondents' attitudes, priorities, language, and framework of
understanding'' (1994, p. 116). Group work is invaluable for grounded tbeocy development- focusing on
the generation rather than the testing of theory and exploring the categories wtuch the participants use to
order their experience (Glazer & Strauss, 1967). Or, as Kitzinger (1994, p. 108) puts it: "Group work
ensures that priority is given to the respondents' tuerarchy of importance., their language and concepts,
their frameworks for understanding the world".

This is invaluable for researching attitudes to, and understanding o( a voting system which impacts on
each participant's political. life. A more structured method of research (such as a poll question, for
example) may overlook the ways in which different groups of people express understanding and attitude.
In this study, each group had quite characteristic ways of understanding the political process and voting

system, as was relevant to their own experience or understanding of the world. For example, the group
which were mainly in the teaching profession or similar white collar occupations with high levels of
tertiary education, talked about voting systems in terms of abstract values and concepts, policy outcomes,

and the importance of education about the whole political process. Education and knowledge figured
highly in their discussions. On the other hand, a group with a particularly low level of education in which
respondents held up a tradition of generations of working class labor values, talked in terms of first-hand,
practical experiences (predominately negative in regards to politics), and with a well developed cynicism
of political jargon and abstract values/concepts such as democracy or stable government.
Use of language becomes important here. Analysis oft he way in which certain forms of speech facilitate
or inhibit discussion and clarify or confuse issues, becomes advantageous for the researcher to engage.
For example, in this study, the use of humorous or derogatory words often covered an underlying lack of
understanding and interest in subjects like voting systems. In those groups which were more alienated
and disaffected by politics in general, this was more prevalent.
However, this is not to take away from the importance and relevance of comments like these. On the
contrary, focus groups encourage "a great variety of communication from participants tapping into a
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wide range and form of understanding" (Kitzinger, 1994, p. 116). This includes not only basic language,
but aJso other more advanced forms of conununication such as anecdotes, jokes, expressions, and loose
word associations. As a researcher, listening to communication between participants allows one time to
acclimatise to language, and the values, concepts, and understandings that this represents. The fact that
participants provide an audience for each other encourages a greater variety of communication that is
often unexplored in more traditional methods of research such as questionnaires. Take for example, the
focus group comprised of wheatbelt fanners and their wives. One female participant in this group, after
beil@ asked about whether she used how-to-vote cards responded:

"we/~

I do use the cards because I'm

really not knowledgeable mos! of the time about it, but I check with my advisor first". Her 'advisor', she

indicated, was her husband seated next to her. This generated shared laughter within the group as they
66

;ecognised that it was typically the mr.n in their group who were more knowledgeable about, and engaged

in, political issues. And furthennore, that everyone was quite at ease with this situation. However, this
very same comment in another of the groups would quite possibly have generated discomfort or derision.
To quote another example from thls group whlch may have been lost on another group: One participant
who had previously been a Liberal candidate for the state seat of Eyre, when asked "Yhether he was a
'swinging' voter (i.e. one who changes who they support with minimal discomfort) responded "I'm a

.lwinging voter -I swing between al/ the conservatives". This response generated much laughter from the
rest of the group who mutually understood that none of them really fit the category of swinging voters they were all entrenched conservative voters.
Another example of this kind of communication at work was the youngest focus group (aged between 2025) talking about minor parties. Minor parties were high on the preference list for thls group. However,
when one less well infonned participant asked who some of the minor parties were, she got some rather
humourous responses. When looking deeper into thls apparently meaningless caricature of minor parties,
it was evident that these voters, although they all tended to place minor parties first on their ballot, still
perceived them to be rather ineffectual and, in the words of one respondent, "out there man". Later
comments backed this up, such as: "no-one expects them to get in", and "if a minor party actually gotln
... it would be interesting . .. obviously the conservattve parties keep everything fairly level". It is also

interesting to note the use of the word 'conservative' hr~re ~ to these younger voters it means either major
party grouping. It became obvious to thls researcher that these participants were talking at a much more
spontaneous and honest level than they would if say, an older person was a part of the forus group.

These examples demonstrate how group research helps to identify group nonns, and facllitates the
collection of data on these noons. For instance, often a particular phrase will help to mobilise an
assertion of group consensus (Kitzinger, 1994, p. 109). Phrases such as these occurred often throughout
the groups in thls study.

For example, during one discussion on minor parties being often under-

represented by the preferential system, one respondent said regarding One Nation and democracy,
')lou 've got a million voles, and you still haven't got a say". The general consensus on thls conunent

summed up what that whole group felt about democracy in Australia- that it was little more than an ideal,
whlch didn't exist in the 'real' world.

In relation to thls, probably one downside of this kind of group work is that the group may censor any
deviation from these group standards or norms (Kitzinger, 1994, p. 110). However, if the researcher is
alert and adept, they can usually pick up on whether every respondent is in agreement with the statements
being made. The researcher must attempt to recognise what infonnation the composition of some groups
may inhibit. On the positive side however, thls in itself can be illuminating for the researcher. Especially
relevant to thls study was whether every respondent really had the same level of understanding of the
voting system in question, or whether some quieter respondents disguised a lack of understanding, or
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even a greater understanding in some cases. Surprisingly, the groups which tended to censor information
were those with a lesser understanding of the voting system, and also those which tended to be more
alienated from, and disaffected with, politics altogether. In one group for instance, one respondent who
suggested that the onus fell back to the individual to become more involved and educated was largely
ignored by the rest of the group who were happier to discuss how they had no interest in politics because
they had been 'let down'. On the other hand, groups in which knowledge and political engagement were
viewed as desirable, tended to promote these attributes and looked down upon those who did not
participate or educate themselves. In this way then, focus group discussjons provide valuable insight into
the operation of group/social processes in the articulation of knowledge - or, as in these examples,
through the examination of what information is censured or muted within the group.

Finally, focus groups can "encourage opc!'i conversation about embarrassing subjects and facilitate the
expression of ideas and llx:periences that might be left underdeveloped in an interview or questionnaire"
(Kitzinger, 1994, p. 116). Many participants would not consent to be interviewed separately, especially if
they felt that they did not know enough. Often when beginning the group discussions on preferential
voting, many participants worried aloud that they did not know enough about it to join in. Once the
discussion was in progress however, they often found they had some valuable contributions to make. It is
very probable that without the support of their friends who had similar views, many of the participants
would not have been so honest about their lack of understanding of the voting system, for example.
Probably the most limiting aspect of this study is the fact that the number of focus groups (and therefore,
population sample covered) is quite small due to the time and resources available to this researcher.
Further exploration of these issues through a more random, representative sample would be advantageous
to any conclusions dmwn by this researcher. On the other hand however, statewide opinion potls may be
hampered by confusion about the mechanics of a voting system. This was certainly evidenced in this
study. The questionnaire completed by aU the focus group participants, which is quantitative such as a
poll question would be, showed little of the depth and variations of perceptions regarding the preferential
voting system which came to light during the focus group discussions. For instance, most participants
chose the neutral opinion option in the questionnaire when asked whether they thought the preferential
system was democratic and effective. The focus group discussions however, showed that the participants
had more opinions on this than they themselves realised, or at least would commit to on paper. As this
study showed, a complicated issue such as the mechanics of a voting system becomes difficult to reduce
to a simple poll question for the electomte to answer.
Although much political research has tl'aditionally been conducted through opinion polls, the use of polls
in the last (2001) federal election raised some questions about their reliability. Well known is the way in
which pollster Gary Morgan, who wrongly predicted a Labor Party federal victory, lost his contract with
The Bu/lelin after the election. There are many ways in which polls can be biased and unrepresentative
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(for some e."{amples see the reference given earlier: Goot, 2002b, p. S9), making focus group~ a viable
option for this kind of research.
While a questionnaire on its own may be lacking for this research. a strength of this study is the use of the
questionnaires for comparison to the recorded group conversations.

This structures the research

somewhat. The questionnalre is valuable in providing data on each participants attitudes and beliefs
before the discussion has affected them in any way. It allows for some comparison between initial,
individual responses and later group responses, as well as maximising subsequent debate and encoumging
participnuts tu .::;.:press their own point of view. Furthennore., this way every respondent has a chance to
express confidential opinions on every issue discussed, which balances the claim above that groups may
censor some information.
Rather than viewing this data as an accurate depiction of the whole population of West Australian voters,
rather view the focus groups a being random pockets, or samples if you like, of the West Australian
voting population at large. Every attempt has been made to sample diverse groups of people, covering the
key demographic and social variables mentioned earlier. These factors are well documented in having an

influence on interest in, and understanding of, the political process. However, each focus group is in
itself rea.sonably homoge;;.ous, so that the groups can be compared and contrasted on a whole to other
groups without having to aooount for too much variation within each group.
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CHAPTER SIX
VOTERS AND THEIR PREFERENCES : THEIR
UNDERSTANDING AND PERCEPTIONS OF THE
ALTERNATIVE VOTE

Introduction
This chapter covers the results of the research conducted through the focus groups. Broadly speaking,
the aims of this research are firstly; to dctennine what level of understanding the West Australian voters
have of the AV system used to e\Nt representatives to the Legislative Assembly; and second, to

determine what these voters think of this system.

This data is presented in several formats. Firstly, a profile of each

fo~o:us

group is given, along with an

outline of the outstandil:;g themes deducted from that particular group. In this section, reference is made
to Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 which are fonnulated from the results of the focus group questionnaire.
The questionnaire can be found in Appendix 4 and the tables can be found in Appendix 5. In the second
part of this chapter, some common themes from all of the groups are looked at in more detail. These
themes are compared and cor:trasted firstly in relation to e.:tch other; and secondly, in relation to exi~ting
theory about the relevant topic.

Focus Groups: Profiles and Responses
Focus Group One
l'ro!i!<;
The first group studied consisted of six people, all residing in the same street. Respondents ranged in
ages from 30 to 40, with four males and two females. They could be loosely described as being of
working class origins. They fit the profile of traditional Labor voters, hailing from generations of Labor
voters, although they also could be described as now being somewhat disaffected Labor supporters.

Theme~

There were several main themes emerging from this group. The first was that all the respondents had
very little understanding of the AV or how it operated, as shown in Table 6.1. Most of this group thought
that somdmw the parties chose where the preferences went, rather than the voters themselves. They
didn't realise how much control they had over where their own prefere11ces were allocated, although none
of them claimed to use how~to·vote cards. This confusion points to a distinct lack of understanding of
just how the system works. This group perceived that the system was utilised by the two major parties for
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their own political ends. As a whole, this group were very cynical toward politics in general and showed
no interest in learning more about the voting system since, in the words of one respondent, "its tzot going

to count anyway". According to information taken from the questionnaire, the only two things about
government which generated any amount of interest were the law making role of Parliament and its
procedures. In keeping with this, one very pervasive theme in this group was a lack of trust in politicians.
This group felt unrepresented on a whole and very alienated from the political process. Their discontent
with politics in general appeared to affect how they perceive the voting system - as unfair,
unrepresentative and corrupt.

One respondent summed up what everyone in the group felt about

preferential voting: "it gets you nawhere {and] I'm not in favour of il".

Focus Group Two
Profile:
This group consisted of six: people, all familiar with each other. Ages did vary slightly in this group,
from 30 to 50.

There was only one male in the group.

All respondents hailed from a middle class

background, having white collar professions with half the group working in the education sector. All
were tertiary educated, several of a very high level. They described themselves as traditional Liberal
voters, but while abo sympathetic to Green politics.

Theme§;.
This group ha~~ n similar understanding of the preferential voting system to the previous group, with areas
of confusion also the same. Areas which these respondents were confused about included how-to-vote
cards, and how parties control preference flows. Interestingly, this whole group claimed to use how-tovote cards and were very influenced by them. In fact, mcst of them didn't realise that they didn't have to
use them, so in this way were le:.>s caMy about the system than the previous group. This group took their
political choice very seriously, giving some thought to preference allocation. Table 6.2 shows the result~
of the relevant question from the questionnaire. This group appeared to be quite politically engaged (thls
did vary "'ith agt" slightly with the older respondents being more so).

They saw voting choices as

affecting them directly, unlike the previous group who felt alienated from the whole process.

For

example, policies regarding education were close to home for these participants. They perceived that they
had a fair to poor understanding of the voting system, as shown in Table

6.1.

On the whole, they were

unsure about the effectiveness of the system, or its democratic qualities, as shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.

Focus Group Three
Profile:
This group was comprised of eight people, divided evenly between male and female.

This group was

very similar to the first, being aged between 30 - 40 and with no tertiary education, but were mostly
unfamiliar with each other. Residing in a safe Labor seat, they were what one could term upper working
class. Most were employed in blue collar jobs, and perceived themselves to be disaffected Labor voters.
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Themes:

A5 mentioned this group was similar in demogra!Jhlc to Group One, and the re~,ponses to the discussion
questions and questionnaire were very similar (comp1rc the results for the two groups in Tables 6.1, 6.2,

6.3, and 6.4). The main difference to the first group was that the respondents were mostly unfamiliar with
one another. The reasoning \'lehind this, as discussed in the previous section, was to detennine whether
this factor mattered to the group discussion. It eventuated that this group discussed issu;:s and perceptions
less readily and fluidly than the other groups, although some conclusions could still be drawn.

What was evident however, was that this group recognised tl~eir lack ofund•Jr:;tanding of the preferential
voting system, as shown in Table 6.2. While in the questionnaire some indicated that they would like to
know more about this system, most participants during the discussion professed a marked disinterest in
politics altogether. Like those in the first group, they felt alienated from the whole process and let down
by the voting system which according to one respondent "makes your vote jump the j11nce ". Politicians
are seen to be in cahoots with big business and those who are powerful - "Liberal shortchanged us, they

sold us out" - while minor parties like One Nation and the Greens are seen as the "under-dog" and
discriminated against by preference voting.

While professing to have no firm party affiliation - ''just

who-ever speaks the most mbbish"- they were all very anti-Liberal and the present conservative. (federal)
government was perceived to be the fault of preferential voting because "no-one I know votedfor him".

What was interesting in this group (like the first) was that no-one used how-to-vote cards. Participants
allocated prefen:nces along the lines of "just to whoever I think is worth it" and "just . .. my favourites".
Of all the groups studied, this one was probably the most uninterested in, and alienated from, the political
process.

Focus Group Four
Profile:
This group wes made up of six participants, three males and three females, aged between 20-29. The
group were well known to each other through a church group, meeting once a week at a member's home.
All hailed from LiberaVNationa1 and other conservalive voting backgrounds.

Several had tertiary

qualifications.

Themes:
As with the previous groups, this group had only a very basic understanding of the preferential voting
system (see Table 6.1). All admitted that their understanding of the system was poor, and once again
most confusion originated over to what extent parties controlled preference flows. A5 with previous
groups, they felt that parties somehow 'controlled' where their votes went - the myth that somehow
parties commandeer votes. They were aware however, that they did not have to fo!low how-to~vote
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cards, although these still appear to be very influential. Most participants claimed to check them when
they wanted to know what order of candidates their party of choice recommended, or when they were not

"if 1'm voting a party line I
look at their recommendations but I don't always follow it to the Jetter ... but sometimes . , . if I don't
aware of any oft he policies of other parties. As one participant commented,

know the difference between them and them ... I will put them in the order they say". Often the
Cclndidate which the parties placed last (i.e. that party's least preferred candidate) on a bow-to-vote card
influenced their choice regarding who to place last.

However, while understanding in this group was fairly low, and most were unsure about the democracy or
effectiveness of the system (Tables 6.3 and 6.4), there was a great deal more interest in politics and the
voting system than usual. Most participants acknowledged that they needed to know more in order to
vote more effectively, and that education of the electorate was important. On the whole this group
appeared quite politically active, with some participants having written letters to "MP's and attending
pro!est rallies on a regular basis.

Although when asked directly they professed to be "totally

uninterested", they seemed to be, on the whole, slightly more politically engaged than the average
participant.

Although this is not to say they were totally happy with the political scene - the usual

cynicism towards party politics was still evident.

As one participant said about his allocation of

preferenc'!s under the current voting system, ''personally, 1 would take it seriously

if I thought it would

count". At the end of the day they felt unanimously, like the group before them, that

~

in the words of

one participant, "!he voice of the people isn 't being heard".

Focus Group Five
Profile:
This group was quite a dilf<:rei!t demographic than the previous groups. Aged between SO and 60 years
old and all close friends, this group consisted of farmers and their wives living in the central wheat belt of
Western Australia. All attend the same church regularly in the nearest town. One respondent was an exme~r.ber

of the Liberal Party who once ran for the seat of Eyre against Labor's Julian Grill. All were

traditional LiberaVNational voters, coming from a long line of consetvative political persuasion.

Them~

In the same way as previous groups, this group felt that their understanding of the preferential voting
system was poor (Table 6.1 ). The one :::,;ception in this group was the participant who had run for
political office, who understandably had an above average understanding of the voting system. However,
although this group rated their own understanding quite low - and there were indeed areas which they
were not quite sure about when it came to preferential voting - they were in fact probably the most
educated about the system of all the groups interviewed. They were aware that they did not have to use
how-to-vote cards, although the majority of the time did tend to use them (especially the females of the
group). This was largely due to the fact that they did not feel they were sufficiently aware of each
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candidates policies and ideological standing to rank them any differently than their chosen party
advocated. In a similar way to the previous group, they would change their preference ranking however,

if they felt that they wanted to vote for someone their party did not support, or vice versa. Also, in a
similar way, one participant pointed out that he used how-to-vote cards as a guide to where candidates feU
along the ideological spectrum. For instance, as he stated, ')'ou know the Labor party's card, they're

going to support, say, the independent who is a bit of a 'lejlie' ". Another participant acknowledged the
fact that the more politically aware and interested a voter is, the more likely they will

b~

not to follow

how-to-vote cards. He stated, "regarding whether we use how-to-vote cards or no~ I h(J'ICII't for quite a

jew years. I u.sed to when I wa.f younger, mainly because I wasn't really interestca in politics, but in
recent years 110. I. . ignore them and chose the candidates in the order that I think they should go".

This comment would also pv;,_, : ·,the fact that maybe older voters take more of an interest in where their
votes are going.

This group w,'..J. ••J .'-

-··~arison

to the other groups very politically engaged, and

furthermore very interested in politic~ an!l ro:specially the preferential voting system. Whether this was
due to the filet that they are slightly older than p.revious groups, ur whether they come from a rural area, or
both, is hard to determine. Either way, they were the only group who came close to even grasping the
theoretical arguments for and against preferential voting, probably due largely to their interest in politics
and the voting system which came wilhout much of the cynicism and political alienation evidenced by
some of the other groups.

Also, this group were r. little more sure about the voting system being

democratic and effective, as shown in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.

Focus Group Six
Profile;
This group was the youngest group studied, with respondents aged between 20 and 25 years of age. They
were all employed, except for one university student. The group was made up of three males and two
females, and all close friends.

Three of the respondents had lived and worked in rural areas at times,

although all lived in Perth at the time of research.

Themes;
This group had a suprisingly high level of interest in politics, with the questionnaire showing most of
them wanted to know more about several aspects of Parliament. They ranked their understanding of the
system similar to the oldest group - mostly poor, but two a little better (Table 6.1}. This group was
divided into two camps. The first were respondents who had grown up in the country and had a little
better understanding of the voting system and politics in general. They attributed this to listening to ABC
radio on the tractor or harvester. Interestingly mdio, the ABC and its youth counterpart Triple J, were
very influential on this group, more so than television The others ir. the group, while less informed, still
demonstrated a desire to be more educated on the issues, mther than the total disinterest and cynicism
which had been exhihited by some other groups. Even aJthough one respondent claimed that ·~JOiilics
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bores me to death", most of the group appeared quite interested and engaged, although maybe slightly

ignorant of some aspects of the voting system. As a whole, this group viewed the preferential system in
quite a positive light, although some were unsure about the effectiveness or democracy of the system
(Tables 6.3 and 6.4). Minor parties were important to this group, with most giving their first preferences
to these, and the system was viewed as positive in that it is. in the words of one participant, "keeping the
lillie guys in the ronning". As in this example, this group dem1mstrated some remarkable insights into

how the system operates although most professed to have a low level of understanding of it. Furthermore,
all of them were aware that they were not required to follow how-to-vote cards to the letter. In fact, some

of them mixed up the order of candidates on purpose, perceiving this to be a way of unsettling the major
parties, while others just gave how-to-vote cards "a quick squiz over". The usual areas of confusion
raised themselves, however, with most respondents not understanding that parties do not control where
voters' secondary preferences go, other than by suggestion on how-to-vote cards. For instance, one
respondent stated that a shortcoming of the preferential system in his view was ''parties receiving
secondary votes that weren 'I meant for them".

Common tbemes witbin tbe groups studied
This section presents the common themes (relevant to the aims of this study) derived from each of the
groHjH.

Some current statistics and/or literature are presented within the analysis to add relevance and

context.

I. How well do 'lot.:...' •mderstand the AV?

Dr Geoff Gallop,

presc.~e.

Premier of WA, claims in an essay

r~garding

electoral reform in WA (Gallop,

1998, p. 80), that the system of electing the Legislative Assembly from single-member constituencies

through compulsory preference voting is ''well established and understood" and therefore should remain.
Further justification for this system which he suggests is that since the system is similar to the federal
system of electing representatives to the lower house, there will be Jess confusion, thus promoting
stability and consistency.

In contrast to the claim that the system is well understood, at a forum on the ideal electoral system for
Western Australia in 1985, Democrat Senator Richard Jeffreys used several examples to demonstrate that
the present system of single-member constituencies elected under the preferential voting system is little
understood. He {Jeffreys, 1985) claims:
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Most voters do not know how preferences operate. The myth of a 'wasted vote' is widely
prevalent.

The idea that following one or other "How to Vote" is compulsory is very

common ... I believe that fewer than ten percent of voters are aware that they can, for
example, register a first preference vote for a new party or independent and have their vote
counted again at full value for the traditional party of their choice if the first candidate is
eliminated. (p. 14)
During question time at the end of Jeffreys' presentation, another speaker, respected Australian political
scientist Dean Jaensch, agreed vehemently with Jeffreys' point regarding how to vote cards, claiming
(Jeffreys, 1985):
There are actually people out there ... who still believe that if you go away from one of the
official how-to-vote cards, your vote is informal. So why not ban the dam things? All they
do is entrench a mindlessness and a tendency for people not to think when they go towards

an election. (p. 15)
Table 6.1 shows the distribution of responses to Question 4 in the focus group questionnaire. Of the total
of the thirty-four participants who completed questionnaires, the most chosen response was a 'poor'
understanding with twelve responses. Eleven responded that their understanding was 'fair' and nine
chose the 'very poor' option. Only two responded as having a good understanding and not one participant
(not even the ex-Liberal party member) chose 'very good'. As we can see from the table, the majority of
responses ranged between 'fair' to 'very poor'. While some participants were maybe a little conservative
in their estimation of their own understanding, on the whole the focus group discussions backed up what
the questionnaire responses showed. That is, that most voters have only a very basic knowledge of how
preferential voting works, with some having very little idea at aU. The following comments arc a fairly
representative range of responses:

"I think I have a general idea how it works but I wou/dtJ 't be able to sit down and explain it to someone
exactly." (Group 6)
"Not how it fully works, just how it works as how it goes to that person." (Group I)
"I wmlidn't haw a clue." (Group 1)

There were several common areas of misconception or confusion. First and foremost was the way in
which parties appear to voters to have more control over preferences than they actually do. Surprisingly,
more than ha1f the r<.!spondents claimed during the course of the fbcus group discussions to not use howto-vote cards, and/or appeared to understand that their vote was still valid even without using them.
However, as Dean Jaensch claims (cited above) there were still some that did not realise this, although
quite possibly the number was less than what he maybe would have estimated. If they did realise this fact
through the course of the focus group discussion (which some did), they were then astounded at the effort
the parties put into gaining these preference assurances on other parties' cards. What these participants
probal:lly don't realise, is how influential these cards actually are, with preference 'leakages' - especially
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at a federal level ~ still relatively low (Australian Politics website).

Thus the most widespread misconception was that parties somehow 'gave' preferences to, or 'took'
preferences fro.n, other parties without voters 'knowing'.

The following comments are quite

representative of the sentiments expressed by most participants:

"[Pauline Hanson and One Nation] had heaps of votes . , . but it went to Labor or Liberal . .. whichever
one at the time, all her votes went that way. That's wrong mate,

if I'm votingfor someone it stays for that

person." (Group I)
"[A shortcoming of the voting system is] that voters may not tlnderstand where their secondary
preferences will go." (Group 2)
"Your vote should go to the person you vote for, and if they don't get in then it goes to someone who you
don't reckon should get in" (Group 3)
"I don 'I hww much about it, but if the minor parties lose out then their votes can go towards something
else that you don't want them to, .. so you could end up voting for someone you don't WQJI/ in. "(Group

4)
"Minor parties always give their preferences to a major party. " (Group 6)
While having a vague idea as to how the system operates, most participants cou1d not explain exactly how
preferences were allocated, or why the above comments appeared to them to be true. These comments
are in some respects correct, since usually the contest does just come down to a battle between Liberal
and Labor candidates, and ofien minor party ballots end up yielding a major party preference vote at some
stage. However, the participants did not realise that the order of these preferences was still ultimately up
to them, and only controlled by a party to the extent that they followed thls party's how-to-vote card

In the course of this research,
participants.

How-to~vote

how-to~vote

cards emerged as a specific problem area for many

cards have been around for almost as long as the AV has been in use in

Australia. As mentioned above, academics such as Dean Jacnsch have called for their abolition in recent
times. They are not alone. The Democrats also have called for the distnbution of how-to-vote cards at
polling booths to be banned, and for each polling booth to display registered how-to-vote infonnation
(Australian. Politics website). On the other hand, the West Australian Commission on Government found
in favour of retaining existing rules for

how-to~vote

cards, despite some opposition to them (COG, 1995,

pp. 32-33).
As proved by this research there is a degree of ambiguity when it comes to how~to-vote cards and whether

or not a voter i::1 required to follow them to ensure their vote is valid. Others are not sure how exactly
preferences are traded between parties, or how these cards affCf;t this. Take for example the following
question submitted to the Australian Politics web11itc recently and published on that site:
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I do not fully understand the allocation of preferences, particularly how party A can
guarantee that its preferences will be allocated to party B. We are talking about a more
concrete arrangement than the publication of 'how to vote cards' aren't we?

As the authors of the site pointed out, how to vote cards are simply 'the beginning and the end of the
matter'! As they also pointed out, overall 'leakages' from major party how-to-vote cards are rarely high,
with these voters tending to follow their how-to-vote cards quite faithfully.

The website points to

evidence that minor party voters are less likely to follow them than major party voters, with Coalition
Voters being the most faithful in following the cards. This was definitely borne out by this research,
which found that the major party voters, especially the conservative voters, tended to follow how-to-vote
cards more closely than those who would tend to vote for a minor party.

Some participants in the focus groups called for the abolition of how-to-vote cards also. One participant
commented: "Mi1mr parties are now supporting Labor.

They know they can only wilr elections by

preferences, so they will do anything they can to try and get those preferences on a how-to-vote card, and
I think you people are so dumb. They're only how-to-vote cards- you can vote however you want. " This
respondent was one of the few who actually grasped this concept. Another participant, a younger voter
from Group 6 also had a strong view regarding how-to-vote cards with which Dean Jaensch would be
impressed: '1 honestly believe that how-to-vote cards should be abolished . ..

if you are going to vote

you should have enough dignity to rmderstand what you are voting for, and inform yourself on what you
are voting for."

One thing which most participants understood was that the preferential system favours the two major
party groupings. However, most did not understand enough how the system works in order to explain why
this was so, or to change it with their own ballots. There was more a feeling of resignation that there was
nothing anyone could do

~

"it is all too complicated", according to a participant in Group 1. Take for

instance these comments:

"Preference voting, from what I see here, it's going to keep it that we 'II ahvaysjust be voting Liberal or
Labor. " (Group I)
"Well, no-one has ever goJ in apart from Labor and Libr:ral." (Group 3)

And, more often than not, this is seen as a negative thing since both major parties appear to be a little out
of favour at the moment.

This, however, was more true for some groups than others.

The more

conservative voters were more happy to a have a 'stable' two-party system with a more mainstream party
in government (even a Labor candidate was perceived to be more preferable than a minor party candidate
to these voters). On the other hand, other more disaffect\:<\ vot~rs (which tended to be traditional Labor
voters and younger voters), preferred the minor parties over major party groupings, and tended to put
minor parties first on their ballot.
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Reference must be made at this point to the concept of strategic voting mentioned briefly in Chapter Four.
Recall that sometimes parties arrange candidates on their how-to-vote cards, or even run idependent
candidates, in a strategic (rather than ideological) manner in order to isolate other parties or candidates for
various reasons. It is also possible for voters to use a form of strategic voting. There was, however, little
evidence of most voters understanding the AV thoroughly enough to do this, or even understand the
concept. Only a few participants appeared to allocate preferences on other than ideological grounds, or
with any specific strategy in mind. As a rule, unless participants were firmly against the policies of one
candidate/party, they tended to follow ideological considerations when allocating preferences, often
following to some extent the how-to-vote suggestions. As far as voting strategically, the few examples
were firstly some younger candidates who intentionally changed the order suggested on how-to-vote
cards, more as a protest than anything else. There were also some voters from rural areas who ignored a
conservative party (e.g. Liberals) due to regional tensions, while placing other ideologically similar
parties (e.g. One Nation, Nationals) higher on their ballot. This research appears to indicate that voters in
rural and regional areas are more politically minded and more likely to engage in, or recognise, strategic
voting.

It appeared from this research that the more conservative a voter is, the more likely they are to be in
favour of the preferential voting system. And further, the more conservative the voter aud the more they
are in favour of the system, then greater also was their general understanding of how the system works.
From this research at least, there appears to be a causal link between the three characteristics, although it
is hard to detennine from such elementary research in what order these three factors occur, and if they are
consistent throughout the voting population. This could be an interesting point for further research.

2. Do voters think that the AV is a good system for electing representatives?
Having established a tentative link between political persuasion, level of understanding of the voting
system, and sentiment towards this system, let us delve a little more into what voters think about the
voting system in terms of the following: effectiveness, democracy, and representativeness.

Well established in the previous chapter was the way in which voters in Australia today are increasingly
registering a protest vote when voting for representatives in lower t···:>uses by giving their first preference
vote to minor parties and independents. While the proportion of voters doing this are still the minority
(around 20 per cent in the 2001 federal election, and 30 per cent in the 2001 West Australian state
election), relatively speaking this is a large figure and is on the i'lcrease at every election, thus posing
some serious questions for the two major party groupings. ln an analysis of the 2001 federal election,
Mackerras {2002, p. 295) found that there is a long term trend in declining first preference vote shari! to
the three main parties from the mid 1980's onwards. He finds that in the 2001 federal election Labor
voters. while not really defecting from Labor on a two-party-preferred basis (keeping in mind the

79

problems with. this method of analysis covered in Chapter 3), simply gave their first preference to minor
parties (especially the Greens) and placed Labor second on the ballot paper.

Following on from this trend of voting away from the major parties, the preferential voting system was
seen accordingly in varying ways. Some did feel that th.e voting system was effe{:tive in that it offered
more scope for these minor parties and those who vote fur them to have more of an input into final
outcomes in elections. "[Preference voting] allows a democratic society to junction with adequate input

from tk" populace", was the assessment of a more politically engaged participant from Group 2.

However, others felt there was no real choice, and that therefore the system was flawed, since the final
outcome is usually a Liberal/National or Labor candidate in any given seat, whether preferences were
used or not.

This view was more strongly held by those who appeared to be more disillusioned and

alienated from the political process ~ usually those who took very little interest in politics because 'they're
aU the same anyway'.

It has been established that West Australian voters are in the vanguard of the trend of voting away from

major parties, and without doubt tile focus group research reflected this trend. The general dissatisfaction
with party politics, and especially the two major parties, often spilled over into dissatisfaction with the
preferential votir1g system. This is not uncommon as voting systems frequently attract the blame for more
general failures in the representative process, and are often the butt of voter discontent with politics and
politicians. Dunleavy and Margetts (1995, p. 9) point to "recurrent evidence from many contemporary
liberal democracies of large-scale discontent with aspects of their voting systems". This is probably not
surprising since it is the voting system which elects politicians, and even the most politically naive can
sec that different voting systems produce different results.

However, this sentiment did vary slightly between focus groups, as would be expected from the
conclusions drawn above.

It appears that the less infonned and/or educated a person is, the more

distrustful they become of the political process, including the preferential voting system.

While more

highly educated respondents did not necessarily wholeheartedly embrace the preferential system, their
criticisms and questions regarding the system demonstrated a willingness to be convinced that the system
had advantages before writing it off completely. Those who fit the typical blue collar, traditional Labor
supporter profile also tended to be less educated and more distrustful, probably in part due to a slightly
more pronounced lack of understanding of the whole system.

These conclusions were borne out by the questionnaire responses, although participants were less willing
to commit themselves on paper, probably due to their own perceived lack of understanding of the voting
system.

Most found it easier to speak about their perceptions of the system rather than answer

questionnaire scales, this being one of the justifications of this kind of research. According to Table 6.3

so

and 6.4, most participants (22 out of 34) chose the neutral opinion when stating whether they saw the
voting system as being effective or democratic.

Of those who did register an opinion. overall more were

positive than negative, although as the tables show, this varies group tv t;roup.

3, The fear of the •wasted vote': myth or reality?
Richard Jeffreys' comments regarding the myth of the 'wasted vote' and the value of secondary votes
were cited earlier in this chapter. It has already been demonstrated that most participants in this study
recognised that the AV perpetuates a two-party system of politics, although none could explain in a
theoretical way why this was so. Following on from this, many respondents, especially those who were
not supporters of either major party grouping, felt that voting was then a waste oftime because only these
two ever won seats

in the lower house and/or formed government. This feeling is then exacerbated by

the fact that many participants felt that major parties somehow took votes away from minor parties. This
then leads to voters not wanting to vote for a party which they perceive will either not have a chance of
success, or that will give their vote to, or have their vote taken by, another party.

With the two major parties largely unpopular,

it is little wonder that many voters, due to a lack of

understanding of how the voting system actually works, felt that they had no desirable options when
allocating preferences.

Major parties are viewed as 'crooks', witlt their members removed from the

'common people', while minor parties are seen as rather ineffectual and making no difference to the final
outcome, or even worse, taken advantage of by the major parties.

While most preferred to back a potential winner, some respondents were still willing to vote for the minor
parties, but with an air of resignation that it is probably a wasted, or ineffective, vote. The only advantage
in this was the realisation that a major party wouldn't get that vote as a first preference. Take the
following comment of a respondent who votes minor parties, mainly as a protest:

"/ don't want any

major party there so /try and stu1r it up by voting backwards and stuff, and whoever gets in, gefj" in".
There is no expectation her~ that tltis respondent's chosen minor party will succeed. The best he can hope
for is to 'stuff things up a little.

While a large proportion of respondents involved were in favour of the minor parties and their policies,
there was a feeling that they were somehow rather ineffectual. For instance when one participant in
Group 1 said that she always voted minor parties, another participant countered with "but how much say

do those mitwr parties have?". Others also realised that minor parties do not get as much media attention
as the tv,:o major parties. Recall the comments expressed in Chapter Three regarding the role of the media
in perpetuating a two-party style of politics. Consider the follov.i.ng comments:

"We don't know a lot about minor parties. Labor artd Liberal is basically what is pushed. "(Group 3)

"/A shortcoming of the preference voting system is that} major parties haw; the numbers to over-ride
mitwr parties. " (Group 2)
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"A vote fora minor parry is a vote fora major party." (Group 6)

The fact remains however, that even while many perceive a vote for a minor party as often a wasted or
effective vote, there ~till appears to be a very strong trend toward voting for minor parties as either a
protest vote. or simply because some do appreciate the policies of these parties and hope that they may
just get in. This was especially true for the Greens. Voters right across the spectrum were in favour of
Green policies, which is borne out by previous re5earch on the last state election, with issues such as old
growth forests extremely relevant. A participant from Group 4 commented:
To some extellll have been party driven, coming as I do from traditional good Liberal
stock, and sometimes I do kind of think of the overafl philosophy behind the parties as wellyou know, capitalism ver~11s socialism . .. but! have noticed lately though, particularly the
last couple of elections, I have definitely varied who I support a Jot more. Like, I've
actually dropped the Liberals down on some of 11!J' forms. with issues like old growth
fore.\·ts being important to me, JOlt know, you have to be a bit more 1esponsib/e.
What a comment! A (quite young) conservative voter who feels that a Green vote is more 'responsible'
than a vote for his traditional party. This seems to be the way (particularly young) voters in Western
Australia are heading. This in tum has definite implications for the importance of preferences in future
elections.

This research seems to indicate that, in spite of the increasing number of first preference votes allocated to
parties other than the two major groupings, Duverger's psychological effect of the 'wasted vote' is a
reality in Western Australia. Although, it is somewhat lessened under the AV as compared to simple
plurality systems.

It is the conclusion of this researcher that, if the electorate were better educated

regarding the voting system, then there would be a marked increase of primary votes given to minor
parties at both ends of the political spectrum.

Conclusion
If there had. to be one main conclusion regarding voters' understanding of the AV, it would be that the
mechanics of the system are generally little understood. It appears that voters understand some aspects of
the system withou( fully understanding how the system works to ensure that the candidate elected has
been elected taking all voters' preferences into account.

Furthennore, it appears that a widespread

distrust of politics and politicians in general influences how voters perceive electoral system~. Perhaps a
better educated electorate, with improved civic education incorporating the voting system, would mean
that voters could become less suspicious of the electoral system, which at present is mysterious and
unclear to the average voter.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
AN ALTERNATIVE TO FULL PREFERENTIAL VOTING:
AN OPTIONAL PREFERENTIAL SYSTEM FOR THE
ALTERNATIVE VOTE
As pointed out in Chapter One, the AV is divided into two basic types: optional and compulsory (or full)

preference marking. Most of this study has been concerned with the compulsory (or full preferential)
form of the AV, since this is the system used in both West Australian and Commonwealth elections, and
is the dominant fonn of the AV used in Australia. However, due to the increased popularity of an

optional system of preference marking under the AV, and its use in two states thus far, a brief look at this

form of voting will complete an analysis of the AV.

Unlike full preferential voting under the AV system, which requires voters to express preferences for all
candidates listed on the ballot paper in order for the vote to be valid, optional preferential voting allows
voters to number only a minimum of candidates - as many as are to be elected. Voters may number
further preferences if they wish, but Legislative Assembly ballots are valid even if only one preference is
indicated.

Both Queensland (in 1992) and New South Wales (in 1981) have adopted optional AV

systems for their lower houses at a state level. Some commentators point to thls system being used earlier
in these two states, which is technically incorrect. The form of preference voting used in Queensland in
1892-1942 and New South Wales in 1926-1928 was contingent voting (see Chapter One for detail) which
is very similar in its workings to the AV but can deliver quite different results. This method will not be
treated in this study.

A5 detailed in Chapter Four, optional AV was first implemented in Western Australia in 1907 but was

changed to compulsory AV in 1911. This was because, in most cases, voters did not go beyond their first
preference, thus making the system operate no differently than a first-past-the-post system for the 1908
election and the 1909 Albany by-election. When voters do not number candidates beyond a first choice
this is known as 'plumping' for one candidate. In spite of the high rate of plumping when the optional
AV was first used in Western Australia in 1908, in 1995 the West Australian Commission on Government
came to the following conclusion with its 8.3.9.5 Recommendation: "A system of optional preferential
voting [i.e. optional AV] should be adopted for the election of members to the Legislative Assembly."
(COG, 1995, p. 3!3)

In its analysis of the arguments for and against optional preference marking under the AV, the COG
report ( 1995, p. 312-13) recognised that the principal advantage of full preference marking as used in
Western Australia is that it "reflects the expression of individual and collective choice ... [and] ensures
that ... a candidate has the support of an absolute majority of voters".

On the other hand, optional

preference marking under the AV was seen in this report to provide "greater freedom a L:td flexibility to
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voters" in that it does not require voters to register a prefert"Oce for a candidate with whom they are
unfamiliar or do not agree.

The report concludes that "this flexibility more accurately reflects the

principles of accountability and representr>".ion, as members of parliament recontesting their seats nre then
judged on their past performance and all candidates are more likely to be chosen because of what they
represent". The report does point out the disadvantage with the optional system, which was also cited by
those who introduced compulsory AV in WAin 1911.

That is, that there may be a large number of

exhausted ballots. A large number of exhausted ballots, whose preferences cannot be determined beyond
the first preference, result in a candidate being elected with the support of only a small number of second
or subsequent preferences

This means a candidate can be elected with only a very small percentage of

electoral SL'pport, which detracts from the representativeness of this system.

It may be useful at this point to make reference to the experiments with an optional AV system in f:anada.

In all three Canadian provinces where the optional fo1m of the AV was used, voters were reluctant to go
beyond their first preference. This then led to the failure of some elected members to eventually win an
absolute majority of votes (Phillips, 1976, pp. 245, 278-279). In British Columbia, this plumping, or lack
of preference transfer, also hurt the o!d coalition partners that would have been expected to gain under an
AV system which, in theory, avoids three-cornered contests (Phillips, 1976, p. 279). In fact, many of the
problems and unpredictabilities experienced by the Canadian provinces which experimented with the AV
can be, at least in part, attributed to the system using optional, not compulsory, preference allocation.

As noted, candidates being elected on a minority of votes was indeed a problem when the optional AV
was first used in Western Australia, and is still happening in states where optional preference marking is
currently allowed. The rate of plumping for one candidate only, without marking subsequent preferences,
is actually increasing over time in both New South Wales and Queensland, where optional AV is used
(Electoral Systems website). In Queensland for example, at the lirst election which used optional AV in
\992, plumping rates stood at 23 pt;r cent (Electoral Systems website).

A survey conducted by the

Electoral Commission of Queensland found that in the February 2001 state election, 60 per cent of
Queenslanders cast a 'number I' only vote. Another 32 per cent allocated all preferences, while only 8
per a:nt chose a partial preference vote. This survey was held in II electorates, and in all but two of
these scats the results were decided :m preferences (Australian Politics website). This means that the 4C
per cent of voters who did decide to allocate some or all preferences had more of a say than those who
chose to vote for only one candidate. Those voters who choose to aUocate only one preference run the
risk of their ballot becoming exhausted and being eliminated from the count.

On the positive side

however, these voters were not obliged to vote for candidates they did not support. Premier Peter Beattie,
who had launched his "Just vote I" campaign quite successfully it seems, claimed that the results of the
survey cited above meant that "voters are increasingly endorsing the reason

1'. · :J

optional preferential

voting was introduced - that voters should not be forced into voting for candidates they do not suppon"
(Australian Politics website).
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In the 2001 Queensland election, because the ALP managed to increase its primary vote to around 48.5
per cent, preferences were less important In many seats the ALP needed only a handful of preferences to
get to 50 per cent of the vote (Australian Politics website). However the problems with. optional AV are
exacerbated if more preferences are required to determine winning candidates, due to large numbers of
exhausted ballots. New South Wales analyst Antony Green, who designs computer software to analyse
elections, presents a convincing argument thl!t optional AV demonstrates a definite advantage to
candidates and parties with the highest primary vote in any electorate. Using statistics from the 1999
New South Wales election to back up his theory, Green (1999) concludes that:
In most cases, by simple mathematics an.1 with no assumptions about the flow of
preferences, OPV [optional AV] tends to assist the candidate with the highest primary vote.
Every exhausted vote cuts the number of votes a·.-n.llable to the second candidate to catch
the leading candidate, before the leading candidate reaches 50% of the vote. (p. 69)
Green ( 1999, p. 69-70) shows that even in contests where preferences were strongly against the victorious
Labor Party, the exhaustion of preferences worked to it's advantage by cutting dramaticatly the number of
preferences flowing to the second candidate. This factor is made all the more effective due to the sheer
number of exhausted votes increasing in recent elections in New South Wales.

As the number of

candidates in lower house elections increases, and furthennore as the vote for non-major parties and
independent candidates increases (a trend reflected in other states and federally), so also do exhausted
ballots under the optional AV system. This is due to increased rates of plumping anrl decisions such as
that by One Nation in the 1999 election to avoid directing preferences to any of the three major
contenders (Green, 1999, pp. 68-73). In this way 6en, optional AV can work in a similar way to a firstpnst~the-post

system in that the candidate with the most primary votes is more likely to win, especially if

voters do not express full preferences.

This factor becomes more problematic when large numbers of electorates n'(juire preferences to
detennine winning candidates. For example, in the 1998 Queensland election under optional AV,
preference distribution was required in nearly 80 per cent of ek-cior&.O..:s (Queensland Electoral
Commission, 1998). In this election it was important for voters to express a full set of preference~ in
order to have a greater influence on outcomes.

Generally though, in Queensland elections, the number of electorates requiring prefer.::oce distribution is
less than iu the examples studied of those using compulsory AV. While the last four dtctions in both
Western Australia and the Commonwealth exhibit anywhere between around 43 and 76 per cent of
e!ectorates requiring preference distribution per election (sec Appendices 2 and 3), the amount of
electorates requiring preference distribution in Queensland elections under optional AV has been
(excepting 1998) less than 46 per cent. However, care must be taken when comparing this figure between
sUites using compulsory AV and optional AV. Returning to Green's arguments for New South Wales
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elections under optional AV, the use of optional AV actually has an effect on the calculation of the
number of electorates requiring preference distribution.

Green explains that to win an election under

compulsory AV, a candidate must receive more than 50 per cent of the fonnal vote, which often requires
some distribution of preferences to be calculated. However, under optional AV, a candidate needs only
50 per cent of the vole remaining in the count; that is, fonnal votes less exhausted votes. Exhausted votes
effectively reduce the number of votes remaining in the

coun~

and therefore the number of votes required

to achieve a majority. By cutting the number of votes in the count, the cundidate with the highest primary
vote is closer to victory, and therefore less preferences arc required to detennine a majority (Green, 1999,
p. 69). Therefore, in some electorates in which preferences would be required under compulsory AV, this
need for preference distribution is alleviated somewhat. So, not only do exhausted ballots tend to favour
the candidate leading on the primary vote, they also have the potential to reduce the number of electorates
in which preferences are even required. This then makes comparison between optional and compulsory
AV systems somewhat arbitrary.

Another related problem which Green identifies concerning optional AV is the use of the two-partypreferred fonn of analysis under this system. The weaknesses of the two-party-preferred fonn of analysis
were discuss~d in Chapter Three and these criticisms can also be applied to it's use under an optional AV
system. The use of this analysis becomes even more problematical under optional AV due to the fact that
large numbers of voters do not distribute preferences such that they are still current in the final count.
With two-party-preferred analysis, exhausted preferences arc treated in the same way as informal vote~
they are excluded from the total vote in calculating percentages. This tends to inflate the percentage vote
for the winning candidate in an electorate, tut s\ uld not, however, significantly affect the state-wide
totals (Green, 1994, p. 3).

Keeping in mind that compllfison between systems of optional and compulsory AV can be arbitrary due
to the mathematical workings of each system, it should probably still be noted that the incidence of
preference distnbution actually changing results under optional AV is, on the whole, comparable with
compulsory A V. In Queensland in 1992 and 1998 these rates arc actually quite high, being nearly 17 and
18 per cent respectively (Queensland Electoral Commission, 1993; 1'198). However, the figures for the
other elections in Queensland and New South Wales are on par with recent elections for Western
Australia and the Commonwealth. That is, there does not !!ppear to be any overall trend in relation to the
number of electorates in which preferences he.vc changed results and the A V being either optional or
compulsory.

It appears then, that since many voters under optional AV systems abstain from voting for all candidates,

parties arc affected in different ways under optional AV. There appear to be clear partisan patterns to
ratl!s of plumping in New South Wales and Queensland, which is often noted by commentators. These
ref1ect the long standing coalition arrangements between the Liberal and National parties to exchange
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preferences. In both states, Labor voters are considerably more likely to plump than coalition voters, or
minor party and independent voters (Electoral Systems website). There is also evidence that how-to-vote
cards are influential • where the how-to-vote material from one of the major parties does not suggest
second and subsequent preferences, rates cf plumping are significantly higher. In a survey conducted at
two by-elections using optional AV in 1992, 75 per cent of voters fol!owed how-to-vote directions,
resultint; in plumping rates of 43 per cent in one district (Gordon), and 63 per cent in another (Kuring-gai)
(Electoral Systems website).

It fo!Jows 1hen, that for political parties, the choice between optional and compulsory AV depends upon

how they perceive they will fare under that system. Take for instance the submissjon by the National
Party to the Conunission on Govenunent arguing the retention of compulsory AV for the West Australian
house of government:
[Full] preferential voting ensures votes for minor rarties and independents are not wasted
and therefore has the effect of increasing the level of effective competition at elections.
Under 'first-past-the-post voting', a person who votes for a 'minor candidate' has no
influence on the election result.

Preferential voting encourages parties to develop constructive relationships with other
parties and candidates (in order to attract their preferences). ( 1995, p. 311)

The 'constructive relationship' which the

~-lational

(formerly Country) Party has had with the Liberal

Party for many years has sustained the presence of this minor party under a fuU preferential system of

AV.

It is probably to be expected that Labor governments will endorse the employment of optional preference

marking, since the ALP, for most of the twentieth century has been disadvantaged (at least at a federal
level) by the full preferential system of the AV.

Origina!ly, until 1974, the Labor Party was formally

committed to a return of first-past-the-post (simple plurality) voting. During the election campaign of
1974, Gough Whitlam altered the party's policy to optional preference marking under the AV whereby
voters would not be

cor.-~pelled

to express a full range of preferences. Whit lam claimed that the optional

form ')f the AV was "perhaps the only electoral procedure in the world which a1lows electors to express
their indifference to candidates" (Electoral Systems website). Subsequently, the Labor controlled State of
New South Wales implemented this change for its lower house elections.

The Labor Party has indeed fared well under optional AV in New South Wales and Queensland. This is
probably due in some part to candidates leading on the primary vote being advantaged under optional AV.
In Queensland particularly, ALP supporters appear to use the optional AV system as a first-past-thc.-post
sys1em, plumping for Labor candidates at a remarkably high rate.
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In the 2001 state election in

Queensland, of the 66 scats (out of a possible 89) won by the Labor Party, only 22, or one third, of these
required preferences to detennine the winning candidate. In none ofthese seats did the Labor candidate
come from behind to win on preferences - all were leading on the first count anyway, and simply had their
plurality confinned by preferences {Queensland Electoral Commission, 2001).

The 2004 Queensland

election, conducted as this study was being completed, demonstrated only a slight loss of ground to the
ALP who seem assured 63 seats in the new parliament.

It also makes sense for minor parties today to be in favour of optional preference marking over
compulsory preference marking.

A earlier minor party like the DLP, which sought to trade tightly

disciplined second preferer~<"<:-:: f::; policies wanted would never have agreed to optional AV, but more
recent minor parties, such as the Australian Democrats, who have at times even left their supporters to
make their own choices between the major contestants, would also be ready to let them abstain from that
choice altogether (Hughes, \983, p. 226).

It must be said at this point though that, given the choice, these minor parties would tend to favour a
system ofPR over either AV system. This is because PR has been demonstrated to return a broader range
of candidates from ali the political parties rather than just those from the two main party groupings, as bas
been evidenced by the patterns of elections to the Federal Senate and most State upper houses. This aside
however, the introduction of optional AV would have a major effect on all political parties, especially on
the power of the major parties, in that a choice of candidate would not inevitably come down to a choice
between one of the two flUI.jor parties. As the Commission on Government lbund:
In keeping with the theme of the public submissions, this method of voting may reduce the
dominance of the major parties as well as improving the standard of their campaigning.
Voters would no longer be required to make an ultimate choice between two candidates
whom they wish to see as the Legislative Assembly member. If the voters preferred neither
of the major parties, or did not like the preselected candidates, they would be able to ignore
them when determining their preferences.

AB a result, the major parties would have to

work h:uder when campaigning to convince voters in each electoral district to mark a
preference for their candidate. (1995, p. 313)

The optional AV system has appeared to favour the One Nation Party in the 1998 and 2001 Queensland .
elections, although the recent 2004 election has seen the party down to one seat. This was particularly
evident in 1998, where support for this party (whlch amounted to 23 per cent of the primary vote) was
more accurately

refl~ted

in terms of scat share than would have bl:en demonstrated under a system of

compulsory AV. For instance in Western Australia, where support f.:n One Nation was also high in both
1998 and 2001, this party obtained no seats in the lower house under compulsory AV. Of course, it must
also be taken into consideration that support for One Nation tended to be concentrated in several
electorates in Qw.>tonsland. However, the fact that the choice for voters did not inevitably come down to
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two major parties (as under compulsory AV) was also an important factor in the success of One Nation in
Queensland.

In New South Wales, the optional AV system has not worked to secure seat share for minor parties to the
same extent as Queensland. However, an important qualification which must be added here is the fact
that Queensland has only one House of Parliament, while New South Wales, like Western Australia and
the Federal system, has two.

Further research would be required to determine whether this factor

influences the way in which Queenslanders allocate preferences. It is possible however, that this House
of Parliament is utilised differently by voters, who maybe wish to see some minor party representation in
their single representative body, thus compensating for the minority repre<>entation which tends to be
found within the upper house of a bicameral system like Western Australia.

This fact aside, it is difficult to determine whether the optional system has

mad~

much difference to

representation in New South Wales as would have been evidenced under a compulsory AV system. The
Labor Party nt the last two state elections has managed to maintain majority government, with a seat share
of 59 per cent. The Greens, as in WA, have increased their vote share con<>iderably over the last few
elections, obtaining only slightly less votes than the National Party (Government and Politics database),
without much success until recently. The Greens won their first seat in the New South Wales lower house
in the Cunningham by-election in 2002. Whether they continue to increase this vote share and gain more
seats remains to be seen, but is very probable given the percentage increase at each state election. And,
there is no doubt that optional alloc'ltion of preferences will make it slightly easier.

However, this

prediction could also apply to Western Australia which has compulsory AV, although in this state minor
parties would face a slightly more difficult task due to the compulsory allocation of preferences.

It might be logical to assume then, given the above arguments, that in states with optional AV more voters
would choose an alternative to voting for a major party grouping. Evidence shows however that the rates
of voting for other than a major party grouping in New South Wales and Queensland are fairly relative
(and even a little Jess) than Western Australia which has a compulsory system of preference allocation. In
the Queensland election in 2001, and New South Wales in 2003, votes for other than a major party
amounted to nearly 23 per cent. This is actualiy less than the nearly 30 per cent for Western Australia in
the 2001 election. So, while this figure appears to be on the increase as in other states, an optional AV
system docs not appear to persuade more voters to vote for minor parties and independents than would
otherwise do so.

The above arguments partly explain why the Liberal Party favours the retention of compulsory AV, in
spite of the fact that the system has not always benefited them in recent times (Western Australia being a
prime example). It is likely that optional AV would disadvantage the Liberal Party even further, in that
they would not automa!ically be assured National Party preferences, and would be even less likely to pick

89

up other important minor party preferences. In essence, the Liberal Party is unlikely to advocate change
to a system which has, in both states in which it is operative, predominately returned Labor governments.

Finally, would voters prefer optional AV over ccmpulsory AV? The focus group research covered in the
previous chapter canvassed the v:11y in which ;nany voters in Western Australia are disSP:dsfied with the
two major party groupings and consequently voting minor parties first on their ballot. It is quite probable
that if the above arguments were put to these voters then they would be in favour of optional preferential
marking for the AV system, which would be more beneficial to minor parties.

The overall tone of public submissions to the Commission on Government indicate that much of the
public is in favour of a change to an optional system (COG, 1995, pp. 311M12). The main reason given
was that voters did not feel they should have to express a preference for a candidate for whom they did
not wish t0 vote. While no survey has looked at Western Australia specifically, a national survey in May

1979 showed 72 per cmt of voters (83 per cent of Australian Democrat voters, 78 per cent of ALP voters,
66 per cent of Liberal voters, and 57 per cent of NCP voters) were in favour of a change to optional
preference marking for the AV system, with only 26 per cent wishing to retain compulsory preference
marking (Hughes, 1983, p. 226). Furthermore, this survey indicates that voters who vote minor parties
like the Democrats recognise that it would be more in their favour to not have to indicate a choice for
either of the two major parties. It is interesting however (according to this survey at least), that even a
large proportion of major party voters appear to be in favour of optional AV. Although this could be
because they do not fully understand all the arguments for and against optional AV, it remains true that
Labor governments in Queensland and New South Wales, elected under this system, have managed to
retain government in the face of considerable support for minor parties in recent elections.

One final advantage of the optional AV system which must be mentioned is that the problems of spoilt
ballots due to numbering errors associated with the compulsory AV version are largely negated. Thus,
the optional system is better for conditions oflow literacy or numeracy. However, due to Australia being
relatively literate, and current rates of infonnal voting fairly low, this consideration may not be as
important as some of the others mentioned.

The arguments for and against optional preferential voting are fairly balanced either skle and the choice
between an optional or compulsory system, like all considerations regarding electoral systems, depends
on bow the individual perceives representation should work.

Those who tend to favour that which

delivers definite majorities, and a stable-, predictable two-party system, would, in theory, choose
compulsory AV for the lower house in state parliaments. On the other hand, there are those who maybe
prefer the contest widened a little to allow minor parties more of a chance, and who also value choice to
abstain from voting for a Cllll~idate above having subsequent choices to fall back on if their first choice is
eliminated, and would therefore prefer optional AV.
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Most research so far indicates that the majority of public opinion seems to be in favour of optional AV.
There coulG be a variety of reasons for this. Firstly, it is quite possible that most voters are not fully
aware of what <Meets a change t') this system would have in terms of limiting their ability to influence the
final result. The research conducted in this study indicates that most voters only have a very basic idea of
how the AV operates, with many not realising just how much influence they can actually have under the
current system in Western Australia. Secondly, and also indicated by this research, many voters resent
the influence that the major parties appear to have, an{l. would welcome the chance to vote for an
alternative without having, at some stage, to indicate a preference for either of the major party candiriates.
Thirdly, as mentioned in Chapter Six, electoral systems currently in use tend to take the brunt of more
general voter discontent, and it is possible that any reasonable change to the electoral system may be
viewed as positive. And finally, it is just possible that a small percent of voters are aware of all the above
arguments and would still opt for a change to optional AV.

It would appear that this choice would best be made by the voting public since political parties will only

choose a system which ultimately benefits them. Recommendations made by independent bodies such as
the

Commi.~sion on Government 'in Western Australia and the Electora1 and Administrative Review

Commission (EARC) in Queensland, which both found in favour of optional preference marking, ere
maybe good examples of a balanced argument to which the public rr...y refer. It must be realised though,
that it becomes problematic to allow the voting public to make decisions on electoral law when studies
such as this one find votZ"r understanding of these issues alanningly low, and the will to educate
themselves r.tost\y lacking.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

Retrospect: Representation and the Alternative Vote thus far
The concept of certain people representing others in the political arena is not new.

As this study

demonstrates, the strands of political representation can be traced back to ancient civilisations. The use of

electiom to choose these representatives is not much newer, although is used more ex.clusivel:r to allocate
modem representatives, whereas the ancient civilisations used both lot and election in vloll}'ing degrees
and constantly debated the advantages and disadvantages of both. The triumph of election as the sole

method by which modem representatives are chosen is probably more interesting and less well known.
and expounded more fully in Bernard Manin's The Principles of Representative Government (1997). In
retrospect, this development can be seen as a watershed for the evolution of representative government as
we know it today. It is difficult to imagine the difference in our political system if lot had been chosen by
reformers during the revolutions of the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, as the method by which to appoint
politicians!

However, while this tradition was still alive in political debate and culture during the 17th

and 18th centuries, by the 19th and 20th centuries a fonn of representative government with
representatives chosen by election became the accepted nann with no apparent alternative.

Not only did this form of representative government become the accepted nonn, but it also came to be
associated with the democratic values which have become entrenched in most Western political systems.
This is particularly true in Australia where the concept of democracy is held in high regard, and indeed
considered to be our birthright as Australian citizens. There was not one pmicipant in the focus groups
studied in the course of this research who was not

ill

favour of democracy, or 'democratic' sovernment.

There were, however, some participants who felt that democracy was not brought about by the Australian
political system of representative government, particularly the electoral system of the AV.

It is true that democracy

ha~

been only relatively recently married to the idea of political representation,

and the relationship has often been, and continues to be, problematic. It was this union however, along
with the triumph of election, which has made representative government what it is today. Representative
institutions which were e,1tablished in the middle ages were converted by reformers and thinkers of the
17th, 18th and 19th centuries to more effectively serve democratic principles such as majority rule,
popular sovereignty, and the values of liberty, equality and justice for all.
principles were in a way enhanced by the

e.~Ulblishment

Some see that democratic

of elected representative government. For

instance, thinkers like James Madison and John S·tuart Mill pointed out that representative institutions
refine and enlarge public

vli:~':IS

making them more representative of the whole nation, not just a few

select lnterests. Others view democracy as a less important consideration for modem governments than
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efficiency.

Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes, for example, felt that repre~entation, although maybe not truly

democratic in the real sense of the word, was superior because the occupation of political office is ju~t
another specialised profe~sion open to those particularly suited to it, not unlike a doctor or banker. These
kinds of debates to do nith democracy and representation show no signs of abating in the present, and if
anything have become more complex:. To look into these would entail a separate study however, and this
thesis was more concerned with tracing the evolution of modern representative government, and its
culmination in different electcr~\ systems, the AV in particular, and how representation is affected by this.

This study demonstrated just how the AV bas affected representation in Australia, focusing particularly
on Western Australia, while looking at the Commonwealth level also. AfJ seen through this study of the
AV, any electoral system will have its own inherent bias and influence on outcomes. Also demonstrated
was that electoral systems, although more often than not introduced with specific (usually partisan)
considerations in h<ind, often take on a life of their own which those who introduced it did not fully
foresee. It also became evident that these factors at times varied between Australian politics on a federal
level and the West Austrrlian experience of the AV.

The outcomes of the AV on a more general and federal level were classified in Chapter Three into two
sections. The first were the effects of the AV which were largely the results of this voting system being
utilised in single-member constituencies.

Any single-member electorate system will always tend to

exaggerate the representation of the winning party, and also lead to the fonnation of a two-party system.
Unless a minority, or a minor party, has concentrated suppC'rt in one electorate then it will not stand much
chance of gaining seat share in lower houses which operate on a single-member electorate system. It was
also noted that even if some minority groups do have this kind of concentration in one electorate, as in the
instance of some ethnic or Aboriginal groups, then other factors such as party pre-selection or cultural
barriers can become an obstacle to 'mirror' (i.e. actual) representation. Some consider the way in which
the AV in single-member constituencies manufactures a majority for the most preferred party - the most
preferred being detennined through preference distribution - an important advantage of this system.
Others prefer a system of PR which ensures more accurate mirroring of all the sections in society and
used in multi-member electorates, usually those like minority groups or minor parties who are
disadvantaged by the AV system. PR is used in the Senate and state upper houses and indeed does ensure
that more diverse candidates are elected.

Those who support plurality systems such as the AV do so on the grounds that the prime aim is the
formation of strong and stable governments - one major party, under normal circumstances, can usually
win a majority of seat.;. The AV system ensures that no candidate is elected until they have, not just the
grea[est number of votes, but also an absolute

nu~ority.

The problems of over-representation and under-

representation remain however, with many 'wasted' votes and malapportionment can be built in
(Jaensch, 1992, p. 364).
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The AV however, has moderated somewhat the more harsh effects of plurality systems. Firstly, it has
prevented vote splitting within the two main party groupings. On a federal level one of the intentions of
the introduction of the AV was to unite the conservative vote against Labor. This was found to have
worked fairly well, with tight preference exchange occurring between the coalition partners. On the other
hand, this was not generally the case in Western Australia, where regional animosities and other factors
led to leakage of preferences between the Liberal and National!Country parties being high.

Another intention behind the introduction of the AVon a federal level was to make preference exchJL1ges
• .· ween candidates from the same party possible in order to encourage multiple endorsements and thus
end, or at lest alleviate to some extent, caucus control. By the end of the 1920's this was seen to have
failed at a federal level of politics, but was slightly more successful in Western Australia, with the
exception of Labor candidates.

It remains, however, that multiple endorsements are still feasible under

the AV system, in theory allowing more choice for voters when it comes to representation by their party
of choice.
The AV has also facilitated the favouring of more moderate, or centre, candidates. Discussed in Chapter
Three was the way in which the system of preference allocation under the AV has the effect of pulling
parties towards the centre. Minor party preferences then, are expected to favour either of the two major
party groupings with those on the left (e.g. the Greens, Democratic Socialist Party) and the centre (e.g. the
Democrats) favouring the ALP, and with those on the right .. g. the Christian Democratic Party,
Australian Shooters Party) favouring the Coalition (Parliament of Australia: Department of the
Parliamentary Library website). These minor parties keep their distance from the two major parties just
enough to differentiate themselves, but not enough to alienate themselves totally from the electorate at
large and thus lose their power to affect preference flows. The more radical these parties are, the less
votes they receive, and the less chance they have of affecting results through preferences. Just recently,
Gerard Henderson (2003), executive director of the Sydney Institute, writing in The West Australian,
found that "in Australia, politics gravitates toward the centre. Partly this reflects the nation's essentially
pragmatic character. But it is also influenced by the prevailing electoral system, which is not reflected in
the democracies of North America or Western Europe". He claims that compulsory voting

play~

a big

part in this because people who would not nonnally vote do so in Australia, and these votes are L".sually
formal. Parties are then attempting to gain these votes, as well as the second and subsequent pref.!rences
of those who would not vote for them in the first instance. Thus their policies gravitate toward the centre
in order to gamer as many of these votes as possible. Henderson compares this to the situation in the US
where "the Centre does not have a vote to be captured", with the swinging vote at the extremes, placing
polarising issues which are marginal in Australia {such as abortion, gun laws, rnd capital punishment) at
the forefront of American politics. Compulsion to vote, coupled with the AV, produces a unique fonn of
politics in Australia, with close elections and patties which converge ideologically.
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Compulsory voting - another fairly unique Australian electoral experiment - is a separate issue large
enough for a study, or many studies, of its own.

However, for the purposes of this study, it wa'l

recognised that compulsicn to vote adds an extra dimension to any voting system under scrutiny. Under
an AV system, not only does it require that parties tailor their policies to suit a broad spectrum of the
voting population, it also ensures that the govenunent or candidate elected under this system is truly
elected by the majority of citizens. It is also claimed that compulsory voting facilitates the operation of
more difficult voting systems, such as the AV (Phillips, Black, Bott & Fischer, 1998, p. 225). Indeed, as
mentioned in Chapter Three, the introduction of the AV in the federal House of Representatives required
the compulsory vote to alleviate the higher levels of informal voting initially experienced under this
system.

Australian electoral policy exhibits its unique fascination with compulsion within the functioning of the
AV itsel[ Most of this study was concerned with the compulsory (full preferential) AV, which is the
form used in the majority of Australian lower house elections. However, the non-compulsory (optional
preferential) AV was considered also, looking briefly at those Australian states where it is used: that is,
New South Wales and Queensland. On the whole, there were found to be some inherent problems with
the optional fonn which are similar to those found under a first-past-the-post electoral system. It was also
noted that many of the problems with the A V in the Canadian experiences could be largely attributed to
the system being optional rather than compulsory. The main problem with optional AV in both the
Canadian context and in Australian experiments is the large proportion of voters which tend to not go
beyond a first preference. 'Plumping' for one candidate was found to be increasing over time in both
states where optional AV is used. On one hand, allowing voters the freedom to abstain for registering a
vote for every candidate is one of the main reasons why optional AV is considered desirable. On the
other hand, if large numbers of voters plump for one candidate only, a candidate can be elected on a
minority of over-all votes, which is essentially undemocratic.

The occurrence of large numbers of

exhausted votes under an optional AV system also has the potential to reduce slightly the number of
electorates in which preferences are required, and tr.11ds to

fav~ur

candidates which are leading on the

primary count, both of which have been demonstrated in New South Wales elections.

If plumping

continues to increase at the current rate in those states with optional AV, then those .who choose to
allocate only one preference are dramatically disadvantaging themselves when it comes to influencing
election outcomes. Tltis situation becomes in many ways worse than a simple plurality S}'!ltem, because
some voters (those who go heyond first preference) have a disproportionate amount of influence over
outcomes. However, the choice is up to voters and not restricted to a select few, and this in itself is an
advantage of the system.

Thu:;, the main advantage of optional AV is the freedom of choice in the allocation, or non-allocation, of
preferences, and the proposed benefit to minor parties. In New South Wales and Queensland, there is
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•
more of a tendency for minor parties to gain seats in the lower houses. This occurs more easily under an
optional AV system because voters can refrain, at some stage, from registering a vote for one or other of
the major parties. If voters do not have to make this ultimate choice between Labor or the Coalition, then
these parties have to work harder when campaigning to convince vOters to vote for them. As noted

previously however, there does not seem to be any marked difference in the amount of voters voting for a
choice other than a major party grouping in states with optional AV. For instance, the amount of voters
voting for other than a major party is comparable with WA, which has compulsory AV.

While optional AV does make the election of minor party candidates somewhat easier, a major effect of
the compulsory AV system which was considered in some detail was the way in which this system has
sustained the presence of some minor parties, without allowing a great deal of actual representation. The
importance of minor parties to the average Australian voter was clearly demonstrated by the focus group
research.

Minor parties are seen to represent more diverse parts of the electorate which remain

unrepresented by the major parties. As previously noted, the system of allocating preferences does mean
that elections ultimately come down to a contest between (what become under this system) the two main
party groupings.

Mackerras {1975, p. 275) recognised this in pointing out that no elector under the

compulsory AV system can avoid casting a vote which expresses either a higher preference for the
Liberal-National candidate or the ALP candidate, even if his/her first preference vote is for a minor party.
However, the fact that minor parties can direct their supporters' preferences quite effectively toward
either of the major parties and thus play a part in determining the winning candidate, makes their presence
important.

The main beneficiary of compulsory AV has been the Country Party in early years, and even in recent
elections the National Party remains consistently over-represented in lower houses, both state and
federally. Over the last decade, other minor parties such as the Democrats, Greens, and more recently
One Nation, have played an important role in influencing election outcomes through the preference flows
of their supporters, thus requiring that the major parties take note of their policies and moderate their own
policies ae<:ordingly. And, provided the trend of increasing numbers of voters supporting minor parties in
lower house elections continues, it is likely that minor parties will secure enough votes to win seats in
future elections, in spite of the bias toward major parties within the AV system.

Some claim that the AV has lessened somewhat the psychological effect of the 'wasted' vote. This claim
may be a little more contentious,

giv~:n

the results of the research conducted in this study. The AV

system, for many years, worked not much differently to a cruder first~past~the-post syst~m in terms ofreaJ
outcomes, although as mentioned above some of the more stark effects of plunility systems were
moderated

somew·.~at

by the AV.

The way in which this system, like all plurality systems, tends to

perpetuate a two-party style of electoral politics was expounded by Duverger, as pointed out in Chapter
One and investigated more fully in later chapters. As aJso mentioned, this factor was recognised in a le:.,
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theoretical way by the participants in the focus group discussions. [hey all recognised that govenunent
was always eitheo· a Labor or Coalition govenunent. Remember from Chapter One that Duv~rger also
considered this factor. This was what he called the psychological effect of plurality systems, which holds
that voters perceive that under the system only one of two parties have a chance of winning election, and
therefore a vote for any other

i)arty

will be, in effect, a wasted vote. Recall that this was also one of

Jeffreys' criticisms of the system cited in the chapter on the focus group research. Shannan (1997, pp. 6164) also discusses the way in which the institutional context of the state lower house party systems makes
them very resistant to change, in that the dichotomised view most voters have of lower house politics is
reinforced by the single-member preferential (AV) voting system. This view is further reinforced by the
'two-party-preferred' method of analysis of voting in lower house elections, discussed in Chapter Three.

These assertations were largely bome out by the focus group research. Many voters did feel that minor
parties were not successful because they did not win seats in the lower house, and that thus, the AV
system was especially failing those who did not wish to vote for one of the two major party groupings. In
spite of this however, voters are increasingly placing minor parties as their first preference on their ballot.
This appeared especially true for the younger participants in the study, who were more likely to place
more extreme (left or right wing) candidates first on their ballots. Bean and McAllister (2002, pp. 274275) in their analysis of the 2001 federal election find that party identification in Australia is still strong,
but the change is in that more of a proportion of this identification is with minor parties., and this trend is
especially pronounced in younger voters. According to the focus group research. it appears unlikely that
this is seen as only a wasted vote by these voters, although this is definitely a factor at times. Entwined
with this is a protest vote, an ideological vote, and a vote in faith that one day the voting system will work

in their favour and that the numbers will be there fur a minor party to win the seat for their electorate.
The focus group research provides some direction for further research imo electoral refonn and education.
Overwhelmingly, the research demonstrated that most voters in Western Australia have only a vCI)' basic
understanding of how the AV operates.

While some recognised the need for education and better

knowledge, many were uninterested in knowing more about how the system operates and how their votes
are distributed. The main area of misconception was how parties direct their supporters preferences, with
ma.1; not understanding the amount of control that they, as vciers, .have over their own preference
distribution. This confusion could maybe due to the fact that at 'limes in Austnilian upper house elections,
voters have been given a choio to vote 'above the: line', or tickct voting, whereby the voter allows his
party to distribute hls preferences for him. The Sou:h Australian Hous;:: of Assembly has been the only
lower house in Australia to utilise ticket voting. This was introduced in 1985 ostensibly to make voting
easier, but in reality offering increased partisan benefit for the obvious reason that parties have more
control over preference flows (Jaensch. 2002,

pp. 87-88).

However, the research appeared

11')

demonstrate that there was simply a general lack of understanding regarding the AV altogether, with the
media being influential because pnrties are always talking about preference 'deals'.
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Lack of voter

·understanding of this voting syswm has been a problem since its introduction, both federally and at state
levels.
Surprisiugly however, many voters do not fotlow how-to-vote cards, or, if they do, they still realise that
this is not necessary for a fonnal vo~c. Only a few of tile voters surveyed thought that they needed to
follow how-to-vote cards in order to vote formally.

Irterestingly, there seems to be a push across the

voting spectrum for the abolition of how-to-vote cards, especially from tllose who had a slightly better
than the average understanding of the system. Many voters find these confusing and unnecessary. Some
of the less informed (and usually conservative) voters valued their guidance, and a few claimed to use
them as an indication of where some of the less we!\ known candidates fall along the ideological
spectrum, but in most cases voters felt them a waste of paper (especially the Green vo!ersl.).
In conclusion, this study establi~hfod that votes for candidates which hail from other than the two major
party <.:Jtlllpings is steadily rising, both in the states and on a federal leveL Also increasing is the number
of candidates contesting most seats, giving more choice in assembly elections than ever before. This in
tum has meant that more electorates are requiring the distribution of preferences to determine which
candidate has an absolute majority of votes. On a federal level, calculated on the last five elections (since
1990). we can expect (:'reference distribution to be required in around 55 ~er cent, or just over half, of all
electorates. Compare this to the average 32 per cent, or a third of all electorates requiring preference
distribution, for the five elections prior to 1990 (1977- 1987). In Western Australia, the trend is similar,
with the last four elections demonstrating a sharp rise of the number of electorates requiring preference
distributiPn (see Appendix 3). The last election in Western Australia (2001), required preferences to be
distributed in 43 out of 57 electorates, whereas prior to 1989 the highest number of electorates which
required preference distribution in any one election was 18.

On the other hand, the number of electorates in which the distribution of preferences change the results
has remained fairly consistent over time. This has been true for both the Commonwca1th and Western
Australia (see Appendices 2 and 3). On a federal level, preference distribution has affected no more than
\4.6 per cent of result:;; (in 1922), and in Western Australia no more than 18 per cent of results (in 1917).
I .t~resting\y, both of these cases occurred not long after the introduction of the AV in the respective
Houses, which means that t~ere is not any correlation between the rise in preference distribution in recent
times and any rise in the number of candidates being defeated due to this distribution.

What can be concluded then, from these findings, is that while more electorates now require p.-eference
distribution to detennine an absolute majority for a winning candidate, it is still the exception rather than
the rule for preferences to change the final result. So, once again, we can come to conclusion that while
the AV does not always work much differently to a simple plurality voting system, it rather modcr:n~s the
extremes of such a system by ensuring that the candidate elected has true majority support. A:
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.n those

cases where a first-past-the-post system would be inacaJrate in it's judgement of the majority, the AV
anunends this by occasionaUy aUering the fmal result.

Howevt:.', can it really be proposed that fl'Uich of the time results under an AV system would be similar to
those under a first-past-the-post system of voting, presuming thnt voters would vote the same mliler a

different electorall)'.5/em? This last point is an enreme!y important qualification since some evidence
from the focus group research suggests that many would not vote in the same way under a different
system.

There is even some danger in comparing the results of compulsory and optional AV systems,

since some voters may vote dLA""-:rently if they are req•Jired to express a prefereru:c for each candidate.
This results of this study lead to the conclusion that voting behaviour both affects, and is affected by, the

mechanics of, and perceptions about, the voting system in use.

Prospect: Where are we heading with representation in Australia?
What remains to be determined is some conclusions we can come to about representation in the
Australian context through this study of the AV, and the direction this
demonstrated

some

is taking us.

Thi~ study

has

of the assumptions regardins representation whicll arc inherent in the system of the

A V. Firstly, the overwhelming purpose of represt:ntation which the AV fulfills is that a government is

elected which has the support of a majori~y of voters.

As

was pointed out in Chapter One, the

manufacturing of majorities is generally considered a positive thing since nonnative theories of
democracy, widely accepted in our society, suggest that government should have this majority support.
There was not one participant in this study who felt thet this majority support for govenunents was
unnecessary or undesirable. Nonnative theories of democracy suggest that if a government has this kind
of support, they then have a mandate to make decisions on behalf of their constituents.

It becomes obvious that the AV delivers a result with which voters :~gree theoretically. Why then docs

there seem to be such a large amount of voter dissatisfaction with this electoral method for selecting
representatives and forming governments. II is easy to simply say that electoral systelllS attract the blame
for larger Jhilings within the political system, and to some extent this is maybe true. Ther~ are other
factors at work however, and these are to do with the purposes and outcomes of representation inherent in
this electoral system, and the fundamental concepts of representation which exist in the Australian
psyche.

To progress with this line of thought, tet us return briefly to the history of representative government.
Discussed in Chapter Two was the history behind the idea of the representative, and the variatbns
between the way in which the American revolutionaries envisioned their representative should behave,
and the Burkean view of the representative which gained widespread acceptance in England and (with
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some variation) in France. The American tradition was to view a representative as simply a delegate,
with representative government a substitute for direct democracy, or a way of people ruling themselves.
On the other hiUJd, the style of representative government which Australians inherited from the English
was that which saw the role of a representative as - in Whig and Burkean tradition ~ a trustee empowered
to make decisions without the strict approval of constituents. So, rather than 'mirroring' constituents
accurately (both in a physical and ideological sense), a Burkcan representative is one who represents
constituents and the nation at large in a metaphysical sense.

At the time of the American Revolution, the writers of the United States Constitution developed an
account of representation based on the political 'man' which debunked the Burkean tradition of the
representative. How could British parliaments represent Americans if there were no Americans in them?
On the other hand, the English concept of representation suited Lhose who framed the Australian
Constitution, and "is exemplified in the fact that for the Australian government to work, politicians have
to abide by conventions, not rules" (Grant, 1997, pp. 15-16). Thus the AV was chosen as a system which
would ensure broad representation of the various political opinions in society, without pandering to
minority groups by giving them direct representation or over-representing them in parliament. Rather,
through the AV, minority groups and parties can influence outcomes and have their presence sustained,
but in the end it is those who obtain scat share which make decisions on behalf of all the voters at large.
They take into account not just their own constituents or those who gave them their first preference vote,
but also those whose preferences gave them their 'majority'. And often, under an AV system. coalitions
are fanned which further broaden the range of views represented by one party grouping. Thus, the AV is
a voting system which reflects the purposes and outcomes of representation which arc a part of our
political heritage.

It became clear through the focus group research that many West Australian voters are no longer
comfortable (if they ever were) with this concept of representation. In this day and age, politicians arc not
always trusted to make decisions on behalf of voters.

A large proportion of voters feel that

representatives should be just that~ representatives in the strictest sense of the word. Many suggested that
representatives elected by the AV represent more narrowly the wishes of their particular electorate, and
that the 'people' should have more of a direct influence on policy outcomes.

AU those studied felt that

their MP's were simply delegates sent to express the voters' views in parliament, in the American
tradition of representation. In this way, Australian ideas regarding representation have progressed far
from their British inception.

This has become evident in the recent rise of populist politics such as those evidenced by Pauline
Hanson's One Nation. David Wells draws some interesting parallels between the populist politics of the
political far~right in America and the appeal of Australian style populism evidenced by One Nation (1997,
pp. 18-28). The calls for the views of 'ordinary' Australians to be heard is growing louder. A delegate
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approach to representation usually characterises those who believe in a more populist or participatory
system of government. It is interesting to note that in Australia, activists representing Aboriginals and
women as political minorities have been shown to favour a delegate approach to representation over and
above the more traditional Burkean role of the representative as an independent decision maker (Rowse.
2001, p. 108; Sawer, 200!c, pp. 39-40).

The issue of minority representation under the AV leads into another direction in which representation in
Australia is moving. This study found tiHlt the system of the AV could be viewed as a compromise
between majority and the minority representation. The attitudes of those studied in this research were
almost paradoxical when it came to representing minority groups, especially in a mirroring. or actual,
sense.

It must be stated here that those respondents studied were drawn from what can be tenned

'mainstream' Australia (i.e. there were no respondents from Aboriginal or Non English Speaking
backgrounds). Their views on political minority groups were interesting. All appeared to believe in the
rule of the majority and majoritarian principles. which are viewed as synonymous with democracy. But,
at the same time, many felt that a failing of the AV was that minor parties rarely (or never, in the case of
Western Australia) won any seats. Their views on minority groups varied depending on which groups
these were. Minorities are generally viewed as a very small proportion of the population who have no
right to impose their views on 'ordinary' people. This is, of course, unless a voter identifies with one of
these groups. and then the voting system is viewed as unrepresentative and unfair if it does not adequately
represent this particular group!

This research identified a tendency for 'mainstream' Australians to view themselves 115 culturally and
ideologically homogenous: i.e. the belief that 'everyone thinks like I do'. Over and again during the
focus group discussions, participants, when discussing their ow11 perceptions. used statements phrased in
the third person, such as: 'most people think', 'everyone thinks' and so on. However, the falsity of a
purely homogenous mainstream political society was evident even in this small, and quite mainstream,
sample of the West Australian population. Notwithstanding, if voters feel that their views or even their
physical person, which to them is what the majority co11sists of. are not being represented correctly, then
the voting system will be viewed accordingly.

Today, mirror (actual or physical) representation of society is becoming more accepted as a legitimate
form of representation, as opposed to simply representation of ideas or opinions in legislative assemblies.
For more on this argument 51!'~ Arule Phillip-~' interesting dissertation on the 'politics of ideas' versus a
'politics of presence' (1995). The electoral system ofPR is seen as more effective in bringing this about.
This was borne out hy the focus group research which pointed to the fact that many voters view
politicians, especially those from major parties, as removed from 'ordinary' people. These politicians are
not 'Joe down the road', to use the words of one participant; in fact, they are seen as an elite group who
have no idea how 'normal' people think and feel.
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This fact certainly detracts from the perceived

representativeness. and therefore legitimacy. of government fanned under an electoral system such as theAV which promotes the election of politicians from major parties. Once again, we can look to the Pauline
Hanson phenomenon as an example, and see a minor party which appealed due to it's perceived distance
from other politicians and major political parties.

It becomes evident then, that there are many complex, and at times conflicting, considerations when it
comes to assessing electoral systems like the AV. Ultimately, the most important thing is education of
the electorate. If there was ICJ be one over-riding recommendation for further action arising from this
study, it would have to be eda:cation of the electorate regarding voting systems, particularly the AV. This
would have to include not just the mechanics of the system, although this is paramount in importance, but
also the purposes and outcomes with regards 10 representatiolt As in the case of the ancient Greeks, it is
important to reflect upon, and theorise about, where we have come from and where we arc going with our
political system. Otherwise we arc in danger of throwing away what is in essence an effective voting
system simply because there exist too many misconceptions about this system. Furthennore, Australian
voters need to determine exactly what it is they expect from this system. For example, they should decide
how much stability and majority rule they are willin~ to sacrifice for diversity and representativeness in
the lower house of Parliament.

And, if these issues can't be decided satisfactorily, then the last word

would have to be in favour of the AV, since this not only manufactures the majority but, in an even more
important way, determines exactly what that majority consists of by moulding, through minority
preferences, the very process by which this majority is fanned.
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APPENDIX t

A Typology of preferential electoral systems
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APPENDJX2
Candidates at the Federal House of Representatives
General Elections 1919 ~ 2001

Election
year

Number of
electoral
districts

Si'ats which
required preference
distribution to detennine
winning candidate

Seats in whir.b the
candidate with a
plurality of first
preferences votes was
defeated

n

n

n

%
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4.8
13.9
25.4
30.3
19.7
24.8
30.4
39.2
26.0
19.0
36.8
32.0
24.8
29.9
36.7
62.6
42.8
44.2
66.6
57.4

Sources:

ParUamentary handbook of the Commonwealth of A11slralia (lsi ed- 20th ed)
Government and Po/ilics database (Rydon, J968a, p. 190)
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5

II
2
2

2
4
7
5
7
10
5
9
2
2
I
8
7
8
5
13
14
10
7
4
6
2
12
4
8
12
7
7
6

%
6.6
14.6
2.7
2.7
2.7
5.3
9.4
6.8
9.4
13.5
6.8
7.5
!.6
!.6
0.8
6.6
5.7
6.6
4.0
10.4
11.2
7.9
5.5
3.2
4.8
1.6
8.2
2.7
5.4
8.2
4.8
4.8
4.0

APPJi;;NDI.Q
Candidates at tbe Western Australian State Legislative Assembly
General Elections 19tl~2001

Election
year

Number of
electoral
district~

Seats wbicb
required preference
distribution to
determine winning
candidate

Seats in which the
candidate with a plurality
of first preference votes
was defeated

n

n

%

n

%

1908
1911
1914
1917
1921
1924
1927
1930
1933
1936
1939
1943
1947
1950
1953
1956
1959
1962
1965
1968
1971
1974
1977
1980
1983
1986
1989
1993
1996
200\

50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50
50

8
8
8
12
18
16
4
13

16.0
16.0
16.0
24.0
36.0
32.0
8.0
26.0
22.0
16.0
22.0
12.0
18.0
14.0
6.0
12.0
18.0
12.0
8.0
15.7
35.3
21.6
9.1
12.7
10.5
12.3
43.9
55.6
50.9
75.4

0
3
3
9
4
5
1
6
4
4
2
3
3
3
1
2
2
3
1
1
5
5
0
0
4
2
4
3
2
6

0.0
6.0
6.0
18.0
8.0
10.0
2.0
12.0
8.0
8.0
4.0
6.0
6.0
6.0
2.0
4.0
4.0
6.0
2.0
2.0
9.8
9.8
0.0
0.0
7.0
3.5
7.0
5.3
3.5
10.5

Sources:

Westem Australian Electoral Commission
Govemmtmt and Politics database

so

50
50
50
50
50
50
51
51
51
55
55
57
57
57
57
57
57

11

8
11
6
9
7
3
6
9
6
4
8
18
11
5
7
6
7
25
26
29
43
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APPENDJX4

FOCUS GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE
1his ;.~an anonymous questionnaire. Please ensure that you do not write your name, or any other
comments that will mnke you indentifiab/e, on the jolfowfng. By completing the questionnaire you are
consenting to take part in this research As such you should first read th(; enclo!t:ed Disclosure Statement
carefully a.~ it explains fully the intention of this project.
Please circle your answer for the following questions:
1. Have you ever visited the State Parliament in person?
Ye.
No

Don't know
2. Purpose of last visit
View debate
Educational tour
Visit an MP
Participate in protest
Other

3. What aspect of Parliament would you li!ce to know more about?

It's law making role
It's Members
It's Educational Services
It's procedures
It's voting systems
4. What is your understanding of the preference voting system used to elect members to the Legislative

Assembly in State Parliament?
Very good
Good
Fair
Poor
Very poor
5. I-Iow much consideration do you give your distribution of secondary preferences (ie. those after your
first preference is allocated)?
A great deal of consideration
Some consideration
A little consideration
No consideration et ali
Don't know
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6. Does the preferential voting system for the Legislative Assembly seem to you to be:
Extremely democratic
Democratic
Neutral opinion
Undemocratic
Extremely undemocratic
7. Does thP. preferential voting system for the Legislative Assembly appear to you to be:
Extremely effective
Effective
Neutral opinion
Ineffective
Extremely ineffective
8. In your opinion, what are the best features ofthe preference voting system as used for Legislative
Assembly elections?

9. In your opinion, what are the shortcomings oft he preference voting system as used for Legislative
Assembly elections?
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APPENDIXS

Table 6,1

Question 4.
What 1s your understanding of the preference voting system 11sed to elect members to the Legislative
Assembly in Stale Parliament?
Scaled
response

Focus Group Number
3
I
2

4

Totals
5

6
0

Very good
1

Good

Fair

4

Poor
Very poor

5

Total number of
respondents

6

J

2

2

2

II
4

J

6

6

12
9

2

6

2

5

5

34

Note: Although there were eight respondents in Group Three, only six completed questionnaires.

Table6.2
Que~>tion 5.
How much consideration do you give your distribution of secondary preferences (ie those after your first
preference is allocated?)

Scaled
response

Focus Group Number
3
I
2

A great deal ...
Some ..

2

A little.

1

No consideration ...

2

4

J

4

Totals
5

6

2

4

J

J

16

2

7

2

4

Don't know
Total11umber of
respondents

3

6

6

6

6
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5

5

34

Table6.3

Q"estion 6
Does the preferential voting system for the Legislative Assembly seem to you to be:
Scnled
response

Focus Group Number
1
2
3

4

Totals
6
5
0

Extremely democratic
Democratic
Neutral opinion 5

2
4

4

Undemocratic

5

2

3

2

2

22

2

4

Extremely undemocratic
Totnl number or
respondents

8

0

6

6

6

6

5

5

34

Tnble6.4

Question 7.
Does the preferential voting system for the Legislative Assembly appear to you to be:
Scaled
rcsFtonse

Focus Group Number
2
3
I

4

Totals
5
6

Extremely effective
Effective

1

2

Neutral opinion 5

4

3

Ineffective

5

2

2

2

3

22

2

3

Extremely ineffective
Total number of
respondents

8

0

6

6

6

6

116

5

5

34

